The announcement of the new Australia-U.K.-U.S. (AUKUS) trilateral security pact has naturally generated animated debate in strategic circles, before the QUAD summit.

What is the AUKUS?

• The first major initiative of AUKUS would be to deliver a nuclear-powered submarine fleet for Australia.
• The nuclear-powered submarines will give Australia naval heft in the Pacific, where China has been particularly aggressive.
• While the US and Britain have had the capability for decades, Australia has never had an n-sub.

Motive: To counter China

• China has nuclear-powered submarines, as well as submarines that can launch nuclear missiles.
• The three signatories to the AUKUS deal have made it clear though, that their aim is not to arm the new subs with nuclear weapons.
• China has been one of Australia’s biggest trading partners, but the relationship has soured over the last few years.
• It was in consideration of Chinese sensibilities that Australia had pulled out of the Malabar Naval Exercise with the US, India, and Japan after participating in the 2007 edition (of which Singapore too, was part).
• Australia came back to Malabar in 2020, which marked the first time in 13 years that the navies of the four Quad nations war-gamed together.

Australia at the Centrestage

• This is primarily because a nuclear-powered submarine gives a navy the capability to reach far out into the ocean and launch attacks.
• A nuclear-powered submarine offers long distances dives, at a higher speed, without being detected gives a nation the ability to protect its interests far from its shores.
• In the context of the AUKUS agreement, nuclear-powered submarines will give the Royal Australian Navy the capability to go into the South China Sea.
• It conclusively puts to rest a long-standing domestic debate on whether it was time for Australia to assess China through the strategic lens, overcoming the purely mercantile considerations that tended to dominate its China policy.

What makes nuclear submarines so important?

• A nuclear-powered submarine is classified as an “SSN” under the US Navy hull classification system, wherein ‘SS’ is the symbol for submarine, and ‘N’ stands for nuclear.
• A nuclear-powered submarine that can launch ballistic missiles is called “SSBN”.
• Conventional diesel-engine submarines have batteries that keep and propel — though not very fast — the vessel underwater. The life of these batteries can vary from a few hours to a few days.
• The newer Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) submarines have additional fuel cells that allow them to stay underwater for longer and move faster than the conventional vessels.
• However, the fuel cells are used only at strategic times, when the endurance to remain submerged is required.
• Both conventional and AIP subs need to come to the surface to recharge their batteries using the diesel engine.
• The diesel engine also propels the vessel on the surface. However, the fuel cells of AIP can only be charged at on-land stations, not while at sea.

Why is France unhappy about Australia getting these submarines?

• The deal has complicated the relations between France and Australia, and also France and the US.
• France is upset as it has been kept out of the loop. But, with the core objective of pushing back against China’s aggression, all five countries — US, UK, Australia, France and India — are on the same track.
• The deal between France and Australia had been marked by delays and other issues.
• The first submarine was expected to be operational around 2034.

Does India have nuclear-powered submarines?

• Yes, India is among the six nations that have SSNs. The other five are the US, the UK, Russia, France and China.
• India has had the capacity since it got the Soviet-built K-43 Charlie-class SSN in 1987.
• Commissioned with the Red Fleet of the USSR in 1967, it was leased to the Indian Navy, and was rechristened INS Chakra. The submarine was decommissioned in 1991.

Indo-Pacific is the core issue

• France, which like the UK has historically been an Indo-Pacific power with territories and bases across the region.
• It has participated in a multi-nation naval exercise in the Bay of Bengal with the four Quad nations.
• There is no gainsaying the fact that rapid accretion in China’s economic and military capacities, but more particularly its belligerence, has led to a tectonic shift in regional security paradigms.
• Several countries have been obliged to review their defence preparedness in response to China’s rising military power and its adverse impact on regional stability.

A chance for the UK

• The AUKUS pact is also an emphatic assertion of the relevance of the U.S.-Australia Security Treaty (ANZUS).
• New Zealand, the outlier, walked away in 1984 from the treaty that ironically still bears its initials.
• Its “nuclear-free” stance ran counter to the U.S. Navy’s non-disclosure policy in regard to nuclear weapons aboard visiting vessels.
• Close ties notwithstanding, Australia’s future fleet of nuclear submarines will not be permitted access to New Zealand’s ports or waters, as averred by PM Jacinda Ardern.
• AUKUS provides a fresh opportunity to the United Kingdom to reinsert itself more directly into the Indo-Pacific.
• It is already a member of the Five Eyes (FVEY), an intelligence-sharing alliance built on Anglo-Saxon solidarity (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the U.K., and the U.S.).

AUKUS is not a substitute for the Quad

• It does not erode the Quad’s significance as a platform for consultations and coordination on broader themes of maritime security, free and open trade, health care, critical technologies, supply chains and capacity-building.
• The AUKUS submarine deal, on the other hand, is an undiluted example of strategic defence collaboration, and a game-changer at that.

Chinese reception of AUKUS

• China, expectedly, has strongly criticised AUKUS and the submarine deal as promoting instability and stoking an arms race.

The exposed double standards

• China has the world’s fastest-growing fleet of sub-surface combatants.
• This includes the Type 093 Shang-class nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) and the Type 094 nuclear-powered Jin-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN).
• Its nuclear submarines are on the prowl in the Indo-Pacific.
• Yet, China denies Australia and others the sovereign right to decide on their defence requirements.

What’s in the box of AUKUS?

Ans. Greater role for Australia

• Australia’s proposed nuclear submarines will give quite a punch in terms of a stand-off capability.
• The growing focus on anti-submarine warfare across a more expansive region is clearly altering calculations.
• Australia’s nuclear submarines would help create a new balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, especially in tandem with the U.S. and the U.K.
• It will now have a more meaningful naval deterrence of its own to protect its sovereign interests.
• It is set to play a more robust role in ensuring peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific.

Way forward

• The setback ‘down under’ may spur France to focus afresh on partners such as India.
• India must strike a balance between continuing imports and implementing the all-important Atmanirbhar Bharat in defence manufacturing.
• France should take AUKUS as a business deal.
• Its momentary reaction at the cancellation of the contract by Australia should soon subside.
• As a major Indo-Pacific power, France is an important part of the regional security calculus.

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On the face of it, the summit meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) this week in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, is well placed to lead the stabilization of Afghanistan after the American retreat.

About SCO

• After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the then security and economic architecture in the Eurasian region dissolved and new structures had to come up.
• The original Shanghai Five were China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan.
• The SCO was formed in 2001, with Uzbekistan included. It expanded in 2017 to include India and Pakistan.
• Since its formation, the SCO has focused on regional non-traditional security, with counter-terrorism as a priority.
• The fight against the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism and extremism has become its mantra. Today, areas of cooperation include themes such as economics and culture.

India’s and the SCO

• India and Pakistan both were observer countries.
• While Central Asian countries and China were not in favor of expansion initially, the main supporter — of India’s entry in particular — was Russia.
• A widely held view is that Russia’s growing unease about an increasingly powerful China prompted it to push for its expansion.
• From 2009 onwards, Russia officially supported India’s ambition to join the SCO. China then asked for its all-weather friend Pakistan’s entry.

Afghanistan and SCO

• Afghanistan has been engaged with the SCO for over 15 years.
• In 2012, Afghanistan became an observer in the SCO when then-Afghan president Hamid Karzai visited China.
• In 2015, Kabul applied for full membership in the group.
• Kabul sought to be a member of the SCO as it believes that it is a natural candidate.
• Geographically, Afghanistan is a part of the SCO region.

Limited (or No) progress made by SCO

• For all the political hype, the SCO has not deepened regionalism in Central Asia.
• Two decades after its formation — it was set up just weeks before the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington — the institutional promise of the SCO remains just that — a promise.
• Seen from the subcontinent, the SCO certainly looks better than the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC).
• That India and Pakistan, whose differences have prevented even regular meetings of SAARC, are actively participating in the SCO, would point to its attractiveness.
• But then SAARC is such a low bar.

Opportunities for role-play in Afghanistan

The crisis in Afghanistan presents a major opportunity for the SCO to realize its regional ambitions.

• Involvement of regional superpowers: The SCO’s importance for Afghanistan seems self-evident when you look at its sponsors and members. Its founding leaders are the two great powers of the east — Russia and China.
• Neighborhood are members: Its other initial members were Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan to the north and northeast of Afghanistan.
• Observers vested interest: Besides Afghanistan, Iran, Belarus and Mongolia are observers. Iran is said to be on track for full membership.
• Many dialogue partners: The SCO has a number of “dialogue partners”. They include Armenia and Azerbaijan from the neighboring Caucasus region and Turkey a step further to the West. Nepal and Sri Lanka from the subcontinent and Cambodia from southeast Asia are also dialogue partners.

Issues with SCO

• China centrism: For an organization that bears the name of Shanghai, but is focused on Central Asia, its associates look disparate.
• Lack of coherence: The Central Asian members of the SCO have quarrels of their own, and have struggled to develop collective approaches to their common regional security challenges.
• Dint go beyond dialogues: As it broadened its membership, the SCO has, unsurprisingly, struggled to deepen institutional cooperation.
• Not comprehensive: There is also one important country missing in the mix. It is Turkmenistan, which shares an 800 km border with Afghanistan and a 1,150 km border with Iran.
• Neutrality of members: The organizing principle of Turkmenistan rulers is absolute “neutrality” — think of it as an extreme form of “non-alignment”. It refuses to join any regional institution, political or military.
• Individual interests: Russia’s effort to build a regional institution in its Central Asian periphery ran parallel to its plans for the so-called “strategic triangle” with China and India. India and Pakistan, needless to say, are poles apart on the Taliban.

No common interest in Afghan Peace

• The US military retreat from Afghanistan has brought cheer to both Moscow and Beijing, although publicly they criticize President Joe Biden’s hasty retreat.
• The US retreat might weaken the glue that binds Moscow and Beijing in Central Asia or tightens it.
• Although Russia and China are closer to each other than ever before, their interests are not entirely the same in Central Asia.

Russian alternatives to SCO

(1) Central Security Treaty Organisation

• While military confidence-building measures have grown under the SCO banner, Russia had its own security organisation for the region, called the Central Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO).
• Three of the SCO members — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan — along with Armenia and Belarus are members of the CSTO.
• Russia sees itself as the sole protector of the former Soviet Republics and may not be ready to share that role with China — “yes” to coordination, but “no” to a Sino-Russian security dyarchy.

(2) Eurasian Economic Union

• Moscow also appears reluctant to back Chinese proposals to promote trade integration under the SCO banner; it prefers the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) under its own leadership.
• China is not a member of either CSTO or EAEU. This is one reason for the weakness of SCO regionalism.

Other deterrents

(1) Affinity with Taliban

• China has openly admitted to cooperating with the Taliban by restoring all formal diplomatic ties. It is the first such country to acknowledge the Taliban.
• Turkmenistan too, which is not part of SCO, has been quite open to engaging the Taliban in sync with its principles of neutrality.
• Some Russian analysts see Turkmenistan as the potential weak link in the defense against the Taliban’s potential threats to the region.
• Uzbekistan seems open to a cautious engagement with the Taliban.

(2) Iranian aspirations for unwarranted interference (just like Turkey does regarding Kashmir)

• Iran, which has ethnic and linguistic links with the Persian-speaking Tajiks, appears equally worried about the Taliban’s policies towards minorities.
• As Moscow and Beijing, Tehran was happy to see the Americans leave in humiliation and appeared hopeful of a positive engagement with the Taliban.
• Those hopes may have been suspended for now, if not discarded.

What can the SCO do now?

• The Afghanistan debacle presents an opportunity for the SCO to play a constructive role in meeting the region’s burgeoning security challenge.
• Providing humanitarian relief, tending to refugees, facilitating an inclusive dialogue and national reconciliation constitute immediate and long-term goals in which the organization can fill a role.
• The SCO can also pressure the Taliban to share power with other domestic actors and refrain from providing sanctuary to foreign terror organizations (through foreign funds from Saudi*).
• It can suspend Afghanistan’s observer status, curtail border traffic or withhold recognition, investments, and aid, should Kabul be found wanting.

Way forward

• While the SCO is not an impressive regional institution, it remains an important diplomatic forum.
• India has sought to make full use of the SCO’s diplomatic possibilities without any illusions about its effectiveness.
• At the SCO summit this week, PM Modi would remind other leaders of the “three evils” that the SCO set out to defeat — terrorism, extremism, and separatism.
• Few would disagree that the Taliban embodied all the three sins in the past. Today, the Taliban and its mentor Pakistan say the sinner wants to become a saint.
• India must focus on finding common ground with those members of the SCO who do share India’s concerns about Afghanistan.

Conclusion

• Given this divergence, it is unlikely that the SCO can come up with a “regional solution” for the Afghan crisis.
• The only real Afghan convergence today is between Pakistan and China.
• Expect them to try and nudge the SCO towards a positive engagement with the Taliban.

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