💥Join UPSC 2027,2028 Mentorship (August Batch) + XFactor Notes & Microthemes PDF

Type: Explained

These Newscards correspond to the explained section of various newspapers. They become immensely important for both prelims and mains and special attention needs to be paid to them

  • Cong: LS not prorogued, is Shah still pushing delimitation Bill?

    Why in the News

    The Congress general secretary in-charge of communications has questioned why the Lok Sabha has not been prorogued ten days after being adjourned sine die. He asked whether the Union Home Minister was still in search of a two-thirds majority to get the Constitutional Amendment Bill on delimitation passed in a special session. The reference is to a twin legislative package: a Constitutional Amendment Bill to advance women’s reservation to 2029, and a Delimitation Bill to increase the strength of the Lok Sabha to up to 850 seats. A House that has been adjourned sine die but not prorogued remains technically in session, which leaves the Presiding Officer able to reconvene it without a fresh summons from the President. A former Secretary General of the Lok Sabha has stated that no clear rule fixes when Parliament should be prorogued after a House is adjourned sine die.

    What is prorogation?

    1. The act itself: Prorogation is the formal termination of a session of a House of Parliament by the President. It ends the session, unlike adjournment, which only suspends a sitting.
    2. Who exercises it: The President prorogues the House on the advice of the Council of Ministers. The Prime Minister advises the President on summoning and proroguing Parliament and on dissolving the Lok Sabha.
    3. How it differs from adjournment sine die: Adjournment sine die is the termination of a sitting for an indefinite period, and it is done by the Presiding Officer of the House. The House remains in session until prorogation is notified.
    4. What it does to pending business: Prorogation ends all pending notices, including questions and motions, other than Bills, which do not lapse on prorogation. Bills lapse only on dissolution of the Lok Sabha, subject to the exceptions the Constitution provides.

    Why does the ten day gap matter?

    1. The normal interval: The time gap between the adjournment of the Lok Sabha sine die and its prorogation is generally two to four days. There are many instances when adjournment and prorogation have taken place on the very same day.
    2. The interval in this case: Ten days have passed since the House was adjourned sine die. No information on its prorogation has been made available.
    3. The longer precedents cited: The gap for the Monsoon Session was 28 days in 2015 and 20 days in 2021. The Congress position is that no comparable legislative move was pending on either occasion.
    4. What an unprorogued House permits: A House still in session can be reconvened by the Presiding Officer without the President issuing a fresh summons. The procedural cost of resuming business is therefore lower than convening a special session from scratch.
    5. The political inference drawn: The Congress reading is that the delay preserves the option of resuming the same session once the numbers for a Constitutional Amendment are assembled. The Union Minister of Parliamentary Affairs did not respond to a request for comment.

    What is the twin legislative package at issue?

    1. The Constitutional Amendment Bill: It seeks to advance the implementation of women’s reservation to 2029. The 106th Constitutional Amendment of 2023 provides 33 per cent reservation for women in the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies, and ties implementation to the next Census and a fresh delimitation.
    2. The Delimitation Bill: It seeks to increase the strength of the Lok Sabha to up to 850 seats. A delimitation exercise would be required to give effect to that expansion.
    3. What delimitation is: Delimitation is the act of fixing the limits or boundaries of territorial constituencies to reflect population changes. Article 82 mandates Parliament to enact a Delimitation Act after every Census.
    4. The freeze the package would end: The 42nd Amendment of 1976 froze seat allocation on the 1971 Census until 2000, and the 84th Amendment of 2001 extended that freeze until the first Census after 2026. The proposed expansion is the first readjustment of Lok Sabha strength since that freeze was imposed.
    5. Why the majority threshold governs the timing: A Constitutional Amendment Bill requires a special majority, which includes a majority of the total membership of each House and two-thirds of members present and voting. The Bill cannot be moved to a vote until that support exists.

    Is there a rule the delay breaches?

    1. No fixed interval is prescribed: No clear rule states when Parliament should be prorogued after a House is adjourned sine die, in the assessment of a former Secretary General of the Lok Sabha. Prorogation is described as a routine practice rather than a timed obligation.
    2. The constitutional source of the power: Article 85(2)(a) empowers the President to prorogue the Houses from time to time. Article 85(2)(b) separately empowers the President to dissolve the Lok Sabha.
    3. The only hard timing rule: Article 85(1) requires that six months shall not intervene between the last sitting of one session and the first sitting of the next. That is the outer limit on the gap between sessions, not on the gap before prorogation.
    4. Where the discretion actually sits: The President acts on the advice of the Council of Ministers in exercising the power. The executive therefore controls both the summoning and the closing of a session.

    Challenges to prorogation as a procedural check

    1. The timing is entirely executive-controlled: No statute or rule of procedure obliges the government to advise prorogation within a stated period. Eg. The interval has ranged from the same day to 28 days for the Monsoon Session of 2015. Fix. Prescribe an outer limit in the Rules of Procedure requiring prorogation within a fixed number of days of adjournment sine die.
    2. Parliament cannot summon itself: Members have no mechanism to require a sitting where the executive does not advise one. Eg. The Article 85(1) six month rule is the only enforceable constraint, and it permits long stretches with no sitting. Fix. Adopt a statutory parliamentary calendar fixing the number of sitting days per year, as the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution recommended in 2002 at 110 days.
    3. The special session route bypasses the ordinary calendar: A session convened outside the three-session cycle compresses notice, scrutiny and committee referral. Eg. The Women’s Reservation Bill in 2023 was introduced and passed within a special session convened for the purpose. Fix. Require that any Bill taken up in a special session first stand referred to a Departmentally Related Standing Committee.
    4. Prorogation ends scrutiny instruments without ending the government’s agenda: Questions and motions lapse on prorogation and Bills survive it, so the balance of the reset favours the executive. Eg. A pending starred question falls away while the Bill it concerned remains on the books. Fix. Carry over admitted questions and motions to the succeeding session on the model used for Bills.
    5. The ordinance route substitutes for a sitting House: A prorogued House allows the executive to legislate by ordinance under Article 123. Eg. Ordinances have been repromulgated across successive gaps between sessions rather than replaced by legislation. Fix. Enforce the bar on repromulgation laid down in Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (2017) by requiring a laid statement of reasons for every ordinance.

    Conclusion

    The Lok Sabha stands adjourned sine die and not yet prorogued ten days on, which keeps the session formally alive and the option of reconvening it open. No rule fixes the permissible interval, so the delay is unusual rather than irregular, and the objection raised is about intent rather than legality. The twin legislative package at issue, the Constitutional Amendment on women’s reservation and the Delimitation Bill that accompanies it, remains untabled for a vote. The next milestone is the notification of prorogation or the summoning of a session in which the Constitutional Amendment Bill is moved.

    “[2024] With reference to the Parliament of India, consider the following statements:

    1. Prorogation of a House by the President of India does not require the advice of the Council of Ministers.

    2. Prorogation of a House is generally done after the House is adjourned sine die, but there is no bar to the President of India proroguing the House which is in session.

    3. Dissolution of the Lok Sabha is done by the President of India who, save in exceptional circumstances, does so on the advice of the Council of Ministers.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 1 and 2

    (c) 2 and 3

    (d) 3 only

  • Small transporters hit by compliance burden

    Why in the News

    The road transport industry, which carries nearly 70 per cent of India’s domestic freight, has been described as facing one of the most difficult periods in its history. Operating costs for commercial vehicles have risen sharply over the last few years. Freight rates have stayed largely stagnant over the same period. Vehicle location tracking devices, originally conceived for passenger safety and emergency response, have since been mandated for goods vehicles as well. Faults in integrating those devices with the VAHAN portal have left commercial vehicles stranded for weeks and in some cases months. The contest is between technology driven governance, which promises transparency and enforcement quality, and its implementation cost, which falls hardest on the small operators who have no margin left to absorb it.

    What is a Vehicle Location Tracking Device (VLTD)?

    1. Function: A Vehicle Location Tracking Device (VLTD) is an onboard unit that continuously transmits a vehicle’s position to a State level control centre over a mobile network. It carries emergency buttons that raise an alert to that centre.
    2. Original purpose: The device was conceived for passenger safety and emergency response, so that a distress signal from a bus or a cab could be located and acted on.
    3. Registration linkage: A fitted device must be registered against the vehicle on the VAHAN portal, the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways database that holds every vehicle’s registration record. A vehicle whose device does not map correctly to that record cannot complete its compliance formalities.

    Why has the road freight business turned financially unsustainable?

    1. Costs and earnings have moved apart: The gap between operational expenses and earnings has widened steadily. Freight rates have not tracked the rise in the cost of running a truck.
    2. Fuel dominates the cost sheet: Diesel alone accounts for nearly 60 per cent of a truck’s operating cost. Every rise in the pump price passes almost directly into the operator’s monthly outgo.
    3. Emission compliance added a new input: Operators have had to absorb the cost of AdBlue, the urea solution injected into the exhaust of Bharat Stage VI (BS-VI) vehicles to cut nitrogen oxide emissions. This is a recurring consumable that did not exist in the earlier cost structure.
    4. Every other input has escalated: Tyre prices, insurance premiums, spare parts, engine oil, lubricants, maintenance expenses, finance costs and statutory compliance charges have all risen together. Toll charges continue to rise alongside them.
    5. Margins have gone below cost for some: Many transporters operate on wafer thin margins simply to retain business. Some are running below their actual cost of operations.

    What has the compliance and enforcement layer added?

    1. Documentation load has grown: The burden of documentation, permits, fitness requirements and other regulatory compliances has increased substantially. Each of these carries its own fee, its own renewal cycle and its own downtime.
    2. Electronic challans have drawn allegations of misuse: The electronic challan was introduced to minimise human intervention and improve road safety. A growing number of transporters allege misuse of the system, producing avoidable penalties and harassment.
    3. Tracking devices were extended without a stated case: The VLTD mandate was extended to goods vehicles in the absence of clear operational necessity. A device designed around passenger distress response was applied to freight movement, adding a financial burden with no matching benefit to the operator.
    4. Integration failure converts compliance into downtime: Technical problems in integrating VLTD units with the VAHAN portal have left many commercial vehicles off the road for weeks and in some cases months.
    5. Downtime compounds financially: Each day a truck stays off the road means lost income, continuing loan repayment pressure and severe financial distress for the operator. The loan instalment does not pause because the portal did not accept the device.

    Does technology driven governance deliver transparency or only new hardship?

    1. The intent is not in dispute: Technology driven governance is welcome where it promotes transparency and efficiency. Both the electronic challan and the tracking mandate were framed in exactly those terms.
    2. Implementation is where the cost lands: A mandate is issued centrally and instantly, while its back end integration is completed unevenly across States and vendors. The operator carries the difference as idle capital.
    3. Enforcement quality decides the outcome: Enforcement must remain transparent, accountable and fair, so that genuine operators are not penalised alongside violators. An automated penalty with no accessible appeal converts a safety tool into a revenue tool.
    4. The burden is uniform, the capacity to bear it is not: A compliance charge set as a flat per vehicle amount is trivial for a large fleet and material for a single truck owner. The same rule therefore produces very different pressure across the sector.
    5. Digital mandates need a working failure route: No route exists for an operator whose device is fitted and paid for but not accepted by the database. The vehicle is treated as non compliant even where the failure is on the system side.

    Why are small operators and self-driving truck owners hit hardest?

    1. They absorb every shock directly: Small transport operators and self-driving truck owners are affected the most by these developments. They have no fleet across which to spread a stranded vehicle or a disputed penalty.
    2. The sector is structurally fragmented: Most road freight capacity sits with small, unorganised firms and single truck owners rather than large corporate fleets. Fragmentation leaves no bargaining power against shippers on freight rates.
    3. Finance costs bite first: Vehicle loans are serviced monthly regardless of utilisation. An operator with one or two trucks moves into default faster than a fleet operator with the same days of downtime.
    4. Highway amenities have not followed toll payments: Despite paying substantial toll charges, drivers continue to face a shortage of secure truck parking zones, clean toilets, rest areas and other basic highway amenities.
    5. Tolls are a rising fixed charge: Toll charges require rationalisation, since they now form a large and rising share of the per trip cost on tolled corridors. A rate that is not linked to service delivered is a pure cost addition.

    Challenges to the road freight compliance regime

    1. Freight rates are not cost linked: No mechanism ties freight rates to the actual cost of operating a truck, so input inflation is absorbed rather than passed on. Eg. The rise in diesel, tyre and insurance costs over recent years has not produced a matching rise in contracted freight rates. Fix. Base freight rates on scientific cost calculations that reflect actual operating expenses and are revised on a stated cycle.
    2. Device mandates run ahead of system readiness: A device is made compulsory before the registration database can reliably record it, so compliant operators are penalised for a back end fault. Eg. VLTD to VAHAN integration failures have kept commercial vehicles off the road for weeks and months. Fix. Tie the commencement of any device mandate to a certified integration test, and grant an automatic provisional clearance where the portal fails to accept a fitted device.
    3. Automated enforcement lacks a low cost appeal route: An electronic penalty is issued instantly while contesting it requires time and travel that a single truck owner cannot spare. Eg. Transporters allege misuse of the electronic challan system producing avoidable penalties. Fix. Provide a time bound online adjudication route with photographic evidence disclosure at the point of the challan.
    4. Compliance costs are not scaled to fleet size: Fees, permits and fitness requirements are set per vehicle, so the smallest operator carries the highest cost per rupee of turnover. Eg. Statutory compliance charges have escalated alongside tyre, insurance and finance costs for operators running one or two trucks. Fix. Introduce a graded fee structure and a single consolidated annual compliance filing for operators below a stated fleet threshold.
    5. Toll collection is not linked to service: Toll rates rise on schedule while wayside amenities on the same corridors remain absent. Eg. Drivers on tolled highways face a shortage of secure parking zones, clean toilets and rest areas. Fix. Make a stated wayside amenity standard a condition of toll revision on each stretch, audited before the next revision is notified.
    6. Overloading and safety enforcement fall on the driver, not the shipper: Penalties for overloading attach to the vehicle and the driver, leaving the consignor who loaded it untouched. Eg. Overloaded highways suffer rapid wear and tear while enforcement action is recorded against the transporter. Fix. Extend statutory liability for overloading to the consignor and the loading point operator.

    Conclusion

    The compliance burden on road freight has grown faster than the sector’s ability to pay for it, and the cost has settled on small operators and self-driving truck owners rather than on large fleets. The immediate cause is not the principle of technology driven governance but its implementation, where a mandate takes effect before the system that records it works. A comprehensive review of the road transport ecosystem is the stated demand, resting on three things: freight rates built on scientific cost calculations, rationalised tolls, and a relook at the compliance load. None of the three has been taken up.

    “[2014, GS3, 12 marks] National Urban Transport Policy emphasises on ‘moving people’ instead of ‘moving vehicles. Discuss critically the success of the various strategies of the Government in this regard.”

  • A dry spell along the Cauvery river

    A dry spell along the Cauvery river

    Why in the News

    Karnataka appealed to the Cauvery Water Management Authority (CWMA) on 11 August to cut its daily release to Tamil Nadu from 12,000 cusecs to 10,000 cusecs. It warned of a severe drinking water shortage if more water were released for crops in the Cauvery basin. Tamil Nadu had already chosen not to open the Mettur dam for irrigation on the customary date of 12 June, given a poor south-west monsoon forecast attributed to a super El Nino. Large tracts of the Cauvery delta consequently remain barren in a season that normally carries two crops. The dispute is no longer only between an upper and a lower riparian State, because Karnataka is simultaneously rationing its own canal irrigation and committing reservoir water to Bengaluru’s drinking supply.

    What is the Cauvery water-sharing arrangement?

    1. The dispute predates the States: The sharing of the Cauvery is a vexed issue going back more than 130 years, to agreements between the Mysore Kingdom and the Madras Presidency that were drawn without regard to any future State boundary.
    2. The award fixes an annual quota and a monsoon share: The Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal and the Supreme Court provided for Karnataka to release 123.14 thousand million cubic feet of the 177.25 thousand million cubic feet annual quota during the south-west monsoon. That share is mostly meant to support paddy cultivation in the Samba season.
    3. A central authority administers the sharing: The CWMA was set up in June 2018 by the Union government to handle water-sharing from the Cauvery among Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Puducherry.
    4. A technical committee advises it: The Cauvery Water Regulation Committee (CWRC) assesses storage and crop requirement and recommends releases to the CWMA, and both bodies sit under the Supreme Court’s continuing supervision.

    What is a cusec?

    1. A cusec measures flow, not volume: A cusec is one cubic foot per second, so a release order of 12,000 cusecs fixes the rate at which water must cross the inter-State point rather than a total quantity.

    What is a TMC?

    1. A TMC measures volume: A thousand million cubic feet (TMC) is a stock of water, roughly 28.3 million cubic metres. Reservoir capacity and annual quotas are stated in TMC rather than in the cusecs used for daily obligations.

    Why does the delta’s cropping calendar depend on a single dam opening date?

    1. One release date sets the whole season: Water released from the Mettur dam, built in Salem district across the Cauvery, on 12 June for irrigation ordinarily reaches Tiruvarur about 300 km downstream by 23 or 24 June. This year nothing reached it.
    2. Two seasons run off that release: Paddy is ordinarily cultivated across 5.3 lakh acres in the delta during the short-term Kuruvai season, followed by 12.9 lakh acres during the longer Samba-Thaladi season.
    3. Samba is the season that matters: Samba transplantation begins in late July or early August and the harvest ends in mid-January, and the crop is both a food security crop and the mainstay of the delta’s rural economy.
    4. Kuruvai is the higher-yield gamble: The shorter-duration Kuruvai crop can offer higher yields and is largely dependent on groundwater drawn through energised pumpsets rather than on canal water.
    5. The acreage has already collapsed: Tamil Nadu government data put the area under paddy cultivation this year at 4.5 lakh acres, against the 5.3 lakh acres the Kuruvai season alone normally covers.

    How is Karnataka rationing its own irrigation?

    1. Farmers sowed against official advice: Farmers across Karnataka’s Cauvery basin defied advice against sowing water-intensive crops such as paddy and sugarcane this season, amid a predicted deficient monsoon and inadequate inflows into the basin’s reservoirs.
    2. A brief August revival encouraged them: The Krishna Raja Sagara (KRS) reservoir has a full level of 124.8 feet. It rose from 93 to 94 feet to over 100 feet within days in the first week of August before stagnating at 109 feet.
    3. The canal system runs off that reservoir: The Visvesvaraya canal system draws water from the KRS reservoir, located across the Cauvery near Mysuru, and serves the Mandya belt.
    4. Releases were cut to four rotational cycles: The Cauvery Irrigation Advisory Committee, a regional body chaired by the Karnataka Water Resources Minister, met in Bengaluru on 19 August and decided to release canal water in only four rotational cycles during the crop season instead of continuously.
    5. The stated purpose is storage, not irrigation: The decision was taken to conserve reservoir storage and ensure water availability for other needs, including drinking water.
    6. Rotation does not sustain a standing crop: A pattern of about 15 days of release followed by 15 days without will not provide enough water for paddy and sugarcane, and leaves farmers able to grow only dry crops.

    What are farmers at the canal’s tail end facing?

    1. The tail end gets water last or not at all: A farmer in Kuntanahalli village of Maddur taluk in Mandya district has raised a paddy nursery on a two-acre plot lying at the tail end of the Visvesvaraya canal system.
    2. The window is measured in days: Without water in the next 7 to 10 days he loses both the sowing season and the Rs 8,000 already spent on raising the nursery.
    3. Switching crops is not a safe alternative: Semi-dry crops such as ragi, pulses and oilseeds are the fallback, and heavy rain arriving late can damage a ragi crop just as its absence damages paddy.
    4. Position on the canal decides outcomes: Paddy transplantation is nearly complete in Karekura and Hosahalli, close to the KRS reservoir, and even there farmers who normally take two crops a year doubt the second.
    5. Losing a crop means becoming a labourer: Most agricultural labourers in the region earn Rs 400 to Rs 500 for a day’s work from 7 a.m. to noon, which is the fallback income for a farmer whose second crop fails.
    6. Sugarcane is exposed for longer: A standing sugarcane crop in Pandavapura taluk needs another nine months before harvest, and without timely rain may not even be fit for use as cattle fodder.
    7. Debt is the binding constraint: Farmers have taken interest-free short-term loans from primary agricultural cooperative credit societies and high-interest loans from microfinance companies, and are seeking a waiver and restraint on aggressive recovery agents.

    Does Bengaluru’s drinking water come at the cost of the Cauvery’s irrigators?

    1. A new drinking water stage is already sanctioned: The Cauvery Stage VI drinking water project is a Rs 6,939 crore initiative approved by the Karnataka government this February.
    2. It adds a fixed annual claim on the river: The project requires an additional 6 thousand million cubic feet of Cauvery water every year, which is a permanent first charge rather than a seasonal allocation.
    3. The service area extends beyond the city: It will supply 500 million litres per day to roughly 30 lakh residents in Bengaluru and the adjoining towns of Bidadi, Hoskote, Anekal, Devanahalli and Nelamangala.
    4. The diversion is from the same reservoir: Farmers in Maddur taluk are bracing for confrontation with the State government over the proposed diversion of KRS water. Their canal draws from the same reservoir.
    5. The competing claim is now internal: The canal rationing decision was justified by the need to protect drinking water, so the same argument that limits releases to Tamil Nadu also limits releases to Karnataka’s own irrigators.

    Why has farmer protest stayed muted this year?

    1. Mobilisation has fallen flat: Protests over poor rainfall and releases to Tamil Nadu have remained muted compared with previous years, and a Karnataka bandh called by a Kannada activist on 13 August drew a lukewarm response outside parts of Maddur taluk.
    2. Farm bodies cannot bring out their own members: The organising secretary of the Mandya District Raithara Hitharakashana Samithi, a farmers’ welfare committee, records that farmers who are the main stakeholders are not responding to calls for struggle.
    3. Ruling party leaders are discouraging the streets: Cultivators say ruling party leaders are warning them against joining what they call an “Opposition trap”, and against the police stations and court appearances that follow a protest.
    4. The Chief Minister has publicly discouraged it: The Karnataka Chief Minister has chastised activists for staging Cauvery protests “for the sake of publicity”, and warned against wading into the river after the Water Resources Department issued a flood alert over releases from the near-brimming Kabini reservoir.
    5. The State’s own position is two-sided: The Chief Minister has acknowledged that Karnataka’s dams are not yet full and vowed to protect farmers’ interests. The same statement emphasised compliance with directions on releasing water to Tamil Nadu.
    6. Farmers question the State’s legal effort: The president of the State Sugarcane Farmers’ Association questions whether the government and its legal team have made a strong enough case before the CWRC, the CWMA and the Supreme Court about the water crisis inside Karnataka.

    What positions have the two States taken?

    1. Tamil Nadu blames storage and shortfall in releases: Low storage at the Mettur dam and Karnataka’s failure to release a sufficient share of the water it received in June and July are the two grounds Tamil Nadu cites for the barren delta.
    2. The reservoir is far below the release threshold: The Mettur dam level is now about 85 feet against a full capacity of 120 feet, and farmer bodies argue that no water should be released until the level reaches at least 100 feet.
    3. The opening date is still unannounced: The Tamil Nadu government has not announced when the Mettur dam will be opened, and it continues its legal battle with Karnataka to secure the State’s share.
    4. It is contesting the reduction in court: Tamil Nadu has strongly opposed Karnataka’s push to reduce releases and is pressing the Supreme Court to ensure strict adherence to the mandated 12,000 cusecs daily flow.
    5. The position is framed as a rights claim: The Tamil Nadu Chief Minister has said the legitimate rights of lower riparian States and the livelihoods dependent on assured river flows must be fully protected.

    What does the delta contribute and what is it losing?

    1. The delta is the State’s rice bowl: Located along the eastern coast and spanning Thanjavur, Tiruvarur, Mayiladuthurai and Nagapattinam, it is characterised by fertile alluvial soil and a tropical climate carried by the Cauvery’s flow.
    2. It supplies most of the State’s procured paddy: During the 2025-26 procurement year, from 1 September 2025 to 31 July 2026, the region contributed 39.5 lakh tonnes of paddy out of a Statewide procurement of 57.5 lakh tonnes.
    3. The failure is visible across districts: A drive of over 200 km from Tiruchi through Thanjavur, Thiruvaiyaru, Tiruvarur and Mannargudi shows largely barren paddy fields where the previous year showed continuous green.
    4. The official acreage may overstate the crop: Some agriculturists dispute the reported figure, citing stunted growth and crops showing signs of withering, which make an area-sown count unreliable as a measure of what will be harvested.
    5. The loss spreads beyond the fields: Economic activity in the region is crippled by the erosion of livelihood opportunities, and shops and other businesses in Mannargudi now down their shutters by 7 p.m.
    6. The poorest bear it first: Much of the zone remains economically backward with a majority dependent on agriculture, and Scheduled Castes, who live there in large numbers, constitute the dominant segment of landless agricultural labourers.

    Why is groundwater not a fallback for the delta?

    1. The water table is falling even between two rivers: In Peramur, about 10 km from Thiruvaiyaru and located between the Cauvery and its branch the Coleroon, the water level is going down.
    2. Extraction technology has migrated to the delta: Submersible pumpsets, once more common in the dry districts of Coimbatore and Dharmapuri, have become commonplace in the delta.
    3. Over-extraction has damaged the resource permanently: Excess withdrawal has led to salinity ingress in many areas, which removes land from cultivation rather than merely reducing a season’s yield.
    4. The Kuruvai fallback is therefore closing: The shorter crop that depends on pumped groundwater is becoming harder to raise in the very years when canal water fails, so the two sources fail together rather than covering for each other.

    What do farmers want, and what will they get?

    1. Compensation demands have begun: Several farmers’ groups have started demanding compensation for crop losses across the delta.
    2. The announced waiver is considered inadequate: Farmers are unhappy with the crop loan waiver scheme announced by the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister and are seeking a full, unconditional waiver of up to Rs 1 lakh for every farmer who has taken a crop loan.
    3. Relief is conditional on a disaster classification: Any compensation will be subject to the Union and State governments’ norms for natural disasters and to a survey by the departments concerned.
    4. Officials are still counting on the monsoon: With about a month left in the season, officials continue to hope for a revival that would allow at least a partial Samba crop.

    Challenges to Cauvery water sharing

    1. The award has no distress-year formula: The allocation assumes a normal monsoon and offers no proportionate sharing rule for a deficit year, so every shortfall becomes a fresh contest. Eg. Karnataka’s request to cut releases from 12,000 to 10,000 cusecs has to be argued case by case rather than settled by a rule. Fix. Notify a pro-rata distress sharing schedule tied to measured basin inflow, so releases fall automatically and equally in a deficit year.
    2. Drinking water and irrigation are not ranked: The award prioritises drinking water in principle without capping how much a growing city may draw, so urban demand expands against a fixed river. Eg. Delhi’s drinking water share of the Yamuna has been litigated against upstream States in the Supreme Court for over two decades. Fix. Fix an audited ceiling on urban drawal from the basin, conditional on the city reusing a notified share of its treated wastewater.
    3. The Article 262 bar is routinely circumvented: Article 262 lets Parliament exclude the courts from water disputes, and States nonetheless reach the Supreme Court through special leave petitions under Article 136. Eg. The Cauvery allocation has been litigated in the Supreme Court repeatedly after the Tribunal’s award. Fix. Amend the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956 to make a tribunal award final on quantum, leaving only implementation questions justiciable.
    4. Tribunals take decades to decide: Article 262 sets no time limit, so an award arrives after the cropping economy it was meant to govern has already changed. Eg. The Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal took 17 years to deliver its decision. Fix. Enact the pending Inter-State River Water Disputes (Amendment) Bill and apply its timelines to disputes already before a tribunal.
    5. Flow data is contested rather than shared: Each State measures inflow and utilisation on its own gauges, so the basic facts of a deficit year are disputed before the sharing question is reached. Eg. Karnataka and Tamil Nadu differ on how much of the June and July inflow was actually released downstream. Fix. Operate a single telemetered gauge network under the CWMA with readings published in real time and binding on both States.
    6. The dispute pays politically: Regional parties gain from an unresolved conflict, so neither an implementation habit nor a negotiated settlement is rewarded at the ballot. Eg. A bandh call and a protest ban were both issued in the same fortnight in Karnataka this month. Fix. Route inter-State negotiation through the Inter-State Council under Article 263, where a recorded agreement carries a political cost to abandon.

    Conclusion

    A deficient monsoon has converted the Cauvery allocation from a sharing arrangement into a distress-year contest that the award was never designed to settle. Karnataka is rationing its own canal command to four rotational cycles and committing an additional annual volume to Bengaluru’s drinking supply. Tamil Nadu’s delta has lost a season because the Mettur dam was never opened. The immediate decisions rest with the Cauvery Water Management Authority on the daily release rate and with the Tamil Nadu government on the dam opening date. Neither will be settled this season without a rule for sharing a shortfall, which is exactly what the existing award does not contain.

    “[2024, GS3, 15 marks] What are the major challenges faced by Indian irrigation system in recent times? State the measures taken by the government for efficient irrigation management.”

  • The birth story no one prepared me for

    The birth story no one prepared me for

    Why in the News

    Preterm births in India are rising, and Delhi alone has recorded a 21 per cent increase over the past five years. A study by the Indian Institute of Technology Delhi with international universities analysed National Family Health Survey data for 2015 to 2020. It established that prolonged exposure to heat significantly raises the chances of preterm birth and low birth weight. Motherhood in India continues to be narrated through the language of labour pain, sacrifice and endurance. That language describes a full-term vaginal delivery and nothing else. Causation is moving towards environmental exposure no individual can control. Responsibility is still located in the mother’s body.

    What is preterm birth?

    1. A birth before 37 completed weeks: Preterm birth is delivery before 37 completed weeks of gestation, counted from the first day of the last menstrual period.
    2. Three severity bands: The World Health Organization classifies births before 28 weeks as extremely preterm, 28 to 32 weeks as very preterm, and 32 to 37 weeks as moderate to late preterm.
    3. Low birth weight is a separate marker: A newborn weighing under 2,500 g is classified as low birth weight, with or without prematurity. The risk compounds when both are present.
    4. India carries the largest absolute burden: India records the highest number of preterm births of any country, at roughly three million a year, which is close to a fifth of the global total.

    What is kangaroo mother care?

    1. Skin-to-skin contact as clinical treatment: Kangaroo mother care places the low birth weight infant upright against the parent’s bare chest for prolonged periods, combined with exclusive breastfeeding, to stabilise temperature, heart rate and breathing.
    2. It is recommended from birth: The World Health Organization advises immediate and continuous kangaroo mother care for infants born under 2,000 g rather than delaying it until the infant is clinically stable.

    What does care inside a neonatal intensive care unit actually involve?

    1. Time is measured by instruments, not routines: Days inside a neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) are structured around oxygen saturation levels, heart-rate monitors and machine alarms rather than feeding schedules or sleepless nights.
    2. The first contact is mediated by equipment: Early memories of motherhood are of incubators and wires rather than of cradling a child, with infants weighing a few hundred grams held for kangaroo mother care.
    3. The mother is a patient at the same time: A caesarean delivery leaves the mother recovering from major abdominal surgery. The infant is treated several corridors away, so hours of sitting are managed through incision pain.
    4. Stays run into weeks, not days: A NICU admission after a very preterm delivery commonly runs six weeks or longer, which is a period of hospital residence rather than a hospital visit.
    5. Solidarity forms sideways, not from clinicians: Support comes from nurses, guards, hospital staff and other mothers in the same unit, who mark small milestones together and register each other’s setbacks.

    Why do preterm births keep rising in India?

    1. Maternal nutrition: The nutritional health of mothers is a direct contributor, with anaemia and low pre-pregnancy weight raising the risk of early delivery.
    2. The changing pattern of pregnancies: Later first pregnancies, higher rates of assisted conception and more multiple births all shift the distribution towards earlier deliveries.
    3. Environmental factors: A significant part of the rise is attributable to environmental exposure rather than to maternal or clinical factors.

    What does the parallel rise in caesarean sections indicate?

    1. Caesarean rates have moved well past the clinical reference range: The National Family Health Survey records 21.5 per cent of deliveries as caesarean nationally, against the 10 to 15 per cent range the World Health Organization treats as the point beyond which population level benefits stop.
    2. The private sector drives the gap: Caesarean deliveries account for 47.4 per cent of births in private facilities against 14.3 per cent in public facilities. The gap points to provider incentives rather than to clinical need.
    3. An emergency caesarean is a different event from an elective one: A preterm emergency caesarean is a rescue procedure for foetal or maternal distress, and it arrives without the preparation an elective procedure allows.
    4. Timing carries its own risk: Caesarean delivery before 39 completed weeks raises neonatal respiratory morbidity, so a rising caesarean rate and a rising preterm rate reinforce each other.

    Who is held responsible when a birth goes wrong?

    1. The dominant script has no place for a preterm birth: An initiation into motherhood that begins at the doors of a neonatal unit has no available story, so the experience goes unnarrated rather than merely unrecognised.
    2. Scrutiny falls on the mother’s conduct: Society places the burden of a healthy pregnancy almost entirely on women, and a premature birth intensifies that scrutiny into questions about whether she travelled or rested enough. The mother’s body becomes the site of investigation.
    3. The evidence points the other way: Environmental exposure and clinical practice are population level determinants, and neither is amenable to individual maternal conduct.
    4. The psychological cost has no recognised name: Conversation around postpartum depression has grown, and the emotional realities of neonatal intensive care motherhood remain largely invisible.
    5. Even the support offered polices the mother: Nurses urge mothers to stay positive because infants sense their emotions. That instruction converts grief into a further maternal responsibility.

    Challenges in maternal and newborn care in India

    1. Neonatal intensive care capacity is thin outside metros: District level special newborn care units handle stabilisation but not ventilation or surgery, so very preterm infants must be transferred to a medical college or a private hospital. Eg. Referral transport for sick newborns remains the weakest link in the newborn care chain in most States. Fix. Attach a functioning level three unit to every district hospital with a dedicated newborn transport ambulance on a fixed response standard.
    2. Neonatal intensive care is catastrophic out-of-pocket expenditure: A six-week private NICU stay runs into several lakh rupees and sits outside most insurance cover for a newborn without an existing policy. Eg. Ayushman Bharat covers the mother’s delivery package but not an extended neonatal admission in every State’s package list. Fix. Add a defined neonatal intensive care package with a per-day rate to the national health insurance benefit list, effective from the date of birth.
    3. Perinatal mental health has no service line: Public maternity facilities have no counsellor attached to the neonatal unit, so the psychological consequences of a preterm birth go unscreened and untreated. Eg. Screening for postpartum depression is not part of the standard postnatal visit schedule. Fix. Post a trained counsellor at every special newborn care unit and add a validated screening question to the routine postnatal check.
    4. Caesarean rates are unaudited in the private sector: No facility level audit compels a hospital to justify its caesarean rate, so the rate rises without a clinical explanation. Eg. Facility caesarean rates above 50 per cent are recorded in several States without triggering review. Fix. Publish facility-wise caesarean rates using the Robson classification and make registration renewal conditional on a rate review.
    5. Heat action plans do not name pregnant women: City heat plans list outdoor workers and the elderly as vulnerable groups and generally omit pregnant women, so no advisory or workplace protection reaches them. Eg. Most State heat action plans carry no antenatal advisory component. Fix. Add pregnant women as a notified vulnerable category, with heat advisories issued through antenatal care contacts and Anganwadi workers.
    6. Kangaroo mother care coverage stays low: The intervention is cheap and evidence-backed, and it requires a mother to remain beside the infant for hours. Most public units are not physically designed for that. Eg. Many newborn units have no space for a mother to stay overnight. Fix. Make mother-side accommodation a licensing condition for any unit designated to handle low birth weight newborns.

    Conclusion

    Preterm birth in India is being pushed upward by heat exposure and other environmental determinants that no individual pregnancy can be managed against, and the clinical system is simultaneously delivering more babies surgically and earlier. The response has stayed at the level of the individual mother, whose conduct is scrutinised and whose psychological care is not provided at all. Recognising heat as a maternal health exposure, auditing caesarean practice and funding neonatal intensive care are the three interventions the evidence already supports. Until they are in place, the burden of a structural change will keep being carried privately.

    “[2025] Consider the following statements:

    Statement I: At the 28th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP28), India refrained from signing the ‘Declaration on Climate and Health’.

    Statement II: The COP 28 Declaration on Climate and Health is a binding declaration; and if signed, it becomes mandatory to decarbonize health sector.

    Statement III: If India’s health sector is decarbonized, the resilience of its healthcare system may be compromised.

    Which one of the following is correct in respect of the above statements?

    (a) Both Statement II and Statement III are correct and both of them explain Statement I

    (b) Both Statement II and Statement III are correct but only one of the them explains Statement I

    (c) Only one of the Statements II and III is correct and that explains Statement I

    (d) Neither Statement II nor Statement III is correct

  • Ethanol blending policy is behind rise in sugar prices, says Opposition

    Ethanol blending policy is behind rise in sugar prices, says Opposition

    Why in the News

    Retail sugar prices reached Rs 62.5 to Rs 64 per kg in Maharashtra and Rs 63 to Rs 64 per kg in Karnataka on 20 August. The corresponding ranges on 1 August were Rs 46.2 to Rs 46.9 and Rs 46.25 to Rs 47 per kg, with Uttar Pradesh at Rs 44.95 to Rs 46.7. Closing stocks for the 2025-26 sugar season are set to fall to a nine-year low on a production shortfall. The ethanol blending programme has been named as the cause of the spike. What is contested is whether diverting cane to fuel drove the price rise, or whether a crop failure larger than the diversion did.

    What is the Ethanol Blended Petrol Programme?

    1. A fuel substitution programme run through sugar mills: The Ethanol Blended Petrol (EBP) Programme requires oil marketing companies to blend ethanol into petrol, and it sources that ethanol partly from sugarcane. It runs under the National Policy on Biofuels, 2018.
    2. Cane can be diverted at three points: Mills may make ethanol from direct sugarcane juice or syrup, from B-heavy molasses, or from C-heavy molasses, each of which sacrifices a different quantity of sugar.
    3. The 20 per cent target was met early: The blending target of 20 per cent ethanol in petrol was achieved ahead of its 2025-26 deadline.
    4. It exists to fix mill finances as much as fuel imports: Diversion gives mills a buyer who pays on delivery, which shortens the cane payment cycle to farmers and cuts crude oil imports at the same time.

    What is sugar recovery?

    1. Recovery is the yield of the crush: Recovery rate is the sugar produced expressed as a percentage of the cane crushed, and it decides how much sugar a given tonnage of cane actually yields.
    2. It is set in the field, not the mill: Recovery depends on sucrose accumulated in the cane stalk, which needs sunlight and aeration in the ripening months, so a waterlogged crop lowers recovery even where tonnage holds up.

    What are B-heavy and C-heavy molasses?

    1. Molasses grades mark how much sugar is left behind: Molasses is the residue after sugar crystals are extracted, and B-heavy molasses is drawn off at an earlier stage than C-heavy molasses, so it retains more fermentable sugar.
    2. The grade decides the sugar sacrificed: One tonne of ethanol from C-heavy molasses costs almost no sugar, B-heavy costs more, and direct juice or syrup costs the most, which is why diversion policy is set grade by grade.

    India’s sugar balance sheet: what do the numbers show?

    Sugar Year (Oct-Sep)Opening StocksDomestic OutputDomestic ConsumptionExportsClosing Stocks
    2016-1772.5202.62244.480.4639.41
    2017-1839.41323.28253.96.32104.71
    2018-19104.71331.6225538143.33
    2019-20143.33273.8525359.4104.78
    2020-21104.78311.22607283.98
    2021-2283.98359.2526211071.23
    2022-2371.233312816457.23
    2023-2457.23319295180.23
    2024-2580.23261.8284850.03
    2025-26*50.03279280841.03

    All figures in lakh tonnes. *Industry estimates. Source: National Federation of Cooperative Sugar Factories Ltd.

    1. The season starts with just over 50 lakh tonnes: Opening stocks for 2025-26 stood at 50.03 lakh tonnes, so total sugar available after adding production works out to about 329 lakh tonnes.
    2. Consumption and exports leave 41 lakh tonnes: Deducting domestic consumption of 280 lakh tonnes and exports of 8 lakh tonnes closes the season at around 41 lakh tonnes.
    3. That is the lowest in nine years: The last time closing stocks were lower was 39.41 lakh tonnes in 2016-17.
    4. A disputed opening figure makes it worse: Some in the industry hold that opening stocks were only 48 lakh tonnes rather than 50.03 lakh tonnes, which would take closing stocks to 39 lakh tonnes, the lowest since 2008-09.
    5. The peak was three seasons of surplus: Closing stocks ran to 143.33 lakh tonnes in 2018-19 and were still 104.78 lakh tonnes in 2019-20, so the current tightness follows a period of overhang, not chronic scarcity.

    Why did production fall so far below projection?

    1. The apex body projected a large crop: The Indian Sugar and Bio-energy Manufacturers Association (ISMA), the association of private sugar mills, estimated gross production for the 2025-26 season at 343.5 lakh tonnes in early November 2025. After 34 lakh tonnes of ethanol diversion, it pegged net output at 309.5 lakh tonnes.
    2. The actual crop came in far smaller: Latest industry estimates put gross production at 309 lakh tonnes and ethanol diversion at 30 lakh tonnes, leaving net output at 279 lakh tonnes. Net output is therefore 30.5 lakh tonnes below the 309.5 lakh tonnes originally projected on a net basis.
    3. Excess rain hit the crop at the wrong time: The cane crop in Maharashtra, Karnataka and Gujarat suffered excess rainfall in September and October last year, with a delayed withdrawal of the southwest monsoon.
    4. Waterlogging cut both tonnage and recovery: Waterlogged fields combined with a lack of sunshine deprived the standing crop of aeration and daylight. That affected cane growth and sucrose accumulation in the stalks, lowering yields and mill recovery.
    5. The two tropical States missed badly: ISMA had projected Maharashtra at 130 lakh tonnes and Karnataka at 63.5 lakh tonnes, and their mills produced only 99.2 lakh tonnes and 47.2 lakh tonnes.
    6. Uttar Pradesh lost output to disease and pest: Factories in the State produced 89.7 lakh tonnes against an earlier estimate of 103.2 lakh tonnes. Red rot fungal disease and the top shoot borer insect pest were the chief causes, and the dominant Co-0238 cane variety has grown increasingly susceptible to both.

    What turned a shortfall into a price spike?

    1. Prices were flat for most of the season: Average ex-factory prices in Maharashtra fell from Rs 38.31 to Rs 36.98 per kg between September 2025 and April 2026, then recovered to Rs 38.23 by June. They rose from July, averaging Rs 41.85 per kg that month.
    2. Declared mill stocks were doubted: Some liquidity-strapped mills had already sold sugar beyond their government-fixed monthly release quotas and had little left. The stocks they declared existed on paper.
    3. A second bad monsoon was priced in early: High rainfall deficiency in June, particularly in Maharashtra and Karnataka, convinced the trade that yields and production would take a hit in the 2026-27 season as well.
    4. Buyers and sellers both moved first: Larger merchants, stockists and bulk industrial consumers began taking positions before July. From August some mills started holding back sales in anticipation of higher prices ahead of the festival season.

    Where does India’s ethanol actually come from?

    1. Sugarcane supplies under a third: Of 810.67 crore litres of ethanol supplied to oil marketing companies for blending between November 2025 and July 2026, only 259.24 crore litres or 32 per cent came from sugarcane-based feedstock.
    2. Direct juice and syrup is the largest cane route: Direct juice or syrup contributed 147.6 crore litres, B-heavy molasses 98.19 crore litres and C-heavy molasses 13.45 crore litres.
    3. Grain supplies the balance: Distilleries using grain-based feedstock supplied 551.43 crore litres or 68 per cent of the total.
    4. Maize leads the grain feedstock: Maize accounted for 288 crore litres, Food Corporation of India rice 207.1 crore litres and broken or damaged foodgrains 56.33 crore litres.

    Is ethanol diversion the cause of the spike or a scapegoat for a crop failure?

    1. The diversion looks large in isolation: Thirty lakh tonnes of sugar went into ethanol in the current season, which is more than two-thirds of the season’s projected closing stock.
    2. The crop failure was larger than the diversion: Gross production before any diversion came in 34.5 lakh tonnes below the initial gross estimate of 343.5 lakh tonnes, so the sugar lost to the weather exceeded the sugar lost to fuel.
    3. Two-thirds of blended ethanol never touched cane: The blending target is being met mainly out of maize and rice, so cutting cane diversion to zero would remove only a third of the programme’s feedstock demand and not a third of the price.
    4. Reversing diversion moves the problem, it does not remove it: Ethanol sales are the payment stream that lets mills clear cane dues on time, so a ban on juice and B-heavy diversion converts a consumer price problem into a farmer arrears problem.

    What has the government done to check sugar prices?

    1. Exports banned on 13 May: All sugar exports were banned until 30 September 2026. It was a precautionary move rather than a response to a confirmed shortage.
    2. Duty-free imports opened this week: Import of up to 10 lakh tonnes of raw sugar at zero duty was allowed until 31 October, against the standard tariff of 100 per cent on the sweetener.
    3. Refiners at Kandla will process the raws: The raw sugar can be processed by companies operating refineries at Gujarat’s Kandla port, such as Shree Renuka Sugars and Shri Dutta India Private Ltd. The refined output can supply the market until Indian mills begin cane crushing from end-October to early November.
    4. Stock limits imposed on 28 July: A stocking limit of 400 tonnes was imposed on all sugar dealers, and no dealer may hold any sugar beyond 30 days of receiving it.
    5. Bulk buyers put under disclosure on 13 August: Mills were directed by letter to furnish details of bulk consumers such as soft drink and confectionery makers and sweetmeat sellers who bought 500 tonnes or more annually, directly or through agents, during the 2025-26 financial year.
    6. A diversion curb is expected next: The government is expected to direct mills not to manufacture ethanol from direct sugarcane juice and B-heavy molasses in the 2026-27 season, on the stated priority of augmenting domestic sugar supply.

    Challenges to the Ethanol Blended Petrol Programme

    1. Grain has crowded out cane as feedstock: Grain-based distilleries now supply more than twice the volume the cane routes do, which shifts the food security question from sugar to cereals. Eg. Food Corporation of India rice was released to distilleries in the current supply year. Fix. Cap grain feedstock at a notified share of annual blending and reserve open market cereal releases for the public distribution system.
    2. Procurement prices have not tracked cane costs: Ethanol procurement prices have stayed largely stagnant as the Fair and Remunerative Price for cane has risen, squeezing distillery margins. Eg. Cane FRP rose from Rs 285 per quintal in 2020-21 to Rs 355 per quintal in 2025-26. Fix. Index the ethanol procurement price for each feedstock route to the notified cane price through a published formula.
    3. Distillation capacity sits underused: Mills built distilleries on the expectation of assured diversion, and capacity idles whenever policy switches back to sugar. Eg. Many mills face underutilised distillation capacity in the current season. Fix. Publish a three-year rolling diversion band so investment decisions are made against a stated range rather than an annual notification.
    4. Higher blends carry a vehicle cost: Ethanol has a lower energy density than petrol, so fuel efficiency falls by roughly 2 to 6 per cent at higher blend levels and older engines face material compatibility issues. Eg. Vehicles manufactured before E20 compliance norms were not certified for the current blend. Fix. Mandate a labelled dual fuel dispensing option at retail outlets so owners of non-compliant vehicles retain a lower blend choice.
    5. Cane ethanol carries a heavy water footprint: Sugarcane is grown largely in water-stressed tropical districts, so cane-based ethanol transfers an irrigation burden to the fuel sector. Eg. Maharashtra and Karnataka face groundwater depletion in the same belts that supply mill cane. Fix. Restrict juice and B-heavy diversion licences to mills that have converted a notified share of their command area to drip irrigation.

    Conclusion

    The sugar price spike is the result of a crop that came in 34.5 lakh tonnes below projection in gross terms, stocks doubted by the trade and positions taken ahead of the festival season, not of ethanol diversion that supplied under a third of blended fuel. The government has answered on the supply side, with an export ban, duty-free raw imports, dealer stock limits and bulk-buyer disclosure. A curb on cane-based ethanol in 2026-27 would trade a consumer price problem for a cane arrears problem. The season will close on the tightest stock position in nine years, and next season’s crop is already being discounted for a deficient June.

    “[2025] Consider the following statements:

    Statement I: Of the two major ethanol producers in the world, i.e., Brazil and the United States of America, the former produces more ethanol than the latter.

    Statement II: Unlike in the United States of America, where corn is the principal feedstock for ethanol production, sugarcane is the principal feedstock for ethanol production in Brazil.

    Which one of the following is correct in respect of the above statements?

    (a) Both Statement I and Statement II are correct and Statement II explains Statement I

    (b) Both Statement I and Statement II are correct but Statement II does not explain Statement I

    (c) Statement I is correct but Statement II is not correct

    (d) Statement I is not correct but Statement II is correct

  • Remembering Niketu Iralu: Peace activist, bridge between Nagas, mainland India

    Remembering Niketu Iralu: Peace activist, bridge between Nagas, mainland India

    Why in the News

    Niketu Iralu, a Naga peace activist, died in a Delhi hospital on 18 August 2026 at the age of 91. He spent six decades on reconciliation between Naga factions and between the Naga people and the rest of India, outside every formal negotiating channel. His maternal uncle, Angami Zapu Phizo, led the Naga National Council (NNC), which declared Naga independence on 14 August 1947. The Centre constituted a new ministerial panel last week to carry forward the stalled talks on a final Naga settlement. The conflict has found no solution in the nearly eight decades since that declaration. One position holds that a final text can now be signed. The competing position is that the reconciliation work behind six decades of talks has no institutional successor.

    What is the Naga peace process?

    1. A ceasefire came before any accord: A peace camp at Chedema, on a hilltop near Kohima, negotiated a ceasefire in 1964 between the rebel Naga Federal Government and the Government of India. It was the first suspension of hostilities after more than a decade of armed insurgency.
    2. The Shillong Accord split the movement: NNC representatives signed the Shillong Accord in 1975, accepting the Constitution of India. A faction rejected it and formed the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) in 1980.
    3. The current track opened with the 1997 ceasefire: The Centre signed a ceasefire with the NSCN (Isak-Muivah) faction in 1997. Talks under it have run for close to three decades without a final agreement.
    4. The Framework Agreement fixed the terms in 2015: The Centre and the NSCN (Isak-Muivah) signed a Framework Agreement on 3 August 2015 recognising the “unique history” of the Nagas. Its contents have never been published.

    Why did a family at the centre of the sovereignty claim produce its leading peace advocate?

    1. The lineage ran through the sovereignty movement: His father, Sevilie Iralu, was among the first Naga doctors. His maternal uncle led the council that made the 1947 declaration.
    2. He chose a different method: He committed himself to non-violence, dialogue and reconciliation rather than armed struggle. He became known across the Northeast as a peace activist rather than a political negotiator.
    3. Initiatives of Change shaped that method: He worked in Initiatives of Change, an organisation that pursues social transformation through “personal change”. Its premise is that a political conflict is resolved by first changing the people inside it.
    4. Mainland India was a discovery, not an inheritance: He left for Madras Christian College in the 1950s, his first encounter with mainland India. He described the crowds boarding trains at Kolkata as a scale of population that felt unsurvivable.
    5. His house was named for the method: His home at Sechu Zubza in Kohima district was called Kerunyu Ki, “The House of Listening”. People travelled to it for counsel rather than to a party office or a negotiating table.
    6. Recognition came as a bridge builder: He received the Bhupen Hazarika Integration Award among other honours. Hundreds gathered at Dimapur airport when his body arrived from Delhi.

    How does the Second World War figure in Naga political memory?

    1. The war reached Naga villages: The Japanese Army invaded Nagaland in 1944 during the Second World War. His village, Khonoma, was overrun and families fled into the forest.
    2. The battle of Kohima was the turning point: The Japanese retreated after the battle of Kohima. An advance past it would have taken them to the Brahmaputra valley and into mainland India.
    3. The cemetery fixed the memory: The Kohima War Cemetery carries the epitaph, “When you go home, tell them of us and say, for their tomorrow, we gave our today.”
    4. The war left a habit of seeing the enemy as human: His sister slapped a Japanese soldier helping himself to a Naga shawl, and the soldier bowed and left. He read that restraint as evidence that the soldier also had a sister at home.

    What did the 1990 repatriation of Phizo’s body show about informal mediation?

    1. The leader died in exile: Angami Zapu Phizo died in London in April 1990. He had been in exile since 1960, when he left for the United Kingdom to mobilise world opinion for the Naga cause.
    2. The request came from the insurgent side: NNC leaders asked him to help bring the body back to India. No working channel existed between the NNC and the Government of India at that point.
    3. The government feared a funeral would trigger violence: The Janata Dal led government judged that returning the body might set off violence in Nagaland. A Janata Dal member of the Rajya Sabha, who had worked with him in Initiatives of Change for three decades, argued that denying the Nagas the right to grieve was the greater risk.
    4. The ask was procedural, not financial: He told the then Finance Minister at a 5 a.m. meeting that the Nagas had collected the money themselves. He asked only for foreign exchange clearance.
    5. The state supplied the logistics: The remains were received at the technical area of Palam airport. A Home Ministry aircraft then carried the casket to Kohima for the funeral.

    Does reconciliation require a community to confront its own failures?

    1. The demand was turned inward, not outward: A tribute in Ukhrul Times described him as a man who spent decades asking Nagas to confront their failures, resist hatred and recover the courage to listen. The demand was addressed to Naga society, not to the Indian state.
    2. Moral courage was defined as internal criticism: He held that moral courage involves “telling one’s own side what it does not want to hear”. He did not treat reconciliation as a concession or as weakness.
    3. Factional politics penalises exactly that: Naga groups have fought each other as often as they have fought the state, and internal criticism reads as disloyalty inside a faction. Eg. The NSCN split of 1988 into the Isak-Muivah and Khaplang factions produced years of inter-factional killing.
    4. The obstacle is not an administrative clause: The unresolved items are a separate Naga flag and a separate Naga constitution, which are claims about identity rather than about administration. A negotiator can concede an administrative arrangement, and only the community can revise a claim about who it is.

    Challenges to the Naga peace settlement

    1. The flag and constitution demand is unresolved: The NSCN (Isak-Muivah) insists on a separate Naga flag and a separate constitution, the Yehzabo, rejected by the Centre as incompatible with Indian sovereignty. Eg. The talks declared concluded in October 2019 ended without agreement on either demand. Fix. Settle the symbolic claim as a cultural flag protected under Article 371A’s guarantee for Naga customary practice, separated from any constitutional status.
    2. The territorial claim crosses three other States: The “Greater Nagalim” demand would merge Naga inhabited areas of Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh into one unit. Eg. The Manipur Assembly has repeatedly resolved against any settlement altering the State’s boundaries. Fix. Use non-territorial autonomy, giving Naga councils outside Nagaland cultural and development powers without redrawing State boundaries.
    3. The negotiation has two competing counterparties: The Centre talks in parallel to the NSCN (Isak-Muivah) and to the Naga National Political Groups, and each rejects a settlement signed only with the other. Eg. The Working Committee of the Naga National Political Groups signed a separate Agreed Position in 2017. Fix. Convene one joint negotiating forum so a single signed text binds every group.
    4. Ceasefire ground rules are routinely breached: Cadres under ceasefire run parallel taxation in Nagaland and in Naga areas of Manipur, which keeps an armed economy alive through the negotiation. Eg. Traders and salaried employees in Dimapur pay levies to more than one faction. Fix. Publish the ceasefire monitoring group’s findings with a fixed penalty schedule for each verified breach.
    5. A text kept secret cannot be ratified: The 2015 Framework Agreement has never been published, so no legislature or public body has examined what was agreed. Eg. Nagaland’s own legislators have sought disclosure of the text on the floor of the Assembly. Fix. Table the agreed text in Parliament and in the Nagaland Assembly before signature, so ratification precedes implementation.
    6. Security law feeds the grievance the talks address: The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 remains in force across parts of Nagaland, sustaining the alienation a settlement is meant to end. Eg. The Oting killings of December 2021 in Mon district led the Assembly to demand repeal. Fix. Complete the district by district withdrawal already begun and move residual powers to a civil authority subject to judicial review.

    Conclusion

    The Naga settlement is stalled on claims about identity, not on administrative detail, and identity claims are revised by a community rather than conceded by a negotiator. The reconciliation work that kept six decades of talks survivable was carried by individuals with no official standing, and it has no institutional successor. A ministerial panel can reopen the file. It cannot by itself rebuild the trust that would let a signed text hold.

    “[2025, GS3, 15 marks] What are the major challenges to internal security and peace process in the North-Eastern States? Map the various peace accords and agreements initiated by the government in the past decade.”

  • Ensuring equity amid India’s educational progress

    Ensuring equity amid India’s educational progress

    Why in the News

    The Unified District Information System for Education Plus (UDISE+) 2025-26 report records notable progress across India’s school education system. Progress is recorded in gross enrolment, student retention, dropout reduction, teacher availability and educational infrastructure. The same report records that regional and social disparities persist in access, resources, learning opportunities and educational outcomes. Differences in gross enrolment ratios, dropout rates, pupil teacher ratios and infrastructure availability now separate States and social groups from one another rather than separating India from an earlier baseline. What is contested is whether an improving national average can be read as equitable, inclusive and quality education.

    What is the Unified District Information System for Education Plus (UDISE+)?

    1. A school level administrative database: UDISE+ is the annual data system that collects information from every recognised school in the country, managed by the Department of School Education and Literacy under the Ministry of Education.
    2. Scale of the 2025-26 round: The report covers 1.47 million schools, 240 million students and 10.2 million teachers.
    3. What it measures: It records enrolment, retention, teacher deployment and school infrastructure, reported down to the district and school level.
    4. Why the numbers matter: The database is the official basis on which school education allocations are made and progress is monitored.

    What is the Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER)?

    1. Enrolment measured against an age group: GER is total enrolment at a school stage expressed as a percentage of the population in the official age group for that stage.
    2. Why a value above 100 is possible: Enrolment of under age and over age children pushes the ratio past 100 without meaning that every eligible child of that age is in school.

    What is the Pupil Teacher Ratio (PTR)?

    1. Students carried by each teacher: PTR is the number of enrolled students per teacher at a given school stage, so a higher value means each teacher carries a larger class load.

    What is the Gender Parity Index?

    1. Girls’ enrolment measured against boys’: The index is the ratio of female to male enrolment at a school stage, and a value above one shows more girls enrolled than boys.

    What is Aadhaar seeding of student records?

    1. Linking an enrolment record to a unique identity number: Seeding attaches a student’s Aadhaar number to the school record, which is how duplicate and inactive enrolments are removed from the count.

    Which States lead and lag on enrolment records and school profile?

    1. Aadhaar seeding of enrolled students: Andhra Pradesh leads at 99.6 percent, followed by Chandigarh at 99 percent. Meghalaya records the lowest rate at 35 percent against a national average of 90.2 percent.
    2. Share of schools and enrolment: Uttar Pradesh accounts for the highest share of both schools and student enrolment. Meghalaya and Himachal Pradesh have the lowest shares of schools relative to enrolment, which produces higher student school ratios.
    3. Composition of schools by stage: West Bengal records the highest proportion of foundational and preparatory schools at 79 percent and among the lowest secondary schools at 11 percent. Chandigarh is the reverse, with 83 percent secondary schools and 5 percent foundational and preparatory schools.
    4. Average enrolment per school: Chandigarh registers the highest at 1,194, followed by Delhi at 788. Ladakh records the lowest at 64, which marks the spread in school size across the country.

    How is enrolment distributed across social groups?

    1. Regional concentration of social groups: Chandigarh and Delhi have the highest proportions of General category students. Lakshadweep, Mizoram, Meghalaya and Ladakh have high proportions of Scheduled Tribe enrolment.
    2. Concentration of Scheduled Caste and Other Backward Classes enrolment: Punjab records one of the highest shares of Scheduled Caste enrolment. Other Backward Classes representation is particularly high in Tamil Nadu and Gujarat.
    3. Gross enrolment by social group at the national level: Other Backward Classes record the highest at 49 percent, followed by General at 27 percent, Scheduled Castes at 17 percent and Scheduled Tribes at 10 percent.
    4. Enrolment set against population: Those figures diverge from the corresponding population of each social group, which is where the enrolment gap between groups becomes visible.
    5. Girls ahead of boys on participation: The Gender Parity Index across all school levels shows higher girls’ enrolment and participation than boys in most States and Union Territories.
    6. Minority enrolment: Students from minority communities account for more than 20 percent of enrolment, with Muslims and Parsis among the major minority groups.

    How far apart are States on teacher availability?

    1. The spread tracks population density: PTR registers lowest in Union Territories and highest in densely populated States.
    2. The secondary stage carries the heaviest load: Foundational, preparatory and middle stage ratios are generally lower than the secondary ratio across most States.
    3. The highest secondary ratios: Jharkhand records the highest secondary PTR at 43, followed by Uttar Pradesh, which signifies a heavy workload on each teacher.
    4. The lowest secondary ratios: Sikkim records the lowest secondary PTR at 6, followed by Ladakh.

    What do the stage wise gross enrolment figures show?

    1. Foundational stage: Meghalaya records the highest at 131, followed by Mizoram. Bihar records the lowest at 24, preceded by Uttar Pradesh.
    2. Preparatory stage: Meghalaya again records the highest at 171, followed by Manipur. Gujarat records the lowest at 74, preceded by Bihar.
    3. Middle stage: Chandigarh and Meghalaya record the highest at 118, followed by Delhi. Bihar records the lowest at 70, preceded by Nagaland.
    4. Secondary stage: Chandigarh registers the highest at 109, followed by Goa. Bihar records the lowest at 48, preceded by Nagaland.
    5. The pattern across stages: One large State sits at or near the bottom at every stage, which concentrates the enrolment deficit rather than spreading it evenly across the country.

    What does the dropout data show about retention at each stage?

    1. Why the indicator matters: The dropout rate determines attainment and the transition rate to the next stage of schooling.
    2. Preparatory stage: Bihar accounts for the highest preparatory dropout rate at 7.9 percent, followed by Meghalaya. Delhi, Haryana and Maharashtra do not report dropout at this stage.
    3. Middle stage: Bihar records the highest middle level dropout rate at 9 percent, followed by Uttar Pradesh. Chandigarh, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh register no dropouts at this stage.
    4. Secondary stage: Ladakh records the highest secondary dropout rate at 14.8 percent, followed by Karnataka. West Bengal records the lowest at 1.5 percent, preceded by Telangana.

    Why has improved access not produced regular attendance?

    1. A school within reach is now the norm: Access to schooling has improved significantly over the years, and most children now have a school at a suitable distance.
    2. Terrain still decides regularity: Remote, hilly, tribal and border areas still have limited schools and transport facilities, so children there face greater difficulty attending regularly. Eg. Bageshwar district of Uttarakhand, Ganjam and Kandhamal districts of Odisha, Kathua district of Jammu and Kashmir, and Palghar district of Maharashtra.
    3. Social position compounds distance: Children from Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, minorities and economically poor families face barriers that limit enrolment, attendance and completion together.

    What limits infrastructure and teacher deployment in backward districts?

    1. Infrastructure has improved unevenly: School infrastructure has improved in several areas of the country on drinking water and electricity, and availability still varies across regions.
    2. Rural schools in backward districts lag: Educationally backward districts continue to struggle to provide a learning environment in rural schools compared with urban areas.
    3. One teacher, many roles: Rural and remote schools face teachers handling multiple classes and subjects alongside non teaching responsibilities allotted by the government.

    Which groups remain outside the gains?

    1. Girls’ schooling has advanced without closing retention: Progress in girls’ schooling has not removed the challenge of reducing dropout rates.
    2. The primary to secondary transition is weak: Improving the transition from primary to secondary education remains a stated gap.
    3. Facilities for disabled children fall short: Sufficient and suitable facilities for children with disabilities are not yet in place.
    4. What inclusion requires: Inclusive infrastructure, accessible classrooms and supportive teaching practices are the stated conditions for equitable education.

    Does progress in national averages amount to educational equity?

    1. Improvement and inequality sit in the same dataset: Educational inequality persists across accessibility, infrastructure, teacher availability, digital resources and social inclusion even as the aggregate indicators improve.
    2. The dimensions move together: Addressing these dimensions collectively is treated as essential, since a gain on one indicator does not carry across to the others.
    3. The paradox of progress: Regional and social imbalances continue to influence educational opportunities and learning conditions, so the national average understates what a child in a lagging district faces.

    What would a targeted equity response have to do differently?

    1. Investment directed at deprived regions: Targeted investment in educationally deprived regions is the first measure set out, in line with the National Education Policy 2020.
    2. Teacher deployment as an equity instrument: Deployment is set out as a requirement distinct from recruitment. Eg. The State spread in secondary stage ratios.
    3. Digital infrastructure as a school input: Improved digital infrastructure is named alongside physical infrastructure rather than as an add on.
    4. Dedicated support for disadvantaged groups: Stronger support for disadvantaged social groups, backed by inclusive social and economic policies, is required in addition to general spending.

    Conclusion

    India’s school education system has largely settled the access question and opened the equity question in its place. The 2025-26 data establishes progress at the national level and leaves the distribution unsettled, since the State a child studies in still predicts enrolment, teacher availability and completion. Progress will read as equity only when the distance between the best and the worst performing States narrows on the same indicators that have improved nationally.

    “[2022, GS2, 15 marks] The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 remains inadequate in promoting incentive-based system for children’s education without generating awareness about the importance of schooling. Analyse.”

  • Dimagi Naxal frames the mind as a security question

    Why in the News

    The Prime Minister’s Independence Day address named the dimagi Naxal, the intellectual Naxal, as a target of the state’s response to Left Wing Extremism (LWE). The address is defended as doing what Indian political discourse had avoided for four decades. The war against Naxalism had been measured in body counts, arms recoveries and district maps turning from red to green, and the architecture of ideas behind the insurgency was rarely confronted. The claim now advanced is that naming the ideological network forces a final battle on the deadliest terror threat to have plagued India. What that opens is a contest over whether a state can move against an ideology without moving against protected speech.

    What does the term dimagi Naxal name?

    1. The ideological support network rather than the armed cadre: The term identifies those who supply the intellectual and organisational scaffolding of the insurgency instead of carrying weapons for it.
    2. Why the coinage matters: Naming that layer shifts the counter insurgency target from territory held to ideas circulated, which no previous formulation did.
    3. Where it was used: The formulation was made from the Red Fort on Independence Day, which places it in the government’s highest profile annual statement of priorities.

    Why does the argument treat Naxalism as an ideology before a militia?

    1. The founding case: Naxalism was always an ideology before it was a militia, and the ideologue of Naxalbari theorised, organised and incited others towards armed revolution rather than acting out of personal deprivation.
    2. The social origin of the leadership: Naxal leadership across generations has been drawn from comfortable, often landed or urban intellectual backgrounds.
    3. The stated political objective: Naxals seek to overthrow the Republic of India along with its bourgeois constitution and to establish a communist state. That state is to liquidate class enemies by armed revolution.
    4. The view of the Indian state itself: Underground cadre, overground members and sympathisers hold that India is an artificial and illegitimate entity denying the right of self determination to different nationalities and working at the behest of international capital.

    What did the shift to urban expansion after 2009 change?

    1. The decision and its trigger: After Operation Green Hunt in 2009, Maoists decided to expand aggressively in urban centres and to hide in plain sight.
    2. The cover adopted: Cadre positioned themselves as human rights activists, university professors, journalists and even corporate employees.
    3. The functions assigned: The stated aims are to act as couriers, to provide safe houses for cadres of banned outfits, to stall action against terror groups, to wage an ideological war on the Indian state and to promote anarchy.
    4. The vocabulary used: Propaganda is packaged in acceptable terminology such as human rights, Dalit assertion, farmer issues and individual rights, with the ostensible aim of justice for the marginalised.
    5. What is not stated publicly: The theoretical framework behind that vocabulary associates freedom from hunger and poverty with the balkanisation of India, which makes it a messianic cult in the form of a secular ideology.

    Why did the ecosystem’s attack shift to development itself?

    1. The doctrine that worked: The government’s counter Naxal doctrine has rested on a triad of security, rehabilitation and development.
    2. The response it provoked: Because the doctrine worked on the ground, the Naxal intellectual ecosystem shifted its attack to development itself.
    3. What is now opposed: Nuclear power projects, agricultural modernisation programmes and infrastructure corridors have been opposed by a recurring cast of civil society groups.
    4. The stated basis of the objection: The objection advanced is not a specific local grievance or a flaw in the project but the writ of the Indian state in that territory.

    What does the movement’s own history suggest about resurgence?

    1. The first wave and its collapse: The first wave of Naxalism was crushed by the mid 1970s.
    2. The interval before its return: It resurfaced two decades later, which shows that suppression of the armed layer alone does not settle the question.
    3. The peak of the second wave: By the mid 2000s nearly a third of the country’s territory lay in the Red Corridor.

    How has the mode of ideological transmission changed?

    1. The old method: Ideologues had to organise physically, travel to villages, print pamphlets and hold clandestine meetings.
    2. The new method: Their successors use smartphones and build a following on Instagram, YouTube and X by monetising a persona built around resistance.
    3. What has and has not changed: The medium has changed and the incitement is more diffuse, and the function is unchanged, which is manufacturing moral cover for anti state violence and instability.
    4. Why participation has widened: Others join for the allure of resistance as a cultural posture or for the profit that anti establishment content generates, without following where the argument leads.

    Can the state contest an ideology without policing lawful dissent?

    1. The stake as the argument puts it: If the Naxals succeed there will be no freedom or liberty, no police but a party militia, no rule of law or courts but kangaroo courts, and intellectuals and professors sent to labour camps.
    2. Why bluntness is defended: People must know what the ideology stands for and the consequences that follow if it prevails.
    3. The asymmetry that closes the argument: A government can be voted out at the next election, and a state that collapses cannot be voted back.
    4. The unresolved edge: The categories the formulation names are professors, journalists and activists, so the test of the doctrine is whether it distinguishes material support for a banned organisation from lawful advocacy that the state finds inconvenient.

    Challenges to the counter Naxal doctrine

    1. A security vacuum follows the withdrawal of central forces: Handing territory back to thin State police forces creates gaps that splinter groups and criminal networks occupy. Eg. Areas cleared in earlier operations in the 1970s were reoccupied two decades later. Fix. Convert forward operating bases into permanent State police stations with local recruitment before central armed police forces are drawn down.
    2. Former cadre turn to organised crime: An insurgency deprived of ideology retains its weapons, terrain knowledge and extortion networks. Eg. Maoist financing in Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh already ran on levies from contractors and transporters. Fix. Tie surrender and rehabilitation payments to verified livelihood placement over several years rather than to a one time cash grant.
    3. Absentee administration in the cleared districts: Security gains do not hold where teachers, doctors and revenue officials do not report to their posted stations. Eg. Interior blocks of Bastar have run on deputation and vacancy for years. Fix. Pay a hardship differential and fix minimum tenure norms so that posting to an interior block is a career step rather than a punishment.
    4. Rejected forest rights claims reopen the original grievance: Land alienation is the grievance the insurgency was built on, and the statutory remedy is under used. Eg. Community Forest Rights claims face high rejection rates in the same districts that were worst affected. Fix. Audit rejected claims at the district level under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 and record reasons for each rejection in writing.
    5. Peace attracts the extraction that caused the conflict: A district declared safe becomes available for mining and industrial investment, which brings displacement back. Eg. Iron ore and bauxite belts overlap almost exactly with the former Red Corridor. Fix. Require Gram Sabha consent under the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 and transparent use of District Mineral Foundation funds before new leases are cleared.
    6. Prosecuting the overground network is evidentially hard: Cases built on association rather than on an act collapse in court and produce long undertrial detention in the interim. Eg. Several urban prosecutions under anti terror law have run for years without trial beginning. Fix. Require sanctioning authorities to record specific evidence of material support before charges are framed, and impose statutory timelines on trial commencement.

    Conclusion

    The formulation moves counter insurgency from a territorial contest to a contest over ideas, at the point where the armed movement has been declared defeated and its support network has not. The government’s own record shows that suppression of the armed layer without settling the grievance produced a second wave two decades later, which is the case for confronting the ideology rather than only the militia. What remains unresolved is the line between the material support network the state may lawfully dismantle and the criticism a democracy is obliged to tolerate, and that line will be drawn by courts rather than by speeches.

    “[2025, GS3, 10 marks] The Government of India recently stated that Left Wing Extremism (LWE) will be eliminated by 2026. What do you understand by LWE and how are the people affected by it? What measures have been taken by the government to eliminate LWE?”

  • How JNU’s admission model gives marginalised students a leg-up

    Why in the News

    A division bench of the Delhi High Court has allowed Jawaharlal Nehru University to continue applying its “deprivation points” model in admissions, subject to the final outcome of the challenge to it. That challenge was brought by an aspirant to a postgraduate course at the university, and the substantive plea is still being heard by a single judge. The model, in place in some form since the 1970s, awards additional points on the entrance test score to candidates from backward districts, to women and transgender applicants, and to Kashmiri migrants. What is contested is whether adding measured points for regional and structural disadvantage produces a truer ranking of ability, or whether it displaces the entrance test as the basis of selection.

    What is the deprivation points model?

    1. A weighting added to the entrance score: Applicants to undergraduate and postgraduate courses can be awarded a maximum of 12 deprivation points, which are added to the entrance test score before final merit is determined.
    2. It targets disadvantage the reservation categories do not capture: The points are directed at candidates from backward regions, at women and transgender persons, and at displaced groups, cutting across social category.
    3. It is unique to one university: No other institution in the country operates a comparable points based deprivation weighting in admissions.
    4. Its age is part of its standing: The model has been part of the university’s admissions process in some form since the 1970s.

    How are the points calculated?

    1. The district of origin is the first determinant: Districts are classified for the current admissions cycle into Quartile 1, meaning backward, and Quartile 2, meaning relatively less backward.
    2. Four Census indicators fix the quartile: The classification uses the percentage of female illiteracy, the percentage of agricultural workers, the percentage of rural population, and the percentage of households with no toilet within the premises.
    3. Undergraduate weighting: A candidate gets six points for a Quartile 1 district and four points for a Quartile 2 district.
    4. Postgraduate weighting: The corresponding figures are three points and two points respectively.
    5. Kashmiri migrants: The system provides five deprivation points to Kashmiri migrant candidates.
    6. Female and transgender candidates, higher band: They receive seven points where they fall within categories including Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, Other Backward Classes, Person with Disability, Quartile 1 or Quartile 2.
    7. Female and transgender candidates, base band: They receive five points where they are from the unreserved category and do not fall in either district quartile.
    8. Which programmes it covers: Points are awarded for undergraduate, postgraduate, certificate of proficiency and advanced diploma of proficiency programmes, and doctoral programmes were excluded in 2017 after the university adopted the 2016 University Grants Commission admission guidelines.

    How has the system changed over time?

    1. The parameters have never been fixed: Both the number of points and the criteria used to identify deprivation have been revised repeatedly over the decades.
    2. It was withdrawn once and brought back: The system was withdrawn in 1984 and restored from 1995-96 after pressure from the students’ union, in a modified form.
    3. Research degrees were carved out in 2017: Deprivation points were discontinued for Master of Philosophy and doctoral admissions. They were retained for undergraduate and postgraduate admissions.
    4. Controversy has tracked it throughout: The model has drawn objection at intervals since its introduction, of which the present writ challenge is the latest instance.

    Why was the system put in place?

    1. To stop the university selecting for prior advantage: It was introduced so that the university did not merely draw students who had already benefited from greater educational opportunities.
    2. The founding mandate was national, not local: The university was created by an Act of Parliament and was not established for Delhi alone, so it was expected to draw talent from across the country.
    3. Test scores are an incomplete measure of merit: Academic performance alone cannot be treated as a complete measure of merit when candidates come from vastly different social, economic and regional circumstances.
    4. It equalises the conditions of competition: Districts were grouped by objective indicators of development, with candidates from more deprived regions receiving additional weightage, so that the comparison between candidates is made on more comparable terms.

    Does adding points to an entrance score redefine merit or dilute it?

    1. The innovation is that it is not category based: The model turns on the structural deprivation and inequalities that shape educational opportunity, rather than on the social category a candidate belongs to.
    2. It reaches disadvantage that reservation does not: A quota operates on identity, so it cannot distinguish between a candidate from a metropolitan school and one from a district with high female illiteracy and no household sanitation.
    3. Geography carries socio historical marginalisation: Any understanding of merit becomes more complicated once region and location are recognised as determinants of the opportunity a candidate had.
    4. The counter case is procedural, not ideological: The challenge before the Delhi High Court does not dispute that regional disadvantage exists, it questions whether an award of up to 12 points on an entrance score is a proportionate way to correct for it.

    What does cross country evidence show about targeted admission measures?

    1. The practice is widespread but not universal: Around one third of the world’s countries use affirmative action or targeted quotas to improve educational access, according to the 2026 Global Education Monitoring Report of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
    2. Geography is an accepted basis elsewhere too: Those measures include quotas and weightings based on geographic or development indicators, not only on social identity.
    3. Five countries are named as showing results: The report records that India, Brazil, China, Israel and Sri Lanka have seen increased enrolment among under represented groups because of targeted measures.
    4. The evidence establishes direction, not design: The report speaks to enrolment outcomes at the national level, so it supports the case for targeting without settling how many points a specific indicator should carry.

    Challenges to the deprivation points model

    1. District level indicators miss intra district inequality: A quartile score attaches to a whole district, so an affluent urban household inside a backward district collects the same points as a landless household in the same district. Eg. Backward districts routinely contain a district headquarters town with private schooling of metropolitan standard. Fix. Compute the weighting from the candidate’s school and block of study rather than from the district of domicile alone.
    2. The indicator set is anchored to ageing Census data: Female illiteracy, agricultural worker share, rural population share and household sanitation are drawn from Census figures that predate a decade of change in each. Eg. Household sanitation coverage changed substantially across districts after the national sanitation mission, which the underlying figures do not reflect. Fix. Recompute district quartiles against the Census 2027 returns and fix a mandatory revision cycle thereafter.
    3. Domicile is provable and therefore gameable: Points that depend on the district of origin create an incentive to establish a domicile record in a Quartile 1 district. Eg. Domicile and residence certificates for educational benefit have been a recurring subject of litigation in State admissions. Fix. Verify the district claim against the school of last attendance rather than against a residence certificate.
    4. Additive points interact unpredictably with statutory quotas: A candidate can hold both a reserved category seat entitlement and a high deprivation score, which compounds two corrections applied for overlapping reasons. Eg. A Scheduled Caste woman from a Quartile 1 district draws the maximum deprivation band on top of category reservation. Fix. Publish the category wise cut off effect of the points each cycle, so the combined weighting is visible and can be calibrated.
    5. Admission support is not the same as completion support: Points widen entry, but the language, foundational and financial gaps that follow entry are not addressed by the admission formula. Eg. Dropout and completion gaps for first generation entrants persist even in institutions with strong entry side affirmative action. Fix. Attach a funded bridge programme and mentorship entitlement to every candidate admitted on deprivation points.
    6. The scheme rests on university policy, not on statute: Because the model is an executive decision of the academic council, it can be withdrawn or curtailed without any legislative process. Eg. It was withdrawn in 1984 and restored only after sustained student mobilisation. Fix. Embed the deprivation weighting in the university’s statutes so that any change requires approval by the university’s statutory bodies and the visitor.

    Conclusion

    The model’s real claim is not that it helps disadvantaged candidates, which any quota does, but that it measures disadvantage on indicators that a category based quota cannot see, and applies the correction as a graded score rather than a reserved seat. Its weakness is the same as its strength, since a weighting anchored to district averages and dated indicators will always be blunt at the level of the individual candidate. The Delhi High Court has left the system operating for now, and the substantive question of whether a 12 point addition to an entrance score is a proportionate correction is still before a single judge.

    Affirmative action in Indian higher education

    1. What it covers: Affirmative action in admissions operates through reserved seats, relaxed qualifying marks and, in a small number of institutions, additional weightage on entrance scores.
    2. The statutory reservation in central institutions: Central educational institutions reserve 15 per cent of seats for Scheduled Castes, 7.5 per cent for Scheduled Tribes, 27 per cent for Other Backward Classes excluding the creamy layer, and 10 per cent for the Economically Weaker Sections.
    3. The access problem it addresses: The Gross Enrolment Ratio in higher education stands at about 28.4 per cent, well short of the National Education Policy 2020 target of 50 per cent by 2035.
    4. The scale of the system: India runs the world’s second largest higher education system, with total enrolment of roughly 4.65 crore students across more than 1,168 universities and 45,473 colleges.

    Constitutional framework governing affirmative action in education

    1. Article 15(4): Enables the state to make special provision for the advancement of socially and educationally backward classes and for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
    2. Article 15(5): Enables reservation in admission to educational institutions, including private unaided institutions, other than minority institutions.
    3. Article 15(6): Enables reservation of up to 10 per cent of seats for the Economically Weaker Sections among citizens not covered by the earlier clauses.
    4. Article 29(2): Bars denial of admission to any state maintained or state aided educational institution on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them.
    5. Article 46: Directs the state to promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections, in particular the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
    6. Article 21A: Guarantees free and compulsory education to all children between six and fourteen years, which is the foundation stage the higher education gaps trace back to.

    Laws and rules governing reservation in educational institutions

    1. Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admission) Act, 2006: Prescribes the category wise reservation of seats in central educational institutions and provides for annual increases in intake so that unreserved seats are not reduced.
    2. Constitution (One Hundred and Third Amendment) Act, 2019: Inserted Articles 15(6) and 16(6) to create the Economically Weaker Sections reservation in education and public employment.
    3. Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in Teachers’ Cadre) Act, 2019: Restores the institution as the unit for computing teaching post reservation, in place of the department wise roster.
    4. Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009: Requires private unaided schools to reserve at least 25 per cent of entry level seats for children from disadvantaged groups and weaker sections.
    5. University Grants Commission Act, 1956: Establishes the Commission with power to determine and maintain standards in higher education. The Commission issues admission guidelines binding on universities under that power.

    Government initiatives for educational access of disadvantaged groups

    1. PM Young Achievers Scholarship Award Scheme for Vibrant India: Provides scholarships to students from Other Backward Classes, Economically Backward Classes and De notified Tribes for schooling and higher education.
    2. National Fellowship for Scheduled Caste Students: Funds Master of Philosophy and doctoral research by Scheduled Caste scholars in recognised universities and institutions.
    3. National Overseas Scholarship: Funds postgraduate and doctoral study abroad for Scheduled Caste, De notified Tribe, landless agricultural labourer and traditional artisan candidates.
    4. Ishan Uday: A special scholarship scheme of the University Grants Commission for students from the North Eastern region pursuing general degree and technical courses.
    5. Pradhan Mantri Uchchatar Shiksha Protsahan Yojana: Provides central sector scholarships to meritorious students from low income families for undergraduate and postgraduate study.

    Back2Basics: Jawaharlal Nehru University

    1. What it is: A central university funded through the University Grants Commission and administered under the Ministry of Education, with the President of India as its visitor.
    2. Its academic character: It is organised around schools and centres rather than conventional departments, and is oriented predominantly towards postgraduate and research programmes.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2024, GS1, 15 marks] Despite comprehensive policies for equity and social justice, underprivileged sections are not yet getting the full benefits of affirmative action envisaged by the Constitution. Comment.”

  • CMs going abroad: The rules around political clearance

    Why in the News

    The Telangana Chief Minister’s visit to the United States has been cancelled after the Ministry of External Affairs denied “clearance from political angle”. The refusal invokes a standing requirement. Every public servant, including the elected head of a State government, must obtain political clearance from the Union government before travelling abroad. That requirement was last formalised in a Cabinet Secretariat circular of 6 May 2015. That circular made prior political clearance and clearance under the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010 mandatory for such travel. The contest is over an executive discretion that decides whether a State’s chief executive may travel abroad at all.

    What is political clearance?

    1. A Union permission for foreign travel by officials: Political clearance is an approval granted by the Ministry of External Affairs before any public servant undertakes a foreign trip.
    2. Its coverage is not limited to senior functionaries: It is required not only for public servants at the top of the administration but for any government servant travelling abroad.
    3. Its stated purpose is foreign policy screening: The system exists to ensure that official foreign visits do not carry diplomatic or foreign policy implications that the government has not assessed.
    4. It is a precondition, not a formality: No other clearance in the chain is processed until political clearance has been obtained.

    On what basis is clearance granted or refused?

    1. The nature of the event: What the visit is for, and whether the occasion is one at which an Indian official presence carries diplomatic weight.
    2. The level of participation from other countries: Who else is attending and at what rank, which determines the protocol implications of an Indian participant.
    3. The kind of invitation extended: Who issued the invitation and through which channel, which is where a direct approach by a foreign mission to a State government becomes an issue.
    4. India’s relations with the host country: The current state of the bilateral relationship, which can make an otherwise routine visit sensitive.
    5. The volume is substantial: The Ministry receives hundreds of requests for political clearance every month from ministries, secretaries, bureaucrats and other officials.
    6. The process has been online since 2016: Applications can be made on the Ministry’s portal at epolclearance.gov.in, and clearance is issued after coordination among various divisions of the Ministry.

    What clearances must a Chief Minister obtain?

    1. Two authorities must be informed: Chief Ministers, along with State and Union Territory ministers, must inform both the Cabinet Secretariat and the Ministry of External Affairs about any foreign visit.
    2. Private travel is not exempt: The requirement applies whether the visit is official or private.
    3. Two clearances are mandatory: The Cabinet Secretariat circular of 6 May 2015 states that prior political clearance and clearance under the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010 are mandatory.
    4. A third clearance comes from the finance side: Chief Ministers, State ministers and other State officials also need clearance from the Department of Economic Affairs, with a copy of the application sent to the Secretary of that Department.
    5. The sequence is fixed: The Department of Economic Affairs and the administrative ministry concerned will entertain an application only if the Ministry of External Affairs political clearance is attached to it.

    How do the rules differ for Union ministers and Members of Parliament?

    1. Union ministers face a second gate: After obtaining political clearance from the Ministry of External Affairs, a Union minister needs additional clearance from the Prime Minister, whether the trip is official or personal.
    2. Members of the Lok Sabha go to the Speaker: Clearance for a Lok Sabha member is granted by the Speaker of the House.
    3. Members of the Rajya Sabha go to the Chairperson: Clearance for a Rajya Sabha member is granted by the Chairperson of that House.
    4. The pattern is significant: Union ministers and Members of Parliament are cleared within their own institution. A State Chief Minister is cleared by an authority outside the State’s own structure.

    What does the record of past denials show?

    1. Refusal is not a new development: Political clearance being denied to a Chief Minister has happened repeatedly across governments of different parties.
    2. A Delhi Chief Minister was refused twice: In 2022 the then Delhi Chief Minister had to cancel a Singapore visit after not receiving clearance, and in October 2019 the Centre had not approved his attendance at another conference abroad.
    3. Refusals also occurred under the previous Union government: During the earlier United Progressive Alliance government, the Ministry denied political clearance for trips by the then Chief Minister of Assam, who belonged to the Congress, to the United States and Israel.
    4. Party affiliation did not decide the outcome: The same government also denied clearance to the then Chief Minister of Jharkhand, who belonged to the Bharatiya Janata Party, for a visit to Thailand.

    What grounds has the Ministry cited for refusing a Chief Minister’s travel?

    1. Channel of invitation as a ground: For a proposed New York visit on 2 April 2012 for a “high level meeting”, the Ministry recorded that direct correspondence by a diplomatic mission with a State government was inappropriate. The objection was to the route of the invitation, not to the substance of the meeting.
    2. Protocol capacity as a ground: For a proposed visit to Israel for an event on water and environment technology, the Ministry recorded that the agencies concerned would be hard put to provide special consideration for a Chief Minister, both from the substantive and the protocol angles.
    3. Neither ground turns on foreign policy risk: Both refusals rest on how a State government engages a foreign mission and on the resources a mission can spare, rather than on any assessed diplomatic consequence of the visit.
    4. The reasons are not published as a rule: These grounds surfaced through disclosed file notings, not through any obligation to communicate reasons to the applicant.

    Is political clearance a foreign policy filter or a check on State autonomy?

    1. Foreign affairs is genuinely a Union subject: Entries 10 to 14 of the Union List place foreign affairs, diplomatic representation and treaty implementation exclusively with the Union, so a clearance requirement has a constitutional foundation.
    2. The State interest is economic, not diplomatic: States compete for investment through overseas roadshows and investor summits, so a travel refusal directly affects a State’s own economic strategy rather than the country’s foreign policy.
    3. The record cuts both ways: The pattern of past refusals weakens the charge that the instrument is purely partisan, and it equally shows that the discretion runs without a settled standard whoever is in office.

    Challenges to the political clearance system

    1. Discretion without published criteria invites the charge of bias: A refusal that cannot be tested against a written standard will always be read politically, whatever the actual reason. Eg. Past refusals to Chief Ministers were each read at the time as partisan acts. Fix. Notify a written clearance policy listing the grounds of refusal and require that the applicable ground be communicated in every rejection.
    2. No timeline means a delay works as a refusal: Where no decision deadline exists, a pending file achieves the same result as a denial once the event date passes. Eg. Conference and summit invitations carry fixed dates that a delayed clearance renders moot. Fix. Fix a statutory outer limit of fifteen working days, after which clearance is deemed granted.
    3. Multiple clearances multiply points of failure: A Chief Minister needs the Ministry of External Affairs, the Cabinet Secretariat and the Department of Economic Affairs to act in sequence, and each can stall. Eg. The finance side will not even open a file until the political clearance is attached to it. Fix. Route the entire chain through the single existing online portal with a common tracking number and visible stage wise status.
    4. No forum reviews a refusal: There is no appellate authority, so the only remedy is writ litigation, which is slower than any travel schedule. Eg. Cancelled visits are typically abandoned rather than litigated. Fix. Designate an appellate authority in the Cabinet Secretariat with a seven day disposal requirement.
    5. States have no institutional channel for external economic engagement: Investment promotion by States is treated case by case through the clearance route rather than through a standing mechanism. Eg. States conduct overseas investor roadshows without any permanent Union State coordination forum for external economic engagement. Fix. Constitute a standing States division consultation under the Ministry of External Affairs to pre clear recurring categories of economic travel.
    6. The instrument has no statutory basis: The entire regime rests on executive circulars, so its scope can be widened or narrowed without legislative scrutiny. Eg. The governing instrument for Chief Ministers is a Cabinet Secretariat circular of 2015. Fix. Place the clearance framework in subordinate legislation laid before Parliament, so changes to its scope are on the record.

    Conclusion

    The refusal is not an unprecedented act, and the constitutional basis for a Union filter on official foreign travel is not seriously in doubt, since foreign affairs sits squarely on the Union List. What the episode exposes is that the filter operates through executive circulars alone, which is what allows every refusal to be read as a political act. Until the grounds of refusal are codified and a review route exists, an instrument designed to protect foreign policy coherence will keep producing federal friction it was never meant to create.

    What is the current status of Centre State relations in India?

    1. The division of powers is constitutionally fixed: Legislative competence is distributed through the Seventh Schedule across the Union List, the State List and the Concurrent List, with residuary powers vesting in Parliament.
    2. The scheme is federal with strong unitary features: Parliament may alter State boundaries without State consent, may legislate on a State List subject in the national interest, and central law prevails over State law on the Concurrent List.
    3. The fiscal position of States has weakened: The States’ effective share of the Centre’s gross tax revenue fell from about 35 per cent in the 2015 to 2020 period to roughly 31 per cent in 2020 to 2024, even as the recommended devolution share stands at 41 per cent.
    4. The standing dialogue forum is largely dormant: The Inter State Council under Article 263 meets infrequently, and its recommendations carry no binding force.

    Constitutional provisions related to Centre State relations

    1. Articles 245 and 246 with the Seventh Schedule: Distribute legislative power between Parliament and the State Legislatures across three enumerated lists.
    2. Union List entries 10 to 14: Place foreign affairs, diplomatic and consular representation, United Nations organisations, participation in international conferences, and entering into and implementing treaties exclusively with the Union.
    3. Article 248: Vests residuary legislative power, over subjects in none of the three lists, in Parliament.
    4. Article 254: Provides that a central law prevails over an inconsistent State law on a Concurrent List subject.
    5. Article 256: Requires every State to exercise its executive power so as to ensure compliance with laws made by Parliament, and empowers the Union to give directions to that end.
    6. Article 257: Empowers the Union to direct a State so that the State’s executive power does not impede the exercise of Union executive power.
    7. Article 263: Empowers the President to establish an Inter State Council to inquire into and advise on disputes and on subjects of common interest between States and the Union.
    8. Article 282: Allows the Union to make grants for any public purpose, which is the route for discretionary transfers outside the Finance Commission award.

    Major debates surrounding Indian federalism

    1. How federal the Constitution actually is: One reading treats India as a unitary state with subsidiary federal features, and the competing reading treats the Centre and the States as co equal within their respective fields, bound by a duty of cooperation.
    2. The office of the Governor: Delays in granting assent to State legislation and the use of discretionary powers have made the Governor the most contested institutional link in the federal chain.
    3. Population based devolution and the North South gap: Southern States argue that devolution formulas anchored in population penalise States that achieved demographic stabilisation, and the delimitation exercise sharpens the same dispute.
    4. Fiscal autonomy after the Goods and Services Tax: States have lost the power to vary rates on most goods, which removes the principal instrument they held for responding to a local revenue shock.
    5. Conditional transfers and scheme design: Centrally Sponsored Schemes require States to find matching funds for programmes designed centrally, which converts State budgets into co financing instruments for Union priorities.

    Back2Basics: Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010

    1. What it regulates: It governs the acceptance and utilisation of foreign contribution and foreign hospitality by individuals, associations and companies in India.
    2. Who administers it: The Foreigners Division of the Ministry of Home Affairs, which grants registration and prior permission and can suspend or cancel a registration.
    3. Why it applies to official travel: Acceptance of foreign hospitality, which includes travel, boarding or lodging costs borne by a foreign source, requires prior permission for public servants and legislators.
    4. Who is barred outright: Election candidates, judges, government servants, members of legislatures, journalists and office bearers of political parties are prohibited from accepting foreign contribution.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2024, GS2, 15 marks] What changes has the Union Government recently introduced in the domain of Centre-State relations? Suggest measures to be adopted to build the trust between the Centre and the States and for strengthening federalism.”