The Principle states that one may harm in order to save more if and only if the harm is an effect or an aspect of the greater good itself. It further states that an act that causes both a greater good and a lesser evil is impermissible if the evil results from a means to the good but can be permissible if the evil results from the good itself or from its non-causal flip side.

Thus, in the above stated case public life, property and security is at a great threat, then, according to the above principle, there is a case for stern action against the radicalized and divisive forces by the state, as harm in form of strict action is an aspect of the greatest good itself.
At the same time state must owe an explanation and also try to find out the root cause of radicalization and evolution of divisive or secessionist forces.
For instance some people in Kashmir in general, are today out in streets opposing the government and its agencies, more intensely, after the new government assumed power which have started taking stern actions without properly assessing and ameliorating the fears and problems of people. Stern actions alone cannot help. It will further aggravate the anger in the common man against the system.

Many would argue that there are times when permissible harm is morally permissible, and even obligatory. The most famous way of ethically assessing war is to use ‘Just War Theory’; a tradition going back to St. Augustine in the 5th Century and St. Thomas in the 13th Century. Just War theory considers the reasons for going to war and the conduct of war. This distinction is important. A war might be ethical but the means unethical, for instance, using landmines, torture, chemicals and current debate is concerned with drones.

All criteria are problematic and hard to meet. Think about ‘right intention’ with regard to the operations by paramilitary forces in Naxal hit areas and discussions about the ‘real’ motives of both the parties in the conflict; state and naxals. And when we come to proportionality, the contemporary debate is particularly fraught. Can it ever be proportional to use drones where there is no risk to life on one side and risk to many lives (including civilian lives) on the other? And when battles are fought in villages and homes by those with no uniforms, how can the principle of permissible harm ever be respected – and indeed should it be?

The character of the internal security domain is changing fast and the ethics needs to keep pace with that change. These particular principles might well need revision. But we should not imagine the fundamental ethical issues have changed. It is still the case that in a sense that any harm is inherently unethical. To be justified, significant ethical reasons are required and although imperfect principle of permissible harm continues to be one way to seek such reasons.