“Hindi Chini bhai bhai” – The tale of these brothers is filled with so much action and drama that it can give Bollywood writers a run for money. See, border issues is never easy to resolve, never has been and never will be. Pangong Tso or Doklam – All point to Troubled LAC and an aggressive neighbour, which is a tough combination for India. Let’s dive into this article to learn about the border skirmishes.

Current Incidents

On May 5, around 250 Indian and Chinese army personnel clashed with iron rods, sticks, and even resorted to stone-pelting in the Pangong Tso lake area of Ladakh, in which soldiers on both sides sustained injuries. In a separate incident, nearly 150 Indian and Chinese military personnel were engaged in a face-off near Naku La Pass in the Sikkim sector on May 9. At least 10 soldiers from both sides sustained injuries.

After Chinese accusation of Indian Army’s border transgressions and strong Indian pushback, Ladakh has become a new festering point for the Sino-Indian relations.

A deeper look into reasons of present tensions

The stand-off in Galwan valley, according to reports, was triggered by China moving in troops and equipment to stop construction activity by India.
Delhi claims that it was well within India’s side of the LAC. The LAC was thought to be settled in this area which has not seen many incidents in the past, but China now appears to think otherwise.
The northern bank of Pangong lake has, however, been a point of contention where there are differing perceptions of the LAC.
The Sikkim incident is unexpected as the contours of the LAC are broadly agreed to in this sector.
Unofficial reason: The broader context for the tensions appears to be a changing dynamic along the LAC, as India plans to catch-up in improving infrastructure there.

Some old bruises in border relations

India and China do not have a well-defined border, and troop face-offs are common along its 3,500 km Line of Actual Control (LAC), though not a bullet has been fired for four decades.
After the 1962 Sino-Indian war, one of the longest standoffs between the Indian and Chinese armies happened at Sumdorongchu (near the Bhutan tri-junction) in 1986, when the troops had an eye-to-eye stalemate.
In 2017, at Doklam, near the same Bhutan tri-junction, the troops of India and China were engaged in a 73-day stand-off, triggering fears of a war between the two nuclear-armed neighbours.

The Gandhi-Deng bargain

- A year after a military skirmish between India and China in the Sumdorong Chu Valley in Arunachal Pradesh, then PM Rajiv Gandhi visited his counterpart Deng Xiaoping in Beijing to mend ties.
- The two leaders agreed to establish a forward-looking relationship but border dispute were temporarily set aside.
- The reason for this pragmatism was rooted in economic and strategic factors: Both China and India needed a stable external environment to promote domestic economic development.
- China was already a decade into the dramatic economic reforms that Deng had initiated, while Gandhi’s India had also embarked on a similar path.
- The Gandhi-Deng bargain paved the way for a number of border management agreements (including the 1993 and 1996 agreements related to confidence-building measures.

Then, Why do face-offs occur so frequently?

Basic: Face-off and stand-off situations occur along the LAC in areas where India and China have overlapping claim lines. The LAC has never been demarcated.
The boundary in the Sikkim sector is broadly agreed but has not been delineated.
Face-offs occur when patrols encounter each other in the contested zones between overlapping claim lines.
Protocols agreed to in 2005 and 2013 detail rules of engagement to prevent such incidents, but have not always been adhered to.

What are the various sectors on the India-China border?

The border can be broadly divided into three sectors—Western, Middle and Eastern.
The Western sector, which includes Ladakh, is governed by the Johnson Line, making Aksai Chin (controlled by China) in Jammu and Kashmir contested territory for India.
The Middle sector, consisting of Uttarakhand and Himachal, is relatively tranquil. Even map exchanges between the two countries have taken place, based on a broad understanding of borders.
In the Eastern Sector (where Indian controls territory based on the MacMahon Line), China claims Arunachal Pradesh as part of southern Tibet, while India contests it.
The MacMahon Line was drawn at the tripartite 1913-14 Simla Convention attended by British India, Tibet and China; the problem: Tibet is involved and China is not a signatory to this pact.

LAC: Why no solution yet?

It’s not like nothing has been done!
Maps have been exchanged in the Middle Sector, but the exercise fell through in the Western Sector where divergence is the greatest.
China has rejected this exercise, viewing it as adding another complication to the on-going boundary negotiations.
India’s argument is rather than agree on one LAC, the exercise could help both sides understand the claims of the other, paving the way to regulate activities in contested areas until a final settlement of the boundary dispute.

Also, Chinese transgressions are frequent: Dragon’s aggressiveness

A higher number indicates that the Chinese soldiers are coming to the Indian side more often, and their movements are being observed and recorded by the Indian soldiers.
This can be seen as an indicator of increased Chinese assertiveness.
Since 73-day Doklam standoff on Sikkim-Bhutan border in 2017 there had been no major standoff.
PM Modi and President Xi met in Wuhan, following the Doklam crisis, and passed some instructions.

Wuhan Coziness turned sour

Modi and Xi had met for their first informal summit at Wuhan in April 2018, where the two leaders had issued strategic guidance to their respective militaries.
These guidelines aimed to strengthen communication in order to build trust and mutual understanding and enhance predictability and effectiveness in the management of border affairs.
They had also directed their militaries to earnestly implement various confidence-building measures agreed upon between the two sides, including the principle of mutual and equal security.
But the latest border issues show hollowness of such talks.

International forces in this bilateral ties

In addition to the border dispute, some of the core issues in the Sino-Indian rivalry include Tibet (the presence of the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan government-in-exile), the burgeoning China-Pakistan partnership, and the two countries’ overlapping spheres of influence in Asia.
These issues have become more salient in the context of the two countries’ simultaneous but asymmetric rising power.
In addition to accruing power domestically, India is also building strong strategic partnerships with China’s other rivals, especially the US and Japan.
Meanwhile, a rising China has stabilized its northern borders with Russia and is working to undermine the US primacy in the East Asian maritime (particularly the South China Sea).
This basically leaves only one border issue with a rival unresolved: namely, the Sino-Indian border.
It is hardly surprising that it is exerting periodic pressure on India along this front—a trend that is only likely to escalate.

India should not fear. Why?

To be sure, China’s regional aggression is COVID-proof. From Japan to Malaysia, Vietnam, Philippines and Taiwan, everyone has had to push back against Beijing’s marauding missions.

1) India can retaliate

India, while still under-resourced, is no longer a pushover, having emerged stronger and wiser from the Depsang incident of 2013, when Chinese troops pitched tents to establish their control over the area.
India and China are both nuclear-armed countries with strong militaries.
India has been building a road along the Galwan River to Daulat Beg Oldie that would improve India’s access to the Karakoram Highway, as well as 61 border roads with a total length of 3,346 km across the Himalayan frontier.
The Indian Air Force’s capabilities have improved as well.

2) China is wooing its people

Presently, China is in the midst of its annual “2 Sessions” of the CPCC (Chinese People’s Political Consultative Process) and NPC (National People’s Congress), where the ruling sentiment is how China is being bold and tough.
Hong Kong was an example of that sentiment. It is likely the India moves may be related. No softening or reasonableness can be expected from China until the NPC ends.
China is, as usual, changing the ground realities to influence a future boundary agreement.

The ground realities before we think settlement

India sees China as occupying 38,000 sq km in Aksai Chin. In the east, China claims as much as 90,000 sq km, extending all across Arunachal Pradesh.
A swap was hinted at by China in 1960 and in the early 1980s, which would have essentially formalized the status quo.
Both sides have now ruled out the status quo as a settlement, agreeing to meaningful and mutual adjustments.
At the same time, the most realistic solution will involve only minor adjustments along the LAC, considering neither side will be willing to part with territory already held.

Way forward

India and China should grasp the current situation as an opportunity to revive the stalled process of clarifying the LAC.
Clarifying the LAC may even provide a fresh impetus to the stalled boundary talks between the Special Representatives.
Beyond the posturing, both sides know a final settlement will ultimately have to use the LAC as a basis, with only minor adjustments. Only a settlement will end the shadow boxing on the LAC.
With both countries in the midst of an unprecedented global pandemic, the time to push for a settlement to a distracting, protracted dispute is now.

Conclusion

The issue is basically the fundamental difference in how both sides view the boundary question.
India insists that its relations with China won’t improve until the border dispute is resolved.
But China differs here.
In some sense, Beijing appears to view an unsettled border as holding some leverage with India, one of the many pressure points it could use to keep India off-guard.
But for now, India should resist the Chinese design which could have disastrous consequences for India’s defence and strategic interests. Lastly, Diplomatic channels is always a better option than skirmishes on the borders.