The Indian armed forces has remained at the forefront of providing internal security, supporting humanitarian missions in India and abroad, and providing conditions of stability along the borders. With the demands of changing geo-strategic scenario and geo-political situations, the military has to constantly focus on its size, equipment, and operational structures to remain an agile, efficient, and smart force capable of meeting present-day challenges and undertaking full spectrum of operations.

Unfortunately, there are grave deficiencies in India’s security management system which had been visible time and again for instance at Uri, Pathankot attacks. These deficiencies are as follows-

1. The heavy involvement of the Army in counterinsurgency operations cannot but affect its preparedness for its primary role, which is to defend the country against external aggression.
2. The paramilitary and Central Police Forces are not trained, raised and equipped to deal with trans-border terrorism by well-trained mercenaries armed with sophisticated equipment who are continuously infiltrating across the border/LOC. 
3. In spite of continuing counterinsurgency operations over the past many years, there has been no integrated equipment policy in respect of the Army, paramilitary and Central police forces.
4. There are matters like terrorist infiltration, illegal migration, smuggling and the flow of narcotics, which are of national concern but are being looked at compartmentally. The inevitable result has been sub-optimal border management.
5. Over the past many years, the Indian Army and other security forces have lagged behind in the quality of their surveillance and communication equipment although technologically superior equipment is readily available the world over.
6. The dilemma has always been to determine the correct balance between 'make or buy.'
7. Higher defence structure is perhaps the weakest part of the defence forces of India. The defence forces are not part of the government of India, but are an attached “office”. This arrangement effectively keeps them outside the policy formulation loop. 

The need is urgent undertaking of reforms on following lines-
1. The Defense Ministry’s research arm DRDO must harness the Indian Technical Prowess in defense research by collaborating with Premier Institutes of Technology across India similar to the lines of DARPA (Defense Advanced Project Agency) done in USA by Pentagon.
2. Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) or Permanent Chairman Chiefs (PC-COSC) is needed to handle current security environment and facilitate integrated theatre commands (Australia model)
3. The CDS would require support from a restructured Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), empowered through appropriate amendments in the Allocation and Transaction of Business Rules and other regulations to reflect new responsibilities. Failing this, the current lack of authority of an IDS, in spite of institutionalizing of the post, will remain.
4. Shekatkar committee [May, 2015] recommended to maintain size ~12lakhs and increase budgetary support from 1.7% to 2.5-3% of GDP.
5. Creation of a new post of Intelligence Advisor to assist the NSA and the National Intelligence Board on matters relating to coordination in the function.
6. Promotion of synergy in civil-military functioning to ensure integration. To begin with, the deputation of armed services officers up to director level in the Ministry of Defence should be considered.
7. Early establishment of a National Defence University (NDU) and the creation of a separate think-tank on internal security.

In this new milieu, the defence forces must not only retain a combat edge in conventional operations, but also handle sub-conventional challenges effectively. The bureaucracy, both civil and military, and the political leadership should support to revamp and restructure our defence systems before we are actually faced with the challenges. The need today is for a synergistic and visionary approach.