Why in the News?

On March 20, 2025, security forces carried out two missions in Bastar, Chhattisgarh, and killed 30 Maoist people. This made the total number of Maoists killed this year more than 100.

What were the key reasons behind the decline of the Maoist insurgency in India?

• Strong Counter-Insurgency Operations: Security forces, including CRPF’s elite COBRA (Commando Battalion for Resolute Action) unit and state police forces, have conducted targeted operations against Maoist strongholds. Example: Operation Prahar in Chhattisgarh led to the elimination of top Maoist leaders and disrupted their logistical networks.
• Improved Governance and Development Initiatives: Infrastructure projects like roads, electrification, and mobile connectivity have reduced Maoist influence by increasing state presence. Example: The Aspirational Districts Programme has focused on healthcare, education, and employment in Maoist-affected regions.
• Erosion of Support Base: Maoists have lost support due to their violent tactics, including forced recruitment, extortion, and attacks on civilians. Example: The killing of Madvi Hidma, a local tribal leader, by Maoists in Bastar led to mass protests by villagers against them.
• Surrender and Rehabilitation Policies: Government schemes like the ‘Surrender and Rehabilitation Policy’ offer financial aid, skill training, and housing to former Maoists. Example: Over 600 Maoists surrendered in Telangana and Andhra Pradesh after the government provided rehabilitation and employment opportunities.
• Internal Divisions and Leadership Crisis: The Maoist movement has suffered from ideological splits, a lack of new leadership, and desertions. Example: The death of Kishenji (Maoist leader) in 2011 and the arrest of several senior cadres have weakened organizational unity.

Why is a purely militaristic approach insufficient in tackling the Maoist insurgency?

• Deep-Rooted Socio-Economic Issues Drive Insurgency: Maoism thrives in areas with poverty, land alienation, and lack of governance. Military force alone does not address the core grievances of tribal communities. Example: The displacement of tribals due to mining projects in Dantewada, Chhattisgarh, has fueled resentment, making them vulnerable to Maoist influence.
• Risk of Civilian Casualties and Alienation: Excessive military action can lead to civilian deaths, human rights violations, and loss of trust in the state, pushing locals towards Maoists instead of the government. Example: The Salwa Judum campaign (2005-2011), a state-backed militia to counter Maoists, led to severe human rights abuses, ultimately worsening the conflict.
• Failure to Provide a Long-Term Solution: Military operations can weaken Maoists but do not offer a sustainable path for peace and rehabilitation. A mix of governance, dialogue, and development is needed. Example: The Nepali Maoists transitioned into mainstream politics through a negotiated peace process, showing that engagement can be a more effective long-term strategy.

Where are the remaining strongholds of Maoist influence in India?

• Southern Chhattisgarh (Bastar Region): Dense forests, difficult terrain, and historical neglect in governance make it a Maoist stronghold. Example: Dantewada, Sukma, and Bijapur districts frequently witness Maoist ambushes on security forces.
• Border Regions of Jharkhand, Odisha, and Telangana: The tri-junction of these states provides a strategic corridor for Maoist movement and arms supply. Example: Latehar (Jharkhand), Malkangiri (Odisha), and Bhadradri-Kothagudem (Telangana) remain active insurgent zones.
• Gadchiroli District (Maharashtra): Proximity to Chhattisgarh’s Maoist belt and forested terrain offer a safe haven for Maoist cadres. Example: The Jambhulkheda encounter  saw security forces eliminate top Maoist leaders in this region.

Who are the primary stakeholders in resolving the Maoist issue peacefully?

• Government (Union and State Governments): Responsible for policy-making, law enforcement, and development initiatives in affected regions. Example: The Surrender and Rehabilitation Policy offers incentives for Maoists to reintegrate into society.
• Security Forces (Police, Paramilitary, and Intelligence Agencies): Play a crucial role in counterinsurgency operations and maintaining law and order. Example: The Greyhounds (Telangana), CoBRA (CRPF), and District Reserve Guard (Chhattisgarh) specialise in anti-Maoist operations.
• Tribal Communities and Local Populations: Often caught in the crossfire, they need protection, development, and inclusion in governance. Example: The PESA Act (1996) empowers tribal self-governance to address their grievances.
• Civil Society and NGOs: Mediate peace talks, advocate for human rights, and support socio-economic development. Example: Swami Agnivesh’s peace efforts attempted negotiations between Maoists and the government.
• Former Maoists and Rehabilitation Advocates: It can influence insurgents to surrender and integrate into mainstream society. Example: Former Maoist leader Gopanna Markam, who surrendered and helped bring others into the fold.

How can lessons from international experiences, such as FARC in Colombia or Nepali Maoists? (Way forward)

• Negotiation and Political Integration: Offering insurgents a political pathway can encourage them to abandon violence. Example: Nepali Maoists transitioned from armed struggle to mainstream politics through the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, leading to their participation in democratic governance.
• Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programs: Providing economic and social reintegration opportunities reduces the chances of re-radicalization. Example: Colombia’s peace deal with FARC (2016) included land reforms, financial aid, and skill development programs for former rebels.
• Addressing Root Causes through Development: Long-term peace requires addressing socio-economic grievances that fuel insurgencies. Example: Colombia’s rural development programs aimed to improve infrastructure, education, and healthcare in former conflict zones to prevent a resurgence of violence.

Mains PYQ:

Question: “Naxalism is a social, economic and developmental issue manifesting as a violent internal security threat. In this context, discuss the emerging issues and suggest a multilayered strategy to tackle the menace of Naxalism.” (2022)

Reason: This question directly addresses Naxalism (Maoist insurgency) as more than just a security problem, aligning with this article. It also asks for a multilayered strategy, hinting at the need for more than just security measures, such as addressing social and economic issues.

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