Note4Students/Syllabus Mapping: GS2 and GS3

India’s International relations with its neighbors has always been under limelight. Be it on the Western, northern or the eastern frontiers. The tussle between India and China has a long history and has just got renewed because of the Doklam issue. Given the threat to Internal Security from external threats, this topic has a high relevance for Mains 2017.

Current Context:

Recent border stand-off between India and China over building of a highway in the Doklam region

Where is Doklam located?

It is located at the tri-junction of India (Sikkim), Bhutan and China (Tibet) as depicted in the diagram below:

 

 

Introduction:

The present standoff in Doklam is a result of the India-Bhutan Friendship treaty of 2007, where India assures Bhutan of protecting its sovereignty from external threats. As per Bhutan, the construction of

Road inside its territory by Chinese army, is also a violation of1988 and 1998 agreements between China and Bhutan.

Significance of Doklam Plateau:

The valley holds strategic significance for India, China as well as Bhutan. India sees it as a dagger pointed towards its so-called ‘chicken’s neck’ sector in the Northeast and rapid Chinese road construction in Tibet could make things difficult for India. At the same time, Sikkim is one of the few sectors where India has an advantage.

1. In the event of war, India’s Brigade-sized military presence inside Bhutan, stationed at Ha, allows it to attack the Chumbi valley from two sides, potentially cutting off Chinese troops stationed facing Sikkim.
2. But China’s recent assertions in the area are portentous for Bhutan which has never faced territorial issues with the Dragon in the past. China, citing the 1890 China-Britain treaty, calls Doklam its own while Bhutan has disputed the fact saying the convention applies to the India-Bhutan border, not Bhutan and China.

Why is China intruding into Doklam?

1. The 21st century Belt and Road initiative by Xi Jinping to take a larger role in global affairs includes similar Silk Road and Maritime Silk road belts. The construction of this highway is also a part of same vision.
2. There is an emerging strategy from Chinese end to get closer to India through its neighbors for last decade through Pakistan (CPEC), meddling with Nepal’s politics, Sri Lanka and now Bhutan.
3. China has been keen to establish its physical presence in this region according to the 1890 Convention.
4. With China’s Belt and Road Initiative gaining momentum and completion of infrastructure programmes like Lhasa-Shigatse Railway, China appears to have turned its attention to the Doklam plateau to establish a strong presence close to the Indian border.

How should India React?

1. Given the China’s policy of asymmetric coercion, India has no option but to narrow the existing comprehensive national power gap between the two countries. Developing strategic partnerships, initiatives like ‘Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor’, ‘Act East Policy’ and counter balancing strategies are steps in the right direction.
2. National security policy needs clear articulation, based on a realistic threat assessment. Apex organizational structures require streamlining to telescope the decision making process. The current format of military modernization demands a holistic review.
3. In an era of ‘limited wars’, a ‘joint military doctrine’ is a sine qua non and ‘tri service theatre commands’ are prerequisites for synergized application of the war waging potential.
4. In the prevailing scenario, facing the China’s Western Theatre Command are India’s seven Army and Air Force commands, which is a serious lacuna.
5. In short engagements, the timely application of requisite combat power at the point of decision is critical. This calls for creating essential infrastructure on highest priority.
6. The border management mechanism needs to be revamped. A single nodal agency is required to coordinate the functions of the various organs. Operational control astride the Line of Actual Control ought to rest with the Army.
7. A well calibrated response mechanism must be put in place, with disputed vulnerable areas effectively dominated and troops fully prepared to meet any eventuality. Paramilitary Forces deployed for manning the borders require urgent upgrade to match the China’s Border Regiments.

Way ahead:

Diplomatic engagement can open a way, but a solution that allows both sides to ‘save face’ is not immediately visible. Though undesirable, an escalation of the conflict remains a possibility. However, both the countries have expressed that they will use official diplomatic channels to reach a solution. For now, the most likely outcome is that both sides back away, giving diplomats and military strategists time to think through their options: India’s decision to commit militarily in Bhutan has changed the game for all sides.

Conclusion:

Both China and India have one of the world’s largest armies with 23 lakhs and 13 lakhs active troops respectively, any kind of war between the two will lead to heavy casualties on both the sides. Apart from that, Chinese economy is also slowing down. India’s economic growth will also be affected if there is a conflict. But no one is walking away from this century-old game just yet. To deal with China on a level footing, the Indian leadership needs to make pragmatic assessments, possess the courage to accept home truths and display audacity for bold decisions.