While the idea of inviting Australia to join Malabar is being explored, we must not forget the concerns with it. This article examines such concerns.

Context

• India’s Ministry of Defence discussed the issue of adding Australia to the trilateral Malabar naval exercise.
• If materialised, it will be the first time since 2007 that all members of Quad-India, U.S., Japan and Australia will participate in a joint military drill.

Possible consequences of the move

• The Chinese leadership sees the maritime Quadrilateral as an Asian-NATO that seeks only to contain China’s rise.
•  India’s intention to involve Australia in the Malabar drill could only be construed as a move directed against Beijing.

India’s perspective

• Following the stand-off in Ladakh, many Indian analysts believe the time is right for India to shed its traditional defensiveness in the maritime domain.
• The realists advocate an alliance with the U.S., Japan and Australia to counter Chinese moves in the Indian Ocean.

Concerns

1) Contrary message to China

• While India and China are negotiating a truce, Australia’s participation in the Malabar exercise sends contrary signals to Beijing.
• If China responded aggressively in the Eastern Indian Ocean, it could needlessly open up a new front in the India-China conflict.

2) Only modest gains for India

• U.S. and its Pacific partners want to form a maritime coalition to implement a ‘rules-based order’ in the Indo-Pacific littorals.
• India’s priority is to acquire strategic capabilities to counter a Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
•  Indian Navy is yet to develop the undersea capability to deter Chinese submarines in the eastern Indian Ocean.
• With U.S. defence companies hesitant to share proprietary technology the gains for India, in exchange for signing up the ‘military-quad’, are modest.
• Without strategic technology transfers, Indian Navy’s deterrence potential in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) will not improve much.

3) Operational issue: India will be drawn into power dynamics of the Asia-Pacific

• With the strategic contest between the U.S. and China, there is every possibility that the military-Quad will be used to draw India into the security dynamics of the Asia-Pacific.
• The U.S. would expect its Indo-Pacific partners, including India, to assist the U.S. Navy in its South China Sea endeavour.
•  The U.S. and Japanese navies have little spare capacity for sustained surveillance and deterrence operations in the IOR.
• Australia is an exception and is ready and able to partner India in securing the Eastern Indian Ocean.

4) Timing

• A balancing coalition must come together at a time when the nature and magnitude of the threat are wholly manifest.
• But, despite a growing presence in the Indian Ocean, the Chines Navy is yet to physically threaten Indian interests at sea.
• So, the onus of the first move to precipitate a crisis in the Eastern Indian Ocean lies with the Indian Navy.

Conclusion

Upgrading the trilateral Malabar to a quadrilateral, without acquiring the requisite combat and deterrence capability, could yield gains for India in the short term, but would prove ineffective in the long run.

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