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Type: Explained

These Newscards correspond to the explained section of various newspapers. They become immensely important for both prelims and mains and special attention needs to be paid to them

  • Take Bishkek to BRICS

    Take Bishkek to BRICS

    Why in the News

    The Bishkek SCO summit offered India a preview of the challenges awaiting BRICS: balancing strategic autonomy, geopolitical rivalry, institutional cooperation and an increasingly diverse, difficult-to-align membership.

    Why is Central Asia’s diversification an opening for India?

    1. A region loosening one dependence: Central Asia was shaped by its Soviet past and still maintains economic links with Russia, but its five countries no longer treat Moscow as their sole partner.
    2. China, Iran and the Gulf as alternatives: The region now looks to China for trade, investment and infrastructure, and to Iran and the Gulf for access to the south. The ongoing conflict complicates the southern route.
    3. Shared security concerns: The region’s growing strategic importance and shared concerns, including terrorism, are what led India and all Central Asian states except Turkmenistan to establish strategic partnerships, which gives India standing before the summit began.

    How can India build connectivity without a land route?

    1. Geography blocks the direct routes: There is no overland access through Pakistan, and Afghanistan’s airspace remains beset by security risks. The absence of direct land access has constrained trade and wider economic and cultural engagement.
    2. Connectivity as strategic geography: Connectivity goes beyond roads and railways. It shapes the economic and strategic geography of Eurasia, so India must expand engagement in ways that overcome the limits geography imposes.
    3. Start with what does not travel by road: The starting point is products and services that do not depend on roads, namely services, digital systems and technological investments.

    Why is the SCO a weak platform for India’s terrorism agenda?

    1. What India asked for: The Prime Minister called on the international community to collectively dismantle the ecosystem of terror, including its financing and recruitment networks.
    2. The will has weakened: International political will against terrorism has weakened over the past year, and the forum reflects that shift.
    3. Pakistan’s recovered standing: Over the past year Pakistan has largely overcome its diplomatic isolation, and it is set to assume the SCO’s rotational chairmanship.
    4. A forum that could not agree on words: In June last year the SCO defence ministers could not agree on the references to terrorism in their joint statement.
    5. China’s financial weight: China possesses greater financial resources than any other member and is heavily investing in Central Asian infrastructure under the Belt and Road Initiative, which sets the forum’s centre of gravity.

    Why should bilateral ties be the objective inside a multilateral forum?

    1. Weight on individual partnerships: Given the forum’s limits, Delhi should place greater weight on its individual partnerships with member states.
    2. The Uzbekistan uranium agreement: The agreement with Uzbekistan on the long-term supply of uranium is a step in that direction.
    3. Multi-vector actors want options: Central Asian countries are emerging as multi-vector actors. They seek multiple options to improve market access rather than choosing between competing powers, and India should become one of those options.
    4. The forum as a venue: A multilateral forum like the SCO is best used to advance bilateral relationships, and that is the strategy to carry forward to BRICS as India prepares to host its 18th summit.

    Conclusion

    The SCO no longer delivers on India’s terrorism agenda, and geography limits what it can deliver on connectivity. What remains useful is the room the summit gives India to sign with individual member states. The test of that approach is whether the BRICS summit in New Delhi produces bilateral agreements of the Uzbekistan uranium kind rather than only a joint declaration.

    Back2Basics: Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

    1. Origin: Founded in 2001 in Shanghai, growing out of the Shanghai Five grouping of 1996 that settled border issues between China, Russia and three Central Asian states.
    2. Membership: Ten members, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India, Pakistan, Iran and Belarus. India and Pakistan joined in 2017, Iran in 2023 and Belarus in 2024.
    3. Structure: The Secretariat is in Beijing and the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure is in Tashkent. The chairmanship rotates annually among members, and the chair hosts the next summit.

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] “IPMDA (Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness) bridges the gap between India’s SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) vision and the Quad’s collective Indo-Pacific strategy.” Make a critical assessment of the statement focusing on IPMDA.”

  • Red label for salt, sugar and fat is a good start

    Red label for salt, sugar and fat is a good start

    Why in the News

    The Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI) has proposed front-of-pack warnings (mandatory cautions printed on the front face of a packet, not in the nutrition table on the back) in the form of red hexagonal labels on packaged food high in sugar, refined carbohydrates, salt and unhealthy fats.

    Can a warning label change what people actually eat?

    1. The case for scepticism: Eating behaviour is complex and shaped by gender, economic wherewithal, awareness and faith-based restrictions, so a label competes with several stronger determinants of choice.
    2. The evidence from Chile: Chile recorded a 24 per cent drop in sugary drink consumption after it introduced black octagonal warning labels on packages in 2016, which shows that a clear front-of-pack warning can shift consumption.
    3. Why the earlier star design failed: An earlier FSSAI proposal for a health star rating was criticised because stars are perceived as positive. Warning labels bearing stars have been associated with increased consumption of unhealthy foods, so clarity and legibility decide whether a label warns or advertises.

    Why can a label be only one part of the response?

    1. A double burden: The obesity epidemic exists alongside malnutrition, so a policy that only discourages excess consumption addresses one half of India’s nutrition problem.
    2. The broader public-health response: The label must sit inside three further measures, raising nutritional awareness, stronger regulation of junk food, and nudges towards healthier lifestyles.
    3. What a label can honestly claim: A red label on a packet will not by itself make people eat better. Its value lies in making it easier to tell healthy choices from harmful ones at the point of purchase.

    Challenges to the front-of-pack warning label proposal

    1. No notification or timeline yet: The proposal has not been notified and the implementation timeline is still awaited, so the regulator’s intent has no legal force. Eg. FSSAI’s 2022 draft for an Indian Nutrition Rating star label was never operationalised and has now been replaced by this proposal.
      The Fix: Notify the regulation with dated phases so manufacturers and consumers have a fixed compliance calendar.
    2. A threshold that misses single-nutrient products: The first of two intended phases applies the label only where a product is high in two or more unhealthy ingredients, which leaves out products high in just one. Eg. A sweetened biscuit that is high in sugar but within limits for salt and fat would carry no warning in phase one.
      The Fix: Trigger the label on any single nutrient of concern crossing its limit, as Chile’s per-nutrient octagons do.
    3. A font too small to warn: The proposed font size may be too small to be effective, so the label could exist on paper without being seen on the shelf. Eg. Chile fixes a minimum size for each octagon relative to the pack face so it cannot be shrunk into the design.
      The Fix: Prescribe a minimum label area as a share of the front panel rather than a point size alone.

    Conclusion

    A warning label sorts products, it does not by itself change appetite. The Chilean result shows the sort is worth doing when the mark is unambiguous. What decides the outcome now is the notification: the date it is issued, whether phase one keeps the two-ingredient threshold, and whether the font is large enough to be read. Those three details are what to watch when FSSAI publishes the final regulation.

    Back2Basics: Food Safety and Standards Authority of India

    1. Statutory basis: FSSAI is a statutory body established under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, which consolidated earlier food laws into a single regulator.
    2. Ministry and location: It functions under the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and is headquartered in New Delhi.
    3. Mandate: It lays down science-based standards for food articles and regulates their manufacture, storage, distribution, sale and import, including labelling and display rules.

    [2024, GS2, 15 marks] In a crucial domain like the public healthcare system, the Indian State should play a vital role to contain the adverse impact of marketisation of the system. Suggest some measures through which the State can enhance the reach of public healthcare at the grassroots level.”

  • Over 7,200 CBI cases under Prevention of Corruption Act pending trial, says CVC report

    Over 7,200 CBI cases under Prevention of Corruption Act pending trial, says CVC report

    Why in the News

    The Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) has reported in its annual report that over 7,200 cases investigated by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 were awaiting completion of trial at the end of 2025.

    Where does the anti-corruption pipeline stall?

    1. Trials run past two decades: More than 400 of the 7,229 pending Prevention of Corruption Act trials have been open for over 20 years.
    2. Appeals add a second backlog: 14,083 appeals, revisions and writ petitions under the Act were pending in the High Courts and the Supreme Court.
    3. Over a third of those are more than a decade old: 3,161 were 10 to 15 years old, 1,347 were 15 to 20 years old and 739 were over 20 years old.
    4. The wider trial load is larger still: Counting cases outside the Act, 11,510 CBI court cases were pending trial at the end of the year.

    What do the investigation and conviction figures show?

    1. Convictions improved: The conviction rate in CBI cases was 71.71 percent in 2025 against 69.14 percent in 2024.
    2. Investigation pendency is small by comparison: 755 corruption related cases were pending investigation, made up of 679 regular cases, 63 preliminary enquiries and 13 Lokpal references (cases the Lokpal has referred to the CBI for investigation).
    3. A year is the usual limit, and 274 cases crossed it: Of the 679 regular cases, 274 had been pending for over one year.
    4. The intake in 2025: The CBI registered 797 regular cases, 177 preliminary enquiries and recorded 31 Lokpal references during the year.

    What capacity does the vigilance system have?

    1. One in seven CBI posts is vacant: Against a sanctioned strength of 7,300, 1,088 posts were vacant, with the largest gap of 672 in the executive ranks.
    2. Departmental inquiries under the Commission: For officers under CVC jurisdiction, 1,460 departmental inquiries were in process during 2025 and 731 were completed.
    3. Inquiries outside its purview: For employees outside its jurisdiction, 9,883 inquiries were in process and 5,561 were completed.
    4. Complaint disposal kept pace: The Commission received 34,153 complaints in 2025 in addition to 1,260 carried forward from 2024, and disposed of 35,193.

    Challenges to prosecuting corruption under the Prevention of Corruption Act

    1. Sanction is a gate the executive controls: Section 19 requires the government’s sanction before a court can take cognisance against a public servant, and Section 17A, added by the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018, requires prior approval even to begin an inquiry into a decision taken in official capacity. Eg. In Vineet Narain v Union of India (1997) the Supreme Court fixed a three month limit for sanction decisions, and the 2018 amendment wrote that limit, extendable by one month, into Section 19 itself.
      The Fix: Treat sanction as deemed granted when the statutory period lapses without a decision.
    2. Special courts are too few for the load: Section 3 of the Act requires trials before special judges, and the same judges carry other criminal work, so a corruption trial waits behind the general docket. Eg. In Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v Union of India the Supreme Court in 2021 recorded 4,984 pending criminal cases against legislators and directed special courts to prioritise them.
      The Fix: Designate exclusive special judges for Prevention of Corruption Act trials in every district with a CBI court, with a monthly disposal target monitored by the High Court.
    3. State consent limits where the CBI can act: Under Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 the CBI needs a State’s consent to investigate within it, and a growing list of States has withdrawn general consent so every case needs a fresh order. Eg. West Bengal withdrew general consent in November 2018, and in 2024 the Supreme Court allowed the State’s suit against the Union over CBI investigations to proceed to trial.
      The Fix: Enact a standalone CBI statute defining its jurisdiction, as the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice recommended in 2023.
    4. Deputation, not a cadre, staffs the agency: The CBI fills most executive posts by deputation from State police and central forces, so vacancies persist when States decline to release officers. Eg. In May 2013, during the coal block allocation hearing, the Supreme Court described the CBI as a “caged parrot” after the agency’s status report had been shared with the Law Minister.
      The Fix: Expand direct recruitment at the sub inspector and deputy superintendent levels and offer fixed tenure with cadre security to reduce reliance on deputation.

    Conclusion

    The Commission’s numbers show the agency’s work improving at the stages it controls and stalling at the stages it does not. The pendency now sits with the courts and the sanctioning authorities rather than with the investigators. The marker to watch is whether the next annual report shows the oldest trials closing rather than the backlog growing.

    Back2Basics: Central Vigilance Commission (CVC)

    1. Origin: Set up in 1964 on the recommendation of the Santhanam Committee on Prevention of Corruption, and made a statutory body by the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003.
    2. Composition: A Central Vigilance Commissioner and up to two Vigilance Commissioners, appointed by the President on the recommendation of a committee of the Prime Minister, the Union Home Minister and the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha.
    3. Powers over the CBI: It exercises superintendence over the CBI’s investigations of offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act by virtue of Section 4 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, and reviews the progress of those investigations.
    4. Reporting: It submits an annual report to the President, and the report is laid before both Houses of Parliament.

    [2026, GS2, 15 marks] “Transparency and accountability in governance are not about controlling corruption but about creating the trust of stakeholders in the policy process by following the Rule of Law and Participatory Governance.” Comment.”

  • SC seeks Centre’s response on use of ‘totalisers’ in EVM vote counting

    SC seeks Centre’s response on use of ‘totalisers’ in EVM vote counting

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has sought the Centre’s response on the use of “totalisers”, machines that consolidate and count votes from multiple electronic voting machine (EVM) control units at once without revealing booth-wise voting trends, as a “fall-back option”. The order came on a petition arguing that totalisers would protect voters’ privacy by concealing booth-wise voting patterns and shield them from reprisals. The Election Commission (EC) had warned the Court against the move, saying that introducing a new and unregulated mechanism at a time when the integrity of EVMs is itself under frequent public questioning could give rise to fresh allegations and controversy. The tension is between the voter’s privacy at the booth level and the booth-wise, machine-wise trail that the EC calls the backbone of a self-verifying count.

    What is a totaliser?

    1. What it does: A totaliser consolidates and counts votes from multiple EVM control units simultaneously, so the result is declared for the group rather than for each booth.
    2. How it connects: It links a cluster of 14 control units, from 14 polling stations, via a cable.
    3. What it outputs: It provides a consolidated result for each candidate across that group of EVMs, with no booth-wise breakdown.

    Why does the petitioner want totalisers?

    1. Privacy of the individual voter: Booth-wise results reveal how a locality voted, and the petitioner argued that totalisers would safeguard the privacy of individual voters.
    2. Protection from reprisals: Political parties victimise voters at the local level after identifying voting patterns in particular polling booths, and concealing the pattern removes the target.
    3. A fall-back, not a replacement: The Court framed the question to the Centre as one of a “fall-back option”, not a wholesale change in counting.

    On what legal and political grounds does the Election Commission object?

    1. The climate is wrong: The EC told the Court that the functioning and integrity of EVMs are still a subject of frequent public questioning, and that a new and as yet unregulated mechanism would further complicate public confidence in an already sensitive area.
    2. There is no law for it: Neither the Representation of the People Act, 1951 nor the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 nor any allied enactment contains a provision recognising, regulating or governing the use of a totaliser in counting.
    3. Amendments would be needed: Substantive amendments and a revision of the statutory procedure governing the counting of votes would have to be made to include totalisers.
    4. Parties have said no: Three of six national parties and 18 of 29 State parties opposed the idea, and only the Law Commission of India, in its 255th report, suggested their selective use.

    Why does the Election Commission say totalisers would reduce transparency?

    1. Counting is witnessed booth by booth: Polling and counting are conducted in the presence of candidates and their agents.
    2. Form 17C is the reconciliation tool: Candidates and agents use Form 17C to match the vote count at the end of polling and again after counting at every polling station, and those comparisons are used in adjudications before election tribunals and courts.
    3. The trail is the backbone: The one-to-one, booth-wise and EVM-wise correspondence under Form 17C is what the EC calls the backbone of the self-verifying and transparent character of counting, and that transparency gives credence to the outcome.
    4. Parties use the pattern legitimately: Knowledge of booth-level voting lets parties improve outreach in booths where they underperformed and make corrective organisational decisions.
    5. Aggregation hides faults: Totalisers would mask technical malfunction and human error in individual EVMs, since clubbed machines stand concealed within the aggregate figure and cannot be identified or independently verified by any party.
    6. The main worry: The EC’s chief concern is that totalisers would become fodder for further misapprehension about EVMs.

    Challenges to introducing totalisers

    1. Machine-level verification would lose its anchor: The Court-ordered paper trail check works per machine, and an aggregated result has no machine to check against. Eg. Association for Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India (2024) required Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) slips to be counted for five randomly selected EVMs per Assembly segment.
      The Fix: Keep the machine-wise VVPAT count and Form 17C reconciliation internal to the counting hall, and publish only the aggregated result.
    2. Small clusters still reveal patterns: In sparsely populated segments a cluster of 14 booths can map onto one or two villages, so aggregation does not conceal the locality’s vote. Eg. Hill and tribal constituencies routinely have polling stations serving a few hundred electors each.
      The Fix: Set the cluster size by elector count rather than by a fixed number of machines.
    3. The EC’s own position has moved: The Commission proposed totalisers to the Law Ministry in 2008 and the Law Commission endorsed selective use in 2015, so its present opposition invites the charge of inconsistency. Eg. The 255th report on electoral reforms cited the EC’s proposal when recommending the change.
      The Fix: Publish a reasoned position paper setting out what changed between the 2008 proposal and the present affidavit.

    Conclusion

    The Court has kept the question open and asked the Centre rather than deciding it. The next step is the Centre’s reply, and the source gives no date for it. The marker to watch is whether the Centre is willing to amend the election rules, since without that amendment the EC’s legal objection stands whatever the Court thinks of the privacy claim.

    Back2Basics: Form 17C

    1. What it is: The “Account of Votes Recorded” prepared by the presiding officer of each polling station under the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961.
    2. Part I: Records the identification numbers of the EVMs used, the total electors, the votes recorded in the machine and the number of tendered votes, and a copy goes to each polling agent at the close of poll.
    3. Part II: Records the result of counting for that machine, filled in at the counting centre and signed by the counting supervisor and candidates’ agents.
    4. Why it matters: It is the only document that lets a candidate compare votes polled at a booth with votes counted from that booth.

    [2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • Distinguished jurist: The unused route to appoint an SC judge

    Why in the News

    A sitting Supreme Court judge has called the “distinguished jurist” route to the Supreme Court under Article 124(3) an “unused mandate” of the Constitution that “needs our serious attention”. The provision has existed since the Constitution came into force, and in more than seven decades no one has been appointed under it. The judge argued that a jurist on the Bench would “diversify the Bench” and would not be “constricted by narrow technicalities”, leaving the Court better placed on public law questions. The tension is that the text permits the appointment while the process, a collegium of judges recommending candidates and Bar rules that keep academics out of practice, has never produced one.

    What is the distinguished jurist route under Article 124(3)?

    1. Three routes to the Court: Article 124(3) allows the appointment of a citizen of India who has served as a High Court judge for five years, practised as an advocate for ten years, or “is, in the opinion of the President, a distinguished jurist”.
    2. Two routes have staffed it: Most judges have been elevated from the High Courts, and a smaller number of lawyers have been appointed directly from the Bar.
    3. The third has never been used: No distinguished jurist has been appointed to the Supreme Court since 1950.

    Where did the clause come from?

    1. A Constituent Assembly amendment: H.V. Kamath moved the clause on 24 May 1949, arguing that the pool of candidates should not be “necessarily confined to Judges or Advocates”.
    2. The case he made: India needed a way to bring in men or women “possessed of outstanding legal and juristic learning” even if they had never practised law, and judges of the International Court of Justice at The Hague are chosen on similar terms.
    3. Ambedkar’s only reservation: B.R. Ambedkar did not object to the idea, wondered whether “eminent” would fit better than “distinguished”, and left the wording to the Drafting Committee, after which the amendment went through.
    4. The High Court parallel was repealed: The Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, enacted during the Emergency, added a distinguished jurist route for High Court judges under Article 217, and the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 removed it.

    What would a jurist on the Bench change?

    1. Diversity of the Bench: The judge’s argument is that a jurist brings a background the Court’s present composition, drawn from High Courts and the Bar, does not.
    2. Public law capacity: A jurist would not remain constricted by narrow technicalities and would be in a stronger position to deal with public law issues.
    3. Academia’s influence on judging: The participation of legal academia and scholars would have a defining impact on the judicial functioning of the Supreme Court.

    Why has the route never been used?

    1. Two explanations from the judge: First, the central government and later the collegium took the view that Indian academia lacks the depth for elevation to the Supreme Court; second, neither the central government nor the collegium has seriously explored the provision.
    2. Who counts as a jurist: The term is generally understood to cover anyone engaged in serious work in the practice, teaching or research of law, including those without courtroom experience.
    3. The Bar rules shut the practice door: Bar Council rules generally prevent full-time law teachers from practising law, so an academic cannot accumulate the ten years at the Bar that the second route needs.
    4. The collegium is the gate: Appointments are initiated through the collegium (the Chief Justice of India and the senior-most judges who recommend names), so a jurist must first be recommended by the Supreme Court collegium before the appointment reaches the government.
    5. The one near miss: Upendra Baxi recalled in 2015 being addressed as “Judge Baxi” by a professor whom Justice P.N. Bhagwati had told that Baxi would be made a judge within months, an appointment that never materialised.
    6. Baxi’s verdict: “The Presidents of India have been looking with a telescope and have not found any jurist worth appointing”, which led him to call the route “a dead issue”.
    7. The Bar route still works: The most recent appointment from the Bar was Justice V. Mohana, recommended by the collegium in May 2026 and sworn in the following month.

    Challenges to using the distinguished jurist route

    1. The collegium evaluates what it knows: A body of judges assesses candidates on judgments written and cases argued, which an academic does not have. Eg. The Memorandum of Procedure for Supreme Court appointments sets out consultation for High Court judges and advocates and carries no chapter on jurists.
      The Fix: Add published criteria for the jurist route to the Memorandum of Procedure, covering scholarship, public law expertise and professional standing.
    2. The President’s “opinion” has no test: The clause leaves the standard undefined, so any appointment invites challenge as arbitrary. Eg. Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2015) struck down the National Judicial Appointments Commission, leaving no body outside the judiciary to frame such a test.
      The Fix: Let the collegium adopt and publish a reasoned selection note for any jurist it recommends, as it now does for some elevations.
    3. Tenure would be short: A scholar considered at the age judges are elevated would retire at 65 within a few years, which limits the institutional gain. Eg. Justice Indu Malhotra, appointed from the Bar in 2018, served three years.
      The Fix: Consider jurists in their early fifties, matching the age at which High Court judges are elevated.
    4. The depth objection is asserted, not tested: The claim that Indian academia lacks depth has never been tested against a shortlist, and other supreme courts have seated academics without judicial or Bar seniority. Eg. The United States Supreme Court seated Felix Frankfurter from Harvard Law School in 1939 and Elena Kagan, who had never been a judge, in 2010.
      The Fix: Have the collegium consider a named shortlist of jurists at least once, so the objection rests on an assessment rather than an assumption.

    Conclusion

    The route is alive in the text and dead in practice, and the reason is procedural rather than constitutional. The status is a public call from within the Court, with no proposal from the collegium or the government to act on it. The marker to watch is whether the collegium or the Memorandum of Procedure names any criterion for the route, since without one the clause stays a dead letter.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2024, GS2, 15 marks] Explain the reasons for the growth of public interest litigation in India. As a result of it, has the Indian Supreme Court emerged as the world’s most powerful judiciary?”

  • The south’s muted voice as political power shifts north

    Why in the News

    The five southern States failed to speak with one voice on delimitation at the recently concluded 31st meeting of the Southern Zonal Council. The Karnataka Chief Minister demanded that the 1971 Census remain the basis for delimitation for another 25 years, and no other Chief Minister matched that position. The south’s “political retreat” from its once-influential national role comes amid growing anxieties over representation and federalism. The tension is between a structural shift, a Lok Sabha that a few Hindi heartland States can dominate, and a self-inflicted one, southern Chief Ministers whose dependence on New Delhi for funds has turned them into supplicants.

    Why has national politics tilted north since Independence?

    1. The national movement itself was north-led: Gandhi, Nehru, Netaji and Patel were the tallest leaders, and C. Rajagopalachari of Madras, T. Prakasam of Andhra and E.M.S. Namboodiripad of Keralam never had comparable national presence.
    2. Southern resistance is not part of the national memory: The resistance movements and anti-British revolts of the south are not valorised across the country, least of all in northern India.
    3. The early Congress was still inclusive: A galaxy of southern leaders in its leadership ranks let the original Indian National Congress be seen as an all-inclusive umbrella party.
    4. Demographics and language did the rest: Blame demographics or the penchant for a “national” language, parliamentary politics has produced northern domination, and both the Congress and the Jana Sangh and its successor the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have been led from the north.
    5. Only one full-term southern Prime Minister: In nearly eight decades of independence, only one Prime Minister from the south completed a full term, and other southern Prime Ministers were seen as placeholders.
    6. Party structures reinforce it: The domination of the Nehru-Gandhi family in the Congress, and the ideological dominance of Hindi and political dominance of the Hindi heartland in the BJP, have overshadowed southern leadership.

    Where have southern leaders of stature come from, and why not from national parties?

    1. The Congress once had strong regional leaders: K. Kamaraj and C. Subramaniam in Tamil Nadu; Neelam Sanjiva Reddy, Kasu Brahmananda Reddy, Marri Chenna Reddy and Y.S. Rajasekhara Reddy in Andhra Pradesh; S. Nijalingappa, Devaraj Urs and S.M. Krishna in Karnataka; and K. Karunakaran in Keralam.
    2. The BJP has none: The party has no south Indian leader of stature in its leadership ranks, and the one who rose from within, B.S. Yediyurappa, quickly faded.
    3. Distinction came from regional parties: M.G. Ramachandran and Jayalalithaa in Tamil Nadu, Namboodiripad in Keralam, N.T. Rama Rao in Andhra Pradesh, K. Chandrashekar Rao in Telangana, and H.D. Deve Gowda, Ramakrishna Hegde and Siddaramaiah in Karnataka all rose through regional parties or national parties with a markedly regional presence.
    4. National parties deny the space: They have rarely let southern leaders acquire a national profile, and P.V. Narasimha Rao, the first south Indian Prime Minister, owed the office largely to his Hindi-speaking skills and was denied his due place in the Congress pantheon.

    What did the Southern Zonal Council reveal about the south’s stand on delimitation?

    1. One strong intervention: The Karnataka Chief Minister also called for the Lok Sabha’s strength to be retained at the present 543 seats and for women’s reservation to be implemented.
    2. One tepid mention: The Keralam Chief Minister made only a passing reference to delimitation.
    3. One retreat: The Tamil Nadu Chief Minister revised his earlier strong opposition and sought only an assurance that States would not be denied their present proportional share of representation in the Lok Sabha.
    4. One absence: The Telangana Chief Minister missed the meeting and deputed the Deputy Chief Minister.
    5. The rest was administrative: The other demands concerned financial devolution, river water disputes and administrative issues, and the most politically consequential issue did not compel the five Chief Ministers onto a common platform.

    How has dependence on New Delhi muted the southern States?

    1. Supplication for funds: Varying degrees of dependence on the Centre make each southern State supplicate for funds and echo some of the BJP’s ideological obsessions.
    2. Andhra Pradesh as the sharpest case: The Chief Minister and Deputy Chief Minister have become more communal in their political articulation than some of the BJP’s allies in the National Democratic Alliance, and the Chief Minister’s need for central funds has diminished his stature as a representative of the Telugu people, a role his party, the Telugu Desam Party, once embodied.
    3. A Centre-State committee ignored: The committee on Centre-State relations chaired by Justice Kurian Joseph, appointed last year by the then Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam government in Tamil Nadu, received little attention in the media or among the southern leadership, a silence that amounts to Chief Ministers abdicating their responsibility.
    4. Keralam’s leadership has weakened: The former Chief Minister from the Communist Party of India (Marxist) took a submissive approach to the Union government, and over two decades both the CPI(M)-led and Congress-led alliances have been unable to make their presence felt nationally.
    5. A silent forum, and silence about it: The National Development Council (NDC) has not met even once under the present Prime Minister, and hardly anyone across the political spectrum has expressed disquiet.

    What did an assertive south once extract from Delhi?

    1. A Commission from a slogan: N.T. Rama Rao’s declaration that “The Centre is a conceptual myth”, alongside other Opposition Chief Ministers, prompted the Prime Minister to appoint the Sarkaria Commission on Centre-State relations in June 1983, and its report was widely reported and discussed.
    2. A funding formula from a coalition of States: In 1968-69, Namboodiripad mobilised the Chief Ministers of Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan to get the NDC to endorse the Gadgil Formula (the population-weighted formula for distributing Plan assistance among States).
    3. Earlier national leaderships listened: The Congress, the Janata Party and the Janata Parivar coalitions were not dismissive of southern concerns on language, Centre-State relations, allocation of funds or railway lines, and policy direction was less Hindi-heartland-centric.
    4. Those parties had a southern base: They had a consequential presence in the southern States and included influential leaders from the region, so the south did not feel its voice was stifled whatever the outcome.

    Is the south’s muted voice a product of arithmetic or of abdication?

    1. The arithmetic is already against the south: Peninsular India’s political presence in the federation is weak even under the present distribution of Lok Sabha seats.
    2. A few States can decide: The entire southern region could be rendered politically inconsequential by the strength of two and a half to three Hindi heartland States in the Lok Sabha.
    3. The delimitation design will sharpen the fear: If such scenarios enter southern political discourse, the delimitation design the Union government is pushing will only heighten political anxieties in the region.
    4. Anxiety will outrun the supplicants: Those anxieties will overwhelm the present crop of supplicant Chief Ministers, the point at which abdication stops being an option.

    Challenges to the south’s voice in national politics

    1. The seat freeze has a sunset: The freeze on Lok Sabha seat allocation lasts only until the first Census after 2026, after which a population-based readjustment reallocates seats northward. Eg. Tamil Nadu’s share of the House could fall from 7.1 percent to 6.3 percent under a population-based expansion.
      The Fix: Fix each State’s share of the Lok Sabha rather than its seat count, so any expansion preserves present proportions.
    2. Fiscal transfers also weight population: Finance Commission formulas that weight 2011 population reduce the share of States that controlled fertility early. Eg. Karnataka’s share of the divisible pool fell from 4.713 percent under the Fourteenth Finance Commission to 3.647 percent under the Fifteenth.
      The Fix: Raise the weight for demographic performance in the devolution formula so fertility decline is rewarded, not penalised.
    3. The Rajya Sabha does not protect States: Seats in the Council of States are allotted by population under the Fourth Schedule, so the second chamber replicates rather than offsets the north’s numerical weight. Eg. Uttar Pradesh holds 31 Rajya Sabha seats against Keralam’s 9.
      The Fix: Give State governments a weighted vote on Bills affecting Centre-State relations, on the model of Germany’s Bundesrat.
    4. Language policy is set centrally: Central education policy carries a language design southern States have resisted for six decades, and funds are tied to its adoption. Eg. Tamil Nadu’s two-language policy against the three-language formula of the National Education Policy, 2020, with Samagra Shiksha funds withheld over the dispute.
      The Fix: Delink scheme funding from acceptance of the language formula and leave the choice to the State, as the Constitution’s State List entry on education once did.

    Conclusion

    The south’s weakness has two sources and both are real. The seat arithmetic is beyond any Chief Minister’s control, but the failure to build a common platform is not. What to watch is whether the five southern Chief Ministers table a joint position on the basis for delimitation before the Union government’s design is legislated. Until they do, the region’s anxiety over representation has no political vehicle.

    What is the current status of Centre-State relations in India?

    1. Two commissions frame the agenda: The Sarkaria Commission, appointed in 1983 and reporting in 1988, and the Punchhi Commission of 2010 remain the reference points for reform of Centre-State relations.
    2. Plan bargaining has ended: The Planning Commission was replaced by NITI Aayog in 2015, and the NDC, the forum where States once negotiated Plan funds, has fallen dormant.
    3. Devolution stands at 41 percent: The Sixteenth Finance Commission retained the States’ share of the divisible pool at 41 percent.
    4. A delimitation design is on the table: The Constitution (One Hundred and Thirty-first Amendment) Bill, 2026 proposed expanding the Lok Sabha from 543 to 850 seats (815 for States, 35 for Union Territories) on 2011 Census data, linked the 33 percent women’s quota to that exercise, and would shift the Lok Sabha to Rajya Sabha ratio from 2.2:1 to 3.3:1.

    Constitutional Provisions Related to Centre-State Relations

    1. Article 3: Parliament may form, merge or alter States and their names without the consent of the State concerned.
    2. Article 80 and the Fourth Schedule: Rajya Sabha seats are allotted to States by population, not equally.
    3. Article 81: Fixes the composition of the Lok Sabha and the proportionality of seats to population across States.
    4. Article 82: Requires readjustment of seats after every Census by a law of Parliament.
    5. Article 263: Empowers the President to establish an Inter-State Council to inquire into and advise on inter-State disputes and common interests.
    6. Article 280: Constitutes the Finance Commission to recommend the distribution of tax proceeds between the Union and the States.
    7. Article 356: Allows President’s Rule where a State’s constitutional machinery fails.

    Laws and Rules Governing Centre-State Relations

    1. States Reorganisation Act, 1956: Creates the five Zonal Councils (Northern, Central, Eastern, Western and Southern), statutory advisory bodies chaired by the Union Home Minister with State Chief Ministers as rotating Vice-Chairpersons.
    2. Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956: Lets a State request the Centre to refer a water dispute to a tribunal whose award, once gazetted, has the force of a Supreme Court order.
    3. Inter-State Council Order, 1990: Constituted the Inter-State Council under Article 263 on the Sarkaria Commission’s recommendation.
    4. Delimitation Act, 2002: Governed the last readjustment of constituency boundaries, which was done without altering any State’s seat total.

    Challenges in Centre-State Relations

    1. Politicisation of the Governor’s office: Governors from the ruling party at the Centre have withheld assent to State Bills for years. Eg. Tamil Nadu and Kerala took their Governors to the Supreme Court over delayed assent.
      The Fix: Adopt the Punchhi Commission’s fixed five-year tenure for Governors, with appointment after consulting the Chief Minister.
    2. A dormant coordination forum: The Inter-State Council has no binding authority and meets rarely, so Centre-State disputes go to court instead of to dialogue. Eg. The Council has met only 11 times since 1990, most recently in 2016.
      The Fix: Implement the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution’s recommendation of at least three Council meetings a year, with a dedicated secretariat.
    3. Centralisation through the fiscal channel: The Centre raises revenue through cesses and surcharges that are not shared, and delays transfers that are owed. Eg. GST compensation cess payments to States were delayed between 2019 and 2022.
      The Fix: Cap cesses and surcharges at 10 percent of gross tax revenue so the divisible pool is not artificially shrunk.
    4. Rigid Centrally Sponsored Schemes: Uniform scheme parameters ignore geographic and ecological variation across States. Eg. Recent changes to the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme’s funding shifted burden onto States.
      The Fix: Allow States to customise 25 to 30 percent of scheme parameters to local needs.

    [2026, GS2, 15 marks] How far has the Indian federal framework been successful in accommodating regional and cultural diversities? Highlight the role of asymmetric federalism and suggest measures to make dispute resolution mechanisms more effective.”

  • Majority of India’s gig workers remain out of govt’s reach

    Majority of India’s gig workers remain out of govt’s reach

    Why in the News

    Only 8.58 lakh gig workers stood registered on the e-Shram portal as of the Ministry of Labour and Employment’s reply in the Rajya Sabha in January 2026, the latest publicly available figure.

    How far has the Budget’s health cover promise actually reached?

    1. Registration against the promise: The Budget’s beneficiary figure of over one crore compares with 8.58 lakh registrations on e-Shram, the figure the Ministry gave Parliament in January 2026.
    2. The optimistic case still falls short: A doubling of registrations since January would still cover only around 15 percent of the estimated gig workforce.
    3. The promise itself drove enrolment: Registrations of gig workers on e-Shram rose sharply from 2025, and the health cover announcement is the visible cause of that surge.
    4. Registration is the gate to every benefit: Registration on e-Shram is a prerequisite for availing benefits, so an unregistered gig worker is invisible to the scheme by design.

    Why does the government not know how many gig workers India has?

    1. One source for every estimate: The figure of over one crore gig workers, quoted in many government replies in Parliament last year, comes from a single document, the NITI Aayog report “India’s Booming Gig and Platform Economy” released in June 2022.
    2. What that report estimated: It put the gig workforce at around 77 lakh in 2020-21 and projected 1.27 crore in 2024-25 and 1.43 crore in the year after.
    3. No dedicated measurement effort exists: In the absence of any effort to measure the gig workforce, official estimates rely solely on this NITI Aayog report.
    4. The national labour survey does not count them: The Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) reports do not capture gig workers as a distinct category, even though the estimated gig workforce is about 2 percent of India’s total workforce of 61.6 crore as cited by the 2025 PLFS report.

    What has the government built for gig workers, and what has not arrived?

    1. e-Shram as the single register: The portal, launched in 2021, is conceptualised as an Aadhaar-seeded National Database of Unorganised Workers (NDUW) and has become the unified platform for tracking the unorganised workforce, including gig workers.
    2. A legal definition came only in 2020: The government officially defined a gig worker only in the Code on Social Security, 2020, which came into force last year.
    3. The Code’s promises remain largely on paper: The Code promised accident insurance, maternity benefits and a dedicated social security fund for gig workers, and most of these are yet to materialise.

    Where are the registered gig workers, by State and by sector?

    1. Registrations are uneven across States: The ten States with the most registered gig workers as of January 2026 are led by West Bengal (54,734), Delhi (49,479), Andhra Pradesh (39,212), Rajasthan (38,205), Karnataka (37,871), Gujarat (34,756) and Madhya Pradesh (34,351), with Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar completing the list.
    2. Urbanised southern States are missing from the top ten: Tamil Nadu (31,654), Telangana (29,951) and Keralam (11,219) are not among the ten States with the highest registrations, despite their high urbanisation.
    3. Twenty one sectors on paper, three in practice: NITI Aayog’s 2022 report listed 21 sectors with gig workers, including agriculture, healthcare, education and retail, but e-Shram registrations concentrate in the food industry, transportation, and domestic and household work.
    4. The sector shares are lopsided: The largest single sector accounts for 32.8 percent of registered gig workers, and construction (3.6 percent) and agriculture (3.4 percent) are the smallest of the top five sectors.

    Challenges to e-Shram as the gateway for gig worker welfare

    1. Enrolment depends on the worker, not the platform: e-Shram is a self-registration portal, and no aggregator is obliged to enrol the workers it engages. Eg. The Rajasthan Platform Based Gig Workers (Registration and Welfare) Act, 2023 instead makes aggregators register their workers with a State welfare board.
      The Fix: Require aggregators to push worker data into e-Shram at onboarding under the Code on Social Security, 2020, so registration stops depending on individual initiative.
    2. No survey category means no target to measure against: Without a gig work module in the labour survey, the government cannot say what share of the workforce any scheme covers. Eg. The Ministry’s January 2026 reply to Parliament could cite portal registrations but no survey count.
      The Fix: Add a platform and gig work classification to the PLFS questionnaire so coverage is measured against a surveyed denominator.
    3. The funding source has not been built: The Code provides for aggregator contributions of 1 to 2 percent of annual turnover, capped at 5 percent of payments to workers, and the fund those contributions were to feed has not materialised. Eg. Karnataka’s Platform Based Gig Workers (Social Security and Welfare) Act, 2025 levies its own transaction fee because no central fund is flowing.
      The Fix: Notify the contribution rules and the social security fund so central benefits do not depend on Budget-by-Budget announcements.
    4. State schemes fragment portability: State-level gig worker boards create separate registrations and benefits for a workforce that moves across State lines. Eg. A delivery worker registered in Rajasthan gains nothing from Karnataka’s fund on relocating.
      The Fix: Make e-Shram the single identifier that State boards read from, so benefits follow the worker across States.

    Conclusion

    The health cover promise has produced registrations faster than any earlier measure, but the register still holds a fraction of the workforce the promise was made for. The deeper problem is a denominator the state has never measured. The next e-Shram registration figure released to Parliament, and whether the Code’s social security fund is finally notified, are the two markers to watch.

    Back2Basics: Gig worker and platform worker under the Code on Social Security, 2020

    1. Gig worker: A person who performs work or participates in a work arrangement and earns from such activities outside the traditional employer-employee relationship.
    2. Platform worker: A person in platform work, meaning work arranged through an online platform that connects organisations or individuals with workers to provide specific services for payment.
    3. Aggregator: A digital intermediary or marketplace through which a buyer or user connects with a seller or service provider, the entity the Code identifies for contributions.
    4. Why the definitions matter: They are the first statutory recognition of gig work in India, and eligibility for the Code’s social security schemes is tied to them.

    [2024, GS3, 15 marks] Discuss the merits and demerits of the four ‘Labour Codes’ in the context of labour market reforms in India. What has been the progress so far in this regard?”

  • Foreign Assets Disclosure Scheme: Concerns rise over high fee on ESOPs, small investments

    Why in the News

    The Foreign Assets of Small Taxpayers – Disclosure Scheme (FAST-DS), launched on 16 August, charges a flat Rs 1 lakh fee to disclose a foreign asset that was already taxed or acquired as a non-resident but was not declared in the income tax return. Salaried employees holding unreported employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) and restricted stock units (RSUs) (shares granted by an employer as part of pay, vesting over time) must pay the fee even where they made no gain. The scheme was proposed in this year’s Budget to address the “practical issues of small taxpayers like students, young professionals, tech employees, relocated NRIs”. The tension is between a fee designed as a low-cost route to compliance and a flat amount that exceeds the value of many of the assets it is meant to regularise.

    What are the two categories under FAST-DS?

    1. Where the complaints sit: The dispute is entirely about Category (ii), where the asset was never untaxed and the only lapse is non-disclosure in the return.
    2. The alternative the Act blocks: The Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015 does not recognise an updated return for income that was never taxed or disclosed, so an updated return does not cure the lapse.

    Why does a flat fee fall hardest on the smallest disclosers?

    1. Fee exceeding the asset: A salaried individual who invested Rs 90,000 in United States-listed stocks, now trading at a loss, must pay Rs 1 lakh upfront to disclose the loss-making holding. The transfer already appeared in the Annual Information Statement (AIS) of his return; only the separate Schedule FA entry was missing.
    2. Fee on salary already reported: An employee of a foreign company operating in India had the vesting details of his ESOPs in his salary but not in Schedule FA. He must pay Rs 1 lakh as a disclosure charge on income that was already part of his taxed pay.
    3. The employee’s objection: ESOPs are part of salary, and Rs 1 lakh for disclosure alone is too high a price for a reporting omission.
    4. The materiality test: Materiality is the maximum error allowed in financial statements before they are considered wrong. Where the amounts fall below any reasonable materiality threshold, a Rs 1 lakh penalty is disproportionate to the error.

    Why are ESOPs and residency status at the centre of the dispute?

    1. Non-residents who became residents: Many employees received ESOPs from their global companies as non-resident Indians (NRIs) and were later deputed to India, becoming residents. They did not disclose the old grants earlier and are disclosing them now.
    2. Disclosure invites a notice: After disclosure, the discloser receives a notice asking how the asset was acquired. The position put to the authorities is that the change from non-resident to resident status must be recorded before such notices issue.
    3. ESOPs as a mainstream pay component: ESOPs are a key salary component in the technology sector, startups and foreign companies. The scale shows in the Balance of Payments (BoP) line for “financial derivatives (other than reserves) and employee stock options”.
    4. The outflow figures: Net outflows under that BoP line stood at just under $24 billion in 2025-26, up 8 per cent from about $22 billion in 2024-25. The 2024-25 figure had itself almost tripled from nearly $8 billion in 2023-24.

    Is the updated return a way around the scheme?

    1. What employees are considering: Many employees are weighing an updated return for such anomalies instead of disclosing under the scheme, with greater scrutiny after disclosure the key concern.
    2. The tax department’s position: Even if an updated return is filed, the discloser remains liable to tax and penalty under the Black Money Act, because the Act does not recognise updated returns for income never taxed or disclosed. Disclosure under FAST-DS is therefore the safer route, and the department states there is no intention of additional scrutiny of such declarations.

    Challenges to FAST-DS

    1. A flat fee suppresses uptake: A disclosure window succeeds only if the cost of using it is below the cost of staying hidden, and a fee larger than the asset inverts that calculation for small holders. Eg. The 90-day compliance window under the Black Money Act in 2015 drew only 644 declarations totalling Rs 4,164 crore.
      The Fix: Slab the Category (ii) fee by asset value, with a nominal fee below a stated threshold.
    2. The department already holds the data: For many disclosers the asset is visible in the AIS or through automatic exchange of financial account information, so the fee is charged for reporting what the department can see. Eg. India receives account data on residents’ foreign holdings under the Common Reporting Standard, with exchanges running since 2017.
      The Fix: Pre-fill Schedule FA from AIS and exchanged data and treat a confirmed pre-filled entry as compliance without a separate fee.
    3. Post-disclosure notices deter the target group: Relocated professionals who disclose and then receive an acquisition notice signal to others that disclosure invites inquiry. Eg. Notices asking how an ESOP grant was acquired reach employees whose grant date predates their residency.
      The Fix: Issue a standing instruction that Category (ii) disclosures carrying non-resident acquisition dates close without notice unless a third-party data mismatch exists.

    Conclusion

    The scheme’s design assumes the small taxpayer’s problem is fear of the Black Money Act, when for ESOP holders the problem is a fee unrelated to the size of the lapse. That mismatch is unresolved and no revision of the fee has been announced. The scheme is open and the source states no closing date. What to watch is whether the Central Board of Direct Taxes slabs the Category (ii) fee or clarifies the treatment of grants acquired as a non-resident.

    Back2Basics

    1. Schedule FA: Schedule FA (Foreign Assets) is the part of the income tax return in which a resident and ordinarily resident taxpayer must list every foreign asset held at any time in the year, including shares, ESOPs, bank accounts and immovable property, whether or not it produced income.
    2. Who must file it: The obligation applies to residents only, so a non-resident who acquired an asset abroad first becomes liable to report it in the year he becomes resident.
    3. The penalty it carries: Failure to report attracts a penalty of Rs 10 lakh under the Black Money Act, relaxed from 2024 for movable foreign assets, other than immovable property, of up to Rs 20 lakh in aggregate.

    [2026] Which one of the following best describes the ‘Crowding Out Effect’ in the context of fiscal policy?

    (a) A situation where private investment increases due to increased Government spending

    (b) A situation where Government borrowing leads to higher interest rates, which reduces private investment

    (c) A situation where an increase in taxes leads to increased private sector investment

    (d) A situation where Government spending has no impact on aggregate demand

  • India’s data centre boom is colliding with its climate reality

    Why in the News

    India’s data centre capacity is set to grow from about 1.5 gigawatts (GW) today to 6.5 GW by 2030, a fourfold expansion in four years, on investment the government estimates at nearly $200 billion over the coming decade. Google, Meta, Amazon and Microsoft have committed billions to build facilities, and States are competing for them with tax exemptions, cheap land and duty waivers. No policy document at the Central or State level has assessed what guaranteed power costs a grid already strained under 45 degree Celsius heat, where cooling water will come from, or what the thermal load of thousands of servers does to regions already near dangerous temperatures. The tension is that the facilities are clustering in exactly the regions where water and grid stress are most acute, and State policies attach almost no conditions to the incentives they offer.

    Why is the scale of the build-out itself the problem?

    1. A fourfold expansion in four years: Capacity nearly tripled from 520 megawatts (MW) in 2020 to nearly 1.5 GW today. The 6.5 GW projected for 2030 compresses the next round of growth into four years.
    2. Electricity demand more than quadruples: Demand from data centres is expected to rise from about 13 terawatt-hours (TWh) in 2024 to roughly 57 TWh by 2030. The Union Ministry of Power estimates that artificial intelligence alone will add 26.3 GW of new demand by 2031-32.
    3. States compete on incentives, not conditions: Maharashtra wants to be the data centre capital. Telangana has declared data centres “essential services”. Karnataka is reviewing its policy to attract more, and Rajasthan is offering tax exemptions and cheap land.

    Why does data centre water use collide with groundwater stress?

    1. The volume per facility: A 100 MW data centre consumes about 2 million litres of water daily, equal to the daily use of roughly 6,500 households. India’s data centres consumed an estimated 150 billion litres in 2024-25, projected to more than double to 358 billion litres annually by 2030.
    2. Clustering in the most stressed regions: Rajasthan extracts 147.11 per cent of its annual groundwater recharge, the second highest rate in the country. Several groundwater assessment units in Maharashtra are classified as semi-critical. Telangana’s Irrigation Minister confirmed in May 2026 that 16 districts were under groundwater stress.
    3. Cities already rationing: Hyderabad’s surface water supply dropped 20 per cent in the summer of 2024 on poor monsoon recharge, forcing the water board to ration supply. Mumbai’s reservoirs stood at 44.5 per cent of capacity in March 2026.
    4. Unaccounted in every State policy: No State policy requires public disclosure of daily water consumption. None requires a hydrogeological assessment before approval. None mandates that water sourcing must not compete with agriculture or municipal supply.

    Why can the grid not deliver the power the boom needs?

    1. Record peaks and interconnection queues: Maharashtra’s peak demand hit 27,230 MW in April 2026, the highest ever handled by the State utility. Two-year waits for 220 kV grid interconnections across the country are lengthening project timelines.
    2. Renewable power is being thrown away: India curtailed 300 gigawatt-hours of renewable energy in the first quarter of 2026 alone because the grid could not carry it, per an Ember Energy analysis of Central Electricity Authority data. Over five years India has met only about 80 per cent of its annual transmission targets, one in four major transmission schemes runs a year or more behind schedule, and 20 GW of renewable capacity faces connectivity delays of more than four months.
    3. Wires lag panels: Rajasthan and Gujarat house the bulk of utility-scale solar and wind. Both face the longest queues at pooling stations (substations where several renewable plants aggregate output before it enters the transmission grid). Solar projects are being built faster than the lines to carry their power.
    4. The coal default: Data centres need reliable, uninterrupted electricity. If renewable power cannot reach them, the power comes from coal, adding to the emissions India is trying to curtail.

    How do data centres make their surroundings hotter?

    1. The satellite evidence: A March 2026 University of Cambridge study of 20 years of NASA satellite data found that data centres raise land surface temperatures by an average of 2 degree Celsius within a 10 km radius, with extreme cases reaching 9.1 degree Celsius. About 340 million people globally live within these affected zones.
    2. Indian cities are already at the edge: Mumbai’s land surface temperature rose from 40.9 degree Celsius in 2003 to 47.3 degree Celsius in 2023, driven largely by urbanisation and heat-trapping infrastructure. Hyderabad’s urban heat island intensity ranges from 5.74 to 6.82 degree Celsius, its urban area doubled between 2001 and 2020, and it recorded temperatures above 43 degree Celsius in the summer of 2024.
    3. The feedback loop: Data centres generate heat, and that heat raises ambient temperature. Higher ambient temperature increases cooling demand. Higher cooling demand raises electricity consumption. Unless that electricity is fully renewable, emissions rise and feed the climate change that is making India hotter.

    Do State policies ask for anything in return for their incentives?

    1. Generous on incentives: State policies offer electricity duty exemptions, transmission charge waivers, stamp duty relief and fast-track clearances.
    2. Silent on conditions: None of the major State policies requires a grid impact assessment before commissioning, mandatory renewable energy sourcing, or a thermal load assessment for surrounding communities.
    3. Telangana guarantees power in a stressed State: The “essential services” classification guarantees data centres uninterrupted power even during shortages, in a State where 16 districts face groundwater stress and temperatures have reached 47 degree Celsius.
    4. Maharashtra diluted its own mandate: The State’s policy originally required 100 per cent renewable energy for core operations. In June 2026 it cut the requirement to 51 per cent, framed as improving project viability.
    5. The exceptions, and their limit: Gujarat’s Data Centre Policy 2026-29 mandates at least 51 per cent green energy sourcing. Karnataka’s IT Minister told the Assembly in March 2026 that the State was reviewing its policy over water and energy concerns, and Tamil Nadu has linked incentives to renewable compliance. Even where mandates exist, enforcement and verification remain weak.

    Why is the constraint market design rather than generation capacity?

    1. Capacity is not the bottleneck: The Union Ministry of Power holds that India’s generation pipeline can absorb the additional demand from data centres. The constraint is market design and transmission infrastructure.
    2. Price grid services separately: The Council on Energy, Environment and Water (CEEW) argues for climate-intelligent power markets in which short-term markets pay separately for ramping, storage and demand response.
    3. Storage at the pooling station: Ember calculates that roughly 3 to 4 GW of two-hour battery storage at renewable pooling stations could have absorbed most of the generation curtailed in early 2026. The technical pieces exist; the gap is regulatory and commercial.

    What should a national sustainability framework contain?

    1. Enforceable use standards: CEEW proposes phased power and water use standards with enforceable benchmarks, and a national AI Energy Star rating that lets buyers and regulators compare how energy efficient a facility or model actually is.
    2. Who pays for the grid: The Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) warns that a significant part of the associated infrastructure cost could be socialised. Where wider grid infrastructure is required, government support or dedicated financing should stop the cost being passed to consumers through higher tariffs.
    3. Siting away from stressed hubs: IEEFA points to coastal locations. These offer proximity to near-shore wind and solar, and seawater cooling without desalination. Most facilities instead cluster around Mumbai, Hyderabad, Bengaluru and the National Capital Region, where water and grid stress are most acute.
    4. Four minimum standards: A national framework would set minimum standards for renewable energy sourcing, water consumption disclosure, grid impact assessment and thermal load evaluation. It would give investors one set of expectations and consumers one set of protections, on the premise that environmental constraints are economic constraints.

    Challenges to a national data centre framework

    1. Split jurisdiction: Water is a State List subject and electricity sits on the Concurrent List, so a Central standard on water sourcing or grid impact binds no State unless the State adopts it. Eg. The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology’s draft National Data Centre Policy of 2020 addressed infrastructure status and single-window clearance, not resource standards.
      The Fix: Route the standards through the Central Electricity Authority’s technical standards and the Bureau of Energy Efficiency, which already bind connected consumers, and tie Central incentive money to State adoption.
    2. Mandates without metering: A renewable sourcing mandate is only as good as the verification behind it, and discoms already miss the obligations they carry. Eg. State distribution companies have missed Renewable Purchase Obligation targets for years, forcing the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy to renotify trajectories.
      The Fix: Require third-party audited reporting of power usage effectiveness and water usage effectiveness (ratios of total facility energy and water to that used by computing equipment) as a condition of every incentive.
    3. Cooling technology is a trade-off, not a free fix: Liquid and immersion cooling cut water use but raise capital cost and still dump heat locally. Eg. Evaporative cooling, the cheapest option at 45 degree Celsius, is also the most water intensive.
      The Fix: Set the water standard by climate zone rather than one national number, so a coastal seawater-cooled site and an inland Rajasthan site face different limits.

    Conclusion

    The data centres will be built, and the only open question is on whose terms. The unresolved tension is between States competing on incentives and a resource base that no State policy has been made to account for. What to watch is whether the Centre converts the four standards, renewable sourcing, water disclosure, grid impact and thermal load, into an enforceable national framework before the projected capacity is locked in. The nearer marker is whether Karnataka’s policy review produces conditions or only more incentives.

    Back2Basics

    1. Urban heat island: An urban heat island is the difference in temperature between a built-up city and its rural surroundings, caused by concrete, asphalt and roofs absorbing and re-emitting heat that vegetation and soil would have released through evaporation.
    2. Intensity: Its intensity is that temperature gap in degrees, so Hyderabad’s 5.74 to 6.82 degree Celsius means the city runs that much hotter than its surroundings at the same hour.
    3. Why data centres add to it: Servers convert almost all the electricity they draw into heat, and cooling systems reject that heat into the surrounding air or water, so a large facility acts as a fixed heat source inside the island.

    “[2026] Which of the following statements with regard to Green Hydrogen is/are correct?

    1. It is decarbonized hydrogen obtained from natural gas reforming combined with carbon capture and storage (CCS).

    2. It is produced using electrolysis of water with electricity generated by renewable energy.

    3. National Green Hydrogen Mission of India aims for abatement of nearly 50 MMT of annual greenhouse gas emissions by 2030.

    (a) 1 only (b) 2 and 3 only (c) 2 only (d) 1, 2 and 3

  • Economy is resilient, the road ahead will be less forgiving

    Why in the News

    India’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew 7.8 per cent in the first quarter of 2026-27, beating expectations for yet another quarter. The print exceeded the 6.8 per cent median forecast of professional forecasters and the Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI) revised projection of 7 per cent. The outperformance came from domestic drivers holding up in a global environment marked by conflict in West Asia and weather uncertainty. The tension is that the conditions that produced this print are turning. Crisil expects the growth-inflation mix to worsen through 2026-27, with growth moderating to 7 per cent and inflation rising to 5.1 per cent, and the balance of risks has shifted from rate cuts towards possible rate hikes.

    What is the growth-inflation mix?

    1. About: The growth-inflation mix is the combination of real output growth and the inflation rate an economy records in the same period. A favourable mix pairs high growth with inflation inside the RBI’s target band of 4 per cent, with a tolerance of 2 percentage points either side.
    2. Why it matters for policy: The RBI sets the policy rate against this mix. Rising inflation alongside slowing growth forces a choice between tightening to contain prices and holding rates to protect activity.

    What drove the first quarter outperformance?

    1. Broad based domestic momentum: Robust industrial activity, healthy consumption and strong goods exports combined with accelerating government investment to drive growth. High-frequency indicators had signalled this momentum in advance.
    2. Residual policy support and transfers: Policy measures introduced last fiscal continued to feed through, and direct benefit transfers expanded steadily. 17 States now provide cash transfers, primarily to women.
    3. Goods and Services Tax (GST) rate cuts, visible in automobiles: Dealer discounts and higher disposable incomes from income-tax relief added to the effect of GST rate cuts. Eg. The Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers (SIAM) reported first quarter sales growth of 26 per cent for passenger vehicles, 20.3 per cent for commercial vehicles and 18.3 per cent for two-wheelers.
    4. Retail credit funding consumption: Other personal loans, a proxy for short-term consumption, grew 14.2 per cent.
    5. Households shielded from crude: The government and oil companies absorbed most of the sharp rise in crude prices, particularly in the initial phase of the West Asia conflict, so household budgets did not take the hit.

    Why will the growth-inflation mix turn less favourable in 2026-27?

    1. Four sources of moderation: Growth will slow on disruptions from the West Asia conflict, unresolved tariff issues with the United States, weather-related risks and a strong base effect in the second half of the year.
    2. Last year’s two tailwinds are gone: Low crude oil prices and a normal monsoon were the two exogenous factors that worked in India’s favour last year. Neither is expected to provide similar support this year.
    3. The conflict’s cost channel: The West Asia conflict has disrupted supply chains and raised insurance, freight and input costs. This weighs on global and domestic growth at the same time.

    Does a deficient monsoon still translate into food inflation?

    1. The El Nino signal: El Nino conditions (a periodic warming of the equatorial Pacific that weakens the Indian monsoon) are intensifying. Over the past 25 years, five of the six El Nino years produced below-normal rainfall.
    2. The deficit so far: Cumulative rainfall stood 14 per cent below the long-period average (LPA) at the end of August. July was 1 per cent above the LPA, and August recorded a deficit of 16 per cent. The India Meteorological Department (IMD) has signalled below-normal rainfall in September.
    3. Irrigation has widened the cushion: India’s net irrigated area has risen by 10 percentage points to 59 per cent over the past decade, improving resilience to rainfall shocks.
    4. Stocks exceed buffer norms: The country holds ample rice and wheat stocks. Foodgrain stocks currently stand at more than twice the buffer norms. That cushion contains price spikes.
    5. Non-crop agriculture now carries the sector: Crop gross value added contracted by an average 0.5 per cent annually in the five years to 2023-24. Non-crop agriculture, now nearly 40 per cent of agricultural gross value added, expanded 6.5 per cent annually over the same period.
    6. The historical record is not linear: Deficient monsoons have not always led to higher food inflation.
    7. The vulnerability that remains: Crops without buffer stocks and perishable vegetables stay exposed to adverse weather. A weak monsoon also hurts rabi production by reducing soil moisture and lowering reservoir levels, so agricultural output and food inflation remain the key variables to watch.

    Why does benign core inflation understate the price risk?

    1. Headline eased, risks did not: Headline inflation eased in July and core inflation remained benign. Upside risks persist on three fronts, crude, input costs and demand.
    2. The crude assumption: Crisil’s base case assumes Brent crude averaging $82 to 87 per barrel this fiscal, with the unresolved West Asia conflict keeping prices volatile. Higher crude translates into slower growth, higher inflation and a wider current account deficit.
    3. Wholesale pressure is being passed on: Core inflation, a gauge of underlying demand pressure, appears deceptively low. Strong demand, rising fuel costs and other input pressures show up in near-double-digit wholesale price inflation, and are gradually being passed through to consumers.
    4. Automobiles show the pass-through: Vehicle prices are set to rise as manufacturers protect margins and dealer discounts are withdrawn. Combined with a high base effect, this moderates automobile growth in the second half.
    5. The rate cycle may reverse: Unlike last year, the balance of risks points towards possible interest rate hikes. Persistent inflationary pressure, the unresolved conflict and weather risk together bring monetary tightening back into consideration.

    What still supports activity through the moderation?

    1. External buffers: Foreign exchange reserves cover more than nine months of imports.
    2. Balance sheet strength: Corporate and banking-sector balance sheets are in robust health.
    3. Fiscal and wage support: Tax relief and public investment continue to support activity. The Pay Commission’s recommendations will add a further boost to consumption when implemented.
    4. The structural condition: Beyond cyclical tailwinds, sustained progress on structural reforms that enhance competitiveness is the condition for maintaining growth momentum.

    Challenges to sustaining the growth momentum

    1. Export exposure to United States tariff policy: Unresolved tariff issues leave goods exporters unable to price contracts beyond a quarter. Eg. In August 2025 the United States raised tariffs on Indian goods to 50 per cent, half of it as a penalty tied to Russian oil purchases.
      The Fix: Conclude the bilateral trade agreement under negotiation and operationalise the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with the United Kingdom signed in 2025, so exposure to one market falls.
    2. Crude dependence transmits every West Asian shock: India imports over 85 per cent of its crude, so a supply disruption raises the import bill, the fiscal cost of absorbing it and consumer prices together. Eg. About 40 per cent of India’s crude imports normally transit the Strait of Hormuz, and a large part of that supply has been offline since the disruptions of March 2026.
      The Fix: Widen the import slate to African, North American and South American barrels under term contracts and expand strategic petroleum reserve capacity beyond the present three sites.
    3. Consumption leaning on one-off boosts: Income-tax relief, GST rate cuts and a Pay Commission award lift spending once, and the base effect then turns against growth. Eg. The HSBC India Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index fell to a five-year low of 52.8 in August 2026, with the survey recording job losses for the first time in over two years.
      The Fix: Tie the next round of support to employment, through the Employment Linked Incentive scheme, so that income growth rather than tax relief carries consumption.
    4. State cash transfers stretch State finances: A cash transfer to women is a recurring commitment that a State cannot withdraw without political cost. Eg. States’ aggregate fiscal deficit rose to 3.2 per cent of GDP in 2024-25, and only 11 States recorded a revenue surplus.
      The Fix: Ring-fence State capital expenditure under the Finance Commission’s fiscal roadmap so transfers do not crowd out investment.
    5. A rate hike would hit credit-led consumption first: Retail borrowing has been funding short-term consumption, and it is the most rate sensitive part of demand. Eg. The RBI raised risk weights on unsecured consumer credit in November 2023 to slow exactly this segment.
      The Fix: Use targeted macroprudential tools on unsecured lending before resorting to a policy rate hike that would also raise the cost of investment.

    Conclusion

    India enters 2026-27 with a strong quarter behind it and a weaker mix ahead. The thing that cannot be settled yet is whether inflation will rise faster than growth slows, because that decides whether the RBI tightens into a moderating economy. The Monetary Policy Committee’s October meeting is the first decision point. The monsoon’s September outcome and the rabi sowing that follows will decide the food inflation half of the equation.

    Key Facts about GDP Measurement

    1. New base year: The GDP base was revised from 2011-12 to 2022-23, with the new series released on 27 February 2026. The Consumer Price Index base moved to 2024 and the Index of Industrial Production base to 2022-23 alongside it.
    2. New data sources: GST data, the Public Financial Management System for central government accounts, e-Vahan for transport spending, and the Annual Survey of Unincorporated Sector Enterprises and the Periodic Labour Force Survey replaced proxy indicators.
    3. Refined deflation: Double deflation (deflating output and inputs separately) now applies in manufacturing and agriculture, and single deflation has been discontinued.
    4. Global alignment: The series aligns with the System of National Accounts 2008 and prepares for the transition to SNA 2025 by 2029-30.

    Challenges in GDP Growth

    1. Weak private investment: Capacity expansion depends on private capital formation, which has stayed subdued. Eg. Gross Fixed Capital Formation is around 30 per cent of GDP.
      The Fix: Scale the Production Linked Incentive scheme’s second phase and adopt Vietnam’s plug-and-play industrial park model to cut the time from approval to production.
    2. Skill mismatch: Skills produced by the education system do not match what industry demands, so rising participation adds less output. Eg. Only about half of graduates are employable.
      The Fix: Expand Industry 4.0 training and emulate Germany’s dual education and apprenticeship system.
    3. Participation gap: A large share of working-age women stays outside the labour force, capping the demographic dividend. Eg. The labour force participation rate is 59.3 per cent (2025), but the female rate is 40.0 per cent.
      The Fix: Deploy working women’s hostels and subsidised childcare on the model of Japan’s Womenomics.
    4. Jobless growth: Output growth is concentrated in sectors that employ few people. Eg. Services contribute about 55 per cent of GDP but employ under 30 per cent of the workforce.
      The Fix: Implement Employment Linked Incentives and study China’s township and village enterprises for rural labour absorption.
    5. Regulatory cost: Contract enforcement, clearance times and regulatory instability keep the cost of doing business above competitors. Eg. Logistics cost is near 8 per cent of GDP.
      The Fix: Emulate Singapore’s TradeNet single-window system to slash clearance times.

    [2021, GS3, 10 marks] Explain the difference between computing methodology of India’s Gross Domestic Product(GDP) before the year 2015 and after the year 2015.”