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Type: IOCR

  • ‘India has no excess capacity, bans forced-labour imports’

    Why in the News

    Both US charges behind its tariffs on India, structural excess capacity and weak curbs on forced-labour imports, are now contested by India. At the G20 Trade Ministers’ Meeting, the Commerce Minister said India has no excess capacity in the flagged sectors and already bans forced-labour imports. The US already levies a 10% “forced labour” tariff on India, and a US Trade Representative (USTR) probe of 60 countries could add more.

    What is structural excess capacity, and what is India’s position?

    1. What it is: Structural excess capacity means an economy produces far more than its market absorbs and exports the surplus cheaply, like a factory dumping unsold goods on a neighbouring town.
    2. India’s growth model: India called itself the fastest-growing large economy, driven by local demand. It is building manufacturing “from design to finished goods” for domestic and global needs.
    3. Where distortion lies: Capacity itself is not the problem. Distortion arises when production concentrates in one place because of hidden subsidies.
    4. Shared worry: India shares concern that trade-distorting support in some economies leads to “dumping and predatory pricing“, meaning selling below cost to kill rivals.
    5. The takeaway: India argues the target should be subsidy-driven distortion, not countries that simply produce a lot.

    How does India want capacity concerns handled?

    1. Trade remedies: Concerns should be met with anti-dumping duties, which offset below-cost imports, and countervailing duties, which offset foreign subsidies. Both need evidence and face judicial review.
    2. No pretext: Supply-chain diversification is legitimate, but cannot justify measures outside World Trade Organization (WTO) rules.
    3. Policy space: The burden of adjustment must not shift to developing countries, which need room to industrialise.
    4. No unilateralism: On both excess capacity and forced labour, India said any step must be multilateral and WTO-compliant.

    What has India done on forced labour?

    1. US tariff route: In July the USTR imposed extra tariffs on 60 countries, including India, after probing whether they did enough to stop forced-labour imports.
    2. Constitutional bar: Article 23 prohibits forced labour as a fundamental right, enforceable by the Supreme Court.
    3. ILO commitments: India has ratified International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions 29 and 105, the core treaties against forced labour.
    4. Import ban: In July India amended its Foreign Trade Policy to prohibit imports of goods made with forced labour.
    5. Firm commitment: India called its commitment to eliminating forced labour “absolute and unconditional“.

    Where does India draw the line at the G20?

    1. Evidence, not presumption: Border measures must rest on “specific and verifiable evidence“, not presumptions about whole countries, regions or sectors, and must respect due process.
    2. Right forum: The ILO, as the universal tripartite body of governments, employers and workers, is the competent forum for labour standards.
    3. Conditional cooperation: India backs G20 cooperation only with no monitoring of members, no new obligations and no use for unilateral trade action.
    4. US-set agenda: The US holds the 2026 G20 Presidency, with sessions on excess capacity, forced labour and updating the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) principle, under which a WTO member gives all members its best tariff terms.

    Challenges

    1. Broken WTO appeals: The WTO Appellate Body has been non-functional since December 2019, so unilateral tariffs face no final ruling.
    2. Region-wide presumptions: Some forced-labour laws presume whole regions guilty without specific evidence. Eg. The US Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, 2021 presumes goods from Xinjiang are tainted.
    3. Domestic enforcement gaps: The Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976 bans bonded labour, yet it persists in brick kilns and farms.
    4. MFN under review: Reopening the MFN principle could erode equal tariff treatment that developing countries rely on.

    Way Forward

    1. Supply-chain traceability: The Ministry of Labour and Employment should certify forced-labour-free supply chains for exporters.
    2. Bilateral settlement: The Commerce Ministry should press to remove the 10% tariff in ongoing India-US trade talks.
    3. Appellate revival: India should lead a developing country coalition to restore WTO appellate review.
    4. Evidence-based remedies: The Directorate General of Trade Remedies (DGTR) should keep India’s own duties strictly evidence-based.

    Conclusion

    India accepts the goals of fair trade and free labour but rejects their use as grounds for unilateral US tariffs. The outcome of the USTR’s excess capacity probe will show whether WTO process or unilateral pressure governs this dispute.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2017] Consider the following statements: 1. India has ratified the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) of WTO. 2. TFA is a part of WTO’s Bali Ministerial Package of 2013. 3. TFA came into force in January 2016. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 and 2 only (b) 1 and 3 only (c) 2 and 3 only (d) 1, 2 and 3 Answer: A”

  • Don’t wait for a consensus

    Why in the News

    Leading US artificial intelligence (AI) companies have signed a voluntary Accord on Super Intelligence. Separately, 28 countries have endorsed Finland and Norway’s “A Call for Control of Frontier AI Models”. Neither the US nor China joined the call, so others must decide whether to act without them.

    What is frontier AI governance, and why is it urgent?

    1. What it is: Frontier AI means the most capable models, built by a handful of companies. Governing it means rules on testing and release, like the clinical trials a new drug must pass.
    2. Industry’s preferred pace: Anthropic, OpenAI and Google DeepMind back “pacing the frontier”, meaning an internationally coordinated adjustment of how fast AI advances, so risks can be managed.
    3. Civil society demand: Civil society groups want a global moratorium on frontier models until binding safeguards exist.
    4. Trigger incidents: Unauthorised and deceptive behaviour by frontier AI agents (systems acting on their own) and debate at the UN General Assembly have raised the stakes.
    5. The takeaway: Calls for governance are louder, but actors want very different things, from self-policing to a full pause.

    How does the White House accord differ from the Finland-Norway call?

    1. Accord on Super Intelligence: The “morally binding” accord promises internal controls, independent external evaluation and an independent board committee, but names no standards or enforcement.
    2. Three-step agenda: The Finland-Norway call seeks:
      • mandatory pre-deployment testing and independent evaluation;
      • common incident reporting standards;
      • an institutional mechanism for standard-setting and verification.
    3. Unclear path: The call sets out significant proposals but no route for putting them into practice.

    Where do the US and China stand?

    1. US position: Washington prefers permissionless innovation (building first, without prior approval) and rejects any “globalist scheme of control for superintelligence”.
    2. China’s position: Beijing treats the UN as the main channel for AI governance but distrusts Western-centric agendas.
    3. Bilateral opening: The two recently opened a bilateral dialogue on advanced AI, but broader consensus remains elusive.

    Can China’s WAICO offer an alternative path?

    1. World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organisation (WAICO): Launched by Beijing in July with 29 founding members, it is headquartered in Shanghai.
    2. Functions: It will promote “supply-demand matching” (matching AI supply with demand across countries), standard setting and convergence on AI governance.
    3. Open membership: Any country may join. The Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence (GPAI) and the G7 Hiroshima Process instead assume members share liberal-democratic values.
    4. Formal forum, limited reach: As an intergovernmental organisation, it can build formal consensus beyond soft law (non-binding guidelines). Its China-led image may confine it to the Global South.

    Should the world wait for a consensus?

    1. No excuse for inaction: Missing US-China consensus cannot justify inaction by others, or let the tech industry define governance as the White House accord does.
    2. India’s stake: India is not at the frontier but sees extensive deployment of frontier models, so it needs accountability safeguards.
    3. Claim to a voice: India’s stand on digital sovereignty supports a greater say in the rules, a rational basis to back the Finland-Norway proposal.

    Challenges

    1. Toothless pledges: Voluntary company pledges carry no penalty for breach.
    2. Access for evaluators: Independent testers need model access and compute that a few firms control.
    3. Forum fragmentation: GPAI, the Hiroshima Process and WAICO may set incompatible standards.

    Way Forward

    1. Safeguards for deployed AI: India should build legal and institutional safeguards for AI already in everyday life, not only for future artificial general intelligence.
    2. Risk-based classification: Regulators should impose stricter duties on high-risk uses such as medical diagnosis.
    3. Testing capacity: India should equip its AI Safety Institute to run independent pre-deployment tests.

    Conclusion

    Without a US-China consensus, frontier AI governance is split between company self-policing and middle powers seeking binding checks. What to watch is whether India formally backs the Finland-Norway call and builds domestic safeguards.

    About AI Regulation

    1. EU AI Act (2024): The European Union sorts AI into four risk tiers, from unacceptable (banned) to minimal.
    2. China’s Generative AI Regulations (2023): Mandate security assessments and algorithm registration.
    3. India’s light-touch model: India has no dedicated AI law and relies on the Information Technology Act, 2000 and the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026] Which of the following statements with regard to Large Language Models (LLMs) used in machine learning is/are correct? 1. LLMs assign probabilities to the next possible words and then pick the one with the highest probability. 2. LLMs process data through mathematical optimization to minimise prediction errors. 3. LLMs produce unbiased outputs. (a) 1 only (b) 1 and 2 only (c) 2 and 3 only (d) 1, 2 and 3 Answer: B”

  • Aid may be dead. Long live international development

    Why in the News

    International aid flows fell by over 23% last year, and a further fall is projected this year. The old aid architecture was already failing, so the Global South needs new routes to international development rather than a return to aid.

    Why are aid flows collapsing?

    1. What international aid is: Grants, cheap loans and technical help that richer countries and agencies give poorer ones for development. It works like a scholarship the donor can withdraw at will.
    2. US trigger: The US President’s decision to axe 80 to 85% of the projects and contracts of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) set off the decline.
    3. Other donors’ cuts: Other donors are also cutting aid, for three reasons:
      • changing political priorities;
      • fiscal constraints;
      • domestic discontent.
    4. Hardest hit: The poorest recipients lose most and have little time to find alternatives. For some, losing aid threatens basic survival, an existential shift whose human costs must be addressed.
    5. The takeaway: Aid is shrinking fastest for the countries with the fewest fallback options.

    Was the old aid system worth saving?

    1. No golden age: The old aid regime was never as good as it is remembered, so golden-age thinking about it misleads.
    2. Distance from the ground: Donors stayed disconnected from local people and practised excessive, misguided management, which hurt even well intended aid packages.
    3. Strings attached: Less scrupulous deals tied aid to donors’ geopolitical goals. Recipients paid with their strategic autonomy, their freedom to set their own policy.
    4. Creaking architecture: The system already suffered from problems of legitimacy, efficiency and accountability, so a fundamental rethink is overdue for donors and recipients alike.

    What four routes does the column propose for international development?

    1. Weaponised interdependence: Major powers now use trade and supply links as pressure, which pushes states to turn inward and rearm. Developing countries can offer critical minerals and ports for technology transfer, training and jobs, not mere extraction.
    2. Revamping multilateral bodies: Developing countries should jointly reform bodies such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) to serve development. Eg. The WTO’s Doha Development Agenda, and the shift from “trade not aid” to “aid for trade”, meaning aid that builds poor countries’ capacity to trade.
    3. Deep ecology: This view treats human, species and planetary well-being as one, an idea rooted in Indigenous and Southern traditions. It can replace aid models that were West-centric and anthropocentric, meaning human centred.
    4. People and planet: “Demand-driven” and “bottom-up” reform follows what communities ask for, so it leaves out other species, which cannot speak. India’s G20 presidency treated all existence as interconnected and advanced the well-being of people and planet.

    Challenges

    1. Bargaining gap: Many poor countries lack the capacity to turn mineral wealth into fair contracts. Eg. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) loans, criticised as “debt-trap diplomacy”.
    2. Weak multilateralism: WTO negotiations rarely conclude now. Eg. The Yaoundé ministerial (2026) closed without consensus.
    3. Immediate human cost: Structural reform takes years, but health and food programmes stop at once.
    4. Donor driven agendas: Recipients often bend their priorities to donor preferences, distorting national needs.
    5. Vague ecological framing: Deep ecology has no agreed measures, so it can stay rhetoric in negotiations.

    Way Forward

    1. Value added deals: Critical mineral agreements should require local processing, training and technology transfer.
    2. Southern coalition at the WTO: Developing countries should table a joint development package at the next ministerial.
    3. Aid effectiveness: Donors should follow the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), which puts recipient ownership and mutual accountability first.
    4. Domestic resources: Recipients should raise their tax to GDP ratio to cut aid dependence.
    5. Bridge funding: South-South funds should sustain essential health programmes during the transition.

    Conclusion

    The fall in aid exposes a system that had lost legitimacy long before its funding dried up. What remains unresolved is whether developing countries can turn their resource leverage into partnerships that build capability rather than a new dependence.

    What are donor agencies?

    1. About: Bilateral, multilateral or private organisations that give financial aid, technical assistance and policy support to recipient countries.
    2. Multilateral and bilateral donors: Multilateral donors include the World Bank and UN bodies. Bilateral donors include USAID and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA).
    3. Private and climate funds: Foundations such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, and the Green Climate Fund, also finance development.
    4. USAID’s end: Set up in 1961, USAID was formally closed on 1 July 2025, and its surviving programmes moved to the US State Department.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2024, GS2, 10 marks] Public charitable trusts have the potential to make India’s development more inclusive as they relate to certain vital public issues. Comment.”

  • [1st October 2026] The Hindu OpED: The India-EFTA partnership, one plus one equals three

    [1st October 2026] The Hindu OpED: The India-EFTA partnership, one plus one equals three

    Question (2025, GS3 – 10 Marks): What are the challenges before the Indian economy when the world is moving away from free trade and multilateralism to protectionism and bilateralism? How can these challenges be met?”
    Linkage: Evaluates India’s trade strategy of negotiating bilateral Trade and Economic Partnership Agreements (TEPAs) to secure investment, technology, and market access as traditional WTO multilateralism faces headwinds.
    [2026] Which of the following countries are members of the European Union?
    1. Belarus
    2. Poland
    3. Germany
    4. Switzerland
    (a) 1, 2 and 4 (b) 1 and 4 only (c) 2 and 3 (d) 2 and 4 only

    Mentor’s Comment

    TEPA is publicised through tariff coverage, but its test is whether an investment and jobs pledge converts into commercial projects. Iceland’s contribution is knowledge, and India’s CCUS effort is at the pre-commercial stage where that knowledge is most useful. The ambition is $100 billion and one million jobs. The missing precondition is evidence of conversion, since a drying facility at Tapri and a memorandum at Raigad are not investment flows. The partnership also shifts the constraint to India. Licensing, storage assessment and monitoring require domestic institutions able to absorb the technology. The article is an ambassador’s advocacy piece, so its claims need to be read against outcome data.

    Why in the News

    The Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement (TEPA) between India and the four European Free Trade Association (EFTA) states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland, entered into force on 1 October 2025. A year on, the real test is the industrial and technological partnership it enables, not tariff cuts.

    What is TEPA, and what sets it apart?

    1. What it is: TEPA is a trade deal in which each side cuts customs duties on the other’s goods, like a standing discount between regular partners.
    2. EFTA’s offer: EFTA states cut duties on 92.2% of their tariff lines (product categories), covering 99.6% of the value of India’s exports to them.
    3. India’s offer: India grants concessions on 82.7% of its tariff lines, covering 95.3% of EFTA’s exports, among India’s most ambitious openings to developed economies.
    4. Investment and jobs chapter: TEPA is India’s first trade agreement with a dedicated chapter on investment and job creation. EFTA states aim to invest $100 billion over 15 years.
    5. The takeaway: By tying market access to investment and jobs, TEPA is built for lasting industrial partnerships, not only cheaper trade.

    Where can Iceland’s experience serve India’s priorities?

    1. Geothermal direct use: Iceland uses low and medium temperature ground heat directly, not to make power. India’s Himalayan geothermal belt can do the same:
      • at Tapri, Kinnaur district, the Indian-Icelandic venture Geotropy dries fruit, so apple growers need not sell at low harvest-time prices;
      • a geothermal cooling facility at the site is due by the end of the year;
      • frontier posts reliant on fuel convoys gain energy security independent of roads.
    2. Carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS): CCUS traps carbon dioxide from industry and reuses or buries it. India is at a pre-commercial stage:
      • the Department of Science and Technology (DST) published India’s first CCUS research road map in December 2025, for the 2070 net-zero goal;
      • Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), NTPC Limited and Indian Oil Corporation Limited are running pilots and feasibility studies;
      • Iceland’s CarbFix injects dissolved carbon dioxide into basalt, where over 95% turns to stone within two years. India’s Deccan Trap basalts are similar;
      • Carbon Iceland, JSW Steel and Bharatia signed a memorandum on an e-methanol project in Raigad, turning steel emissions into fuel with green hydrogen;
      • the gain lies in technology licensing and co-developed projects, not equipment exports.
    3. Fisheries processing: Icelandic firms plan to process North Atlantic catch in India under TEPA. Iceland uses about 90% of each cod, far more than most fishing nations.

    How does Iceland link India to the Arctic and to Europe?

    1. Arctic Council: Iceland is a founding member of the Arctic Council, the forum of the eight Arctic States. India has been an Observer since 2013.
    2. India’s Arctic engagement: India published its Arctic Policy in 2022 and runs the Himadri station in Svalbard. Iceland offers it a direct bilateral channel into Arctic research.
    3. Complement to the EU deal: TEPA complements, not rivals, the European Union (EU)-India Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Together the two pacts give India more than either alone, “one plus one equalling three“.

    Challenges

    1. Investment promise unproven: Turning the investment pledge into ground-level projects remains a bureaucratic challenge.
    2. Standards barriers: Strict European sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) rules on food safety and plant health hold back Indian farm exports.
    3. Investor caution: Norwegian pension funds have hesitated to invest in India over perceived regulatory unpredictability.
    4. Thin logistics links: Few direct shipping and air-cargo routes raise freight costs.

    Way Forward

    1. Investment tracker: The Ministry of Commerce and Industry should publish yearly EFTA investment and jobs data.
    2. Pension fund outreach: India should court Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global for Indian green bonds.
    3. Geothermal mapping: The Ministry of New and Renewable Energy should map Himalayan direct-use sites on the Tapri model.
    4. Joint storage pilots: DST and public sector firms should run basalt storage pilots with Icelandic partners.

    Conclusion

    TEPA’s worth will be judged by the plants and jobs it seeds, not by tariff schedules. Whether its investment chapter turns geothermal, carbon capture and fisheries ideas into bankable ventures will decide if the European pacts truly add up.

    Key numbers

    1. Jobs target: one million direct jobs to be facilitated under TEPA.
    2. CCUS potential: about 750 million tonnes of carbon dioxide a year by 2050 (NITI Aayog, 2022).
    3. CCUS Budget outlay: Rs 20,000 crore over five years (Union Budget, February).
    4. Raigad e-methanol project: 3,00,000 tonnes a year.
    5. First carbon-to-fuel plant: George Olah plant, Svartsengi, Iceland, making methanol since 2011-12.

  • Rising sea level threat to India’s eroding coastline

    Why in the News

    India’s coastal no-build strip is still measured from today’s high-tide line, even as the shoreline retreats and the sea rises faster. The UN General Assembly (UNGA) has adopted its first ever declaration on rising sea levels, asking nations to build sea-level rise projections into coastal infrastructure planning.

    What does the UN declaration settle about statehood?

    1. Montevideo test: The 1933 Montevideo Convention defines a State by a permanent population, defined territory, government and capacity to enter into relations with other states. A sinking country risks failing the territory test.
    2. Continued statehood: The declaration’s “presumption in favour of continued statehood” lets a sinking country keep its sovereignty, UN seat and nautical boundaries. It works like a title deed that survives the flood.
    3. Displaced people: Countries must protect the human rights of those who lose homes. Eg. Over a third of Tuvalu‘s 11,000 people have sought Australian climate visas.
    4. The takeaway: Sinking island nations such as Tuvalu, Kiribati and the Maldives keep their legal existence.

    What does India gain from a pledge meant for small islands?

    1. India’s stand: India backed stable maritime zones and reaffirmed “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”: those who caused more warming and can pay more should do more.
    2. Island count: A 2023-24 remeasurement counts 1,298 offshore islands and islets.
    3. Island boundaries: Lakshadweep and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands push India’s sea boundaries into the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal, so fixed boundaries protect India too.

    Is India’s coastal law ready for a retreating shore?

    1. Eroding shoreline: The National Centre for Coastal Research (NCCR) found about a third of the mainland shoreline eroding.
    2. CRZ no-build strip: The Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) Notification, 2019 bars new building within 50 metres of the high-tide line in dense rural areas and 200 metres elsewhere.
    3. Moving baseline: The high-tide line marks today’s highest spring tide, so on the fastest-eroding stretches a house at the 50-metre edge reaches the water in about ten years.
    4. Unused hazard line: The Survey of India‘s hazard line factors in sea level rise, but the 2019 rules use it only for disaster management and land-use planning.

    Where does India fall short on people already displaced?

    1. Vanishing islands: In the Sundarbans, Ghoramara island has lost about half its area in five decades.
    2. Repeat displacement: Families who moved to Ghoramara from the vanished Lohachara island were displaced again within a decade, without secure tenure or livelihoods.
    3. No legal category: Indian law does not recognise people who lose land gradually to erosion, so each relocation is decided case by case.
    4. People at risk: A Frontiers in Marine Science review puts 45 million Indians at risk by 2050.
    5. Fiji’s model: Fiji wrote relocation into its Climate Change Act in 2021, backed by a trust fund.

    Challenges

    1. Locked-in rise: A UN brief finds seas will keep rising for centuries to millennia even at net zero.
    2. Adaptation finance gap: Developing countries’ adaptation needs far exceed the international public finance available.
    3. Distant finance goal: At the Baku summit, India called the new goal of $300 billion a year by 2035 “too little and too distant”.

    Way Forward

    1. Hazard-line baseline: Measure the no-build strip from the hazard line, or widen it by local erosion rates before the UN review due by September 2030.
    2. Erosion displacement law: Give families displaced by erosion land title and livelihood support by law.
    3. Finance diplomacy: Press for “timely and predictable disbursement” of adaptation finance at COP31 in Antalya in November.

    Conclusion

    The UN has secured sinking States’ legal future, but India’s coastal rules still plan against a shoreline moving inland. Whether the no-build strip moves to the hazard line before the next UN review will test India’s readiness.

    Key numbers

    1. Sea-level rise rate (World Meteorological Organization): 2.1 mm a year in 1993-2002, 4.7 mm in 2015-2024; a record 6 mm in 2024 alone.
    2. Rise by 2100 (‘Surging Seas in a Warming World’, 2024): about 38 cm at lowest emissions, about 77 cm if emissions keep climbing.
    3. Erosion (NCCR, 1990-2016): 234 sq km lost, 231 sq km gained; nearly 400 km retreating over 5 metres a year and 225 km by 3 to 5 metres; over 170 km of West Bengal in the fastest category.
    4. Adaptation finance (UN Environment Programme): needs over $310 billion a year by 2035; $26 billion of international public finance in 2023.
    5. India’s coastline (2023-24 remeasurement): 11,098 km.
    6. Ghoramara island area (Sundarbans): about 7.2 sq km shrinking to 3.6 sq km.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2020] Which one of the following statements best describes the term ‘Social Cost of Carbon’? It is a measure, in monetary value, of the (a) long-term damage done by a tonne of CO2, emissions in a given year. (b) requirement of fossil fuels for a country to provide goods and services to its citizens, (c) efforts put in by a climate refugee to adapt to live in a new place. (d) contribution of an individual person to the carbon footprint on the planet Earth. Answer: (a)”

  • In aftermath of BRICS, going back to Bandung

    Why in the News

    The 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi earlier this month produced a 140-point declaration that, in places, echoes the anti-colonial Bandung agenda. The debate is whether BRICS can inherit the mission of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and whether India, leaning towards Washington, can lead the Global South.

    What did Bandung and NAM stand for?

    1. Bandung Conference: In April 1955, leaders of 29 newly independent Asian and African countries met at Bandung, Indonesia. They agreed on ten principles, chiefly:
      • sovereignty and non-interference;
      • refusal to join great-power military blocs;
      • support for peoples under colonial rule.
    2. Non-Aligned Movement: Six years later, at Belgrade, this became NAM, a platform for decolonisation. It backed Algeria, Vietnam, the anti-apartheid struggle and the Palestinians.
    3. New International Economic Order (NIEO): In the 1970s, NAM took to the United Nations (UN) a demand for fair commodity prices, technology access and a voice in global institutions.
    4. Loss of direction: India was NAM’s founder and moral centre. After the Soviet Union collapsed, many members, India included, drifted towards the United States (US).
    5. The takeaway: NAM survives only in name, so BRICS is judged as its possible heir.

    What did the New Delhi declaration say, and leave unsaid?

    1. BRICS reach: Formed in 2009, BRICS now represents more than half of humanity.
    2. Bandung echoes: The declaration seeks reform of the UN Security Council, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and World Trade Organization (WTO). It also backs:
      • an end to the blockade of Cuba;
      • a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as capital;
      • climate finance for countries that did not cause the crisis.
    3. Not NAM’s heir: BRICS members have different systems and interests, and several are close US partners.
    4. Silences of consensus: The declaration condemns “unilateral coercive measures” and urges “maximum restraint” in West Asia. It names neither who imposes them nor the aggressor.

    Why does BRICS’s limited project still matter?

    1. Reform, not rupture: BRICS seeks more than one centre of power, not an end to domination. It would reform the US dollar’s dominance but is silent on poor nations’ debt.
    2. Shield against coercion: When tariffs become weapons and sanctions on one country disrupt many, alternatives give governments room:
      • trade in national currencies;
      • development finance without strings;
      • a reserve arrangement, a pooled emergency fund, outside the IMF.
    3. Strength in numbers: A larger, stronger BRICS makes it harder for one power to dictate terms.

    Can India lead the Global South while leaning towards Washington?

    1. Junior partner charge: The critique holds that India acts as a “junior partner” of the US, deepening military and trade arrangements aimed at containing China.
    2. West Asia contradiction: India embraces Israel strategically yet signed the Palestinian statehood text. Surveys across West Asia rank Israel and the US as the region’s greatest threats.
    3. Selective silence: India has been silent on US actions against Iran, Venezuela and Cuba, and has not clearly condemned the destruction of Gaza.
    4. Hidden poverty: Before the summit, the capital’s slums were screened from view.
    5. Return to Bandung: The critique urges a return to Bandung’s idea of peoples’ right to decide their own destinies:
      • freedom from US pressure;
      • solidarity with Palestine and opposition to sanctions;
      • payment of climate debt to poorer nations;
      • a BRICS that is more than a lobby.

    Challenges

    1. India-China rivalry: Border friction between India and China limits BRICS’s strategic cohesion.
    2. Expansion without criteria: A larger BRICS risks becoming a talk shop, as NAM did.
    3. Dollar dependence: The US dollar still settles over 80% of global trade, so de-dollarisation is slow.

    Way Forward

    1. Membership criteria: BRICS should set formal criteria for full and partner membership.
    2. Stronger bank: Members should raise the capital of the New Development Bank (NDB) and widen its Global South lending.
    3. Debt agenda: BRICS should take up sovereign debt relief.
    4. Consistent positions: India should judge unilateral actions by one standard, whoever acts.

    Conclusion

    BRICS offers the Global South a hedge against coercion, not the anti-colonial programme Bandung and NAM carried. Whether India uses BRICS to speak for that programme, or as one more seat at the table, remains unresolved.

    About BRICS

    1. Origin: A Goldman Sachs economist coined “BRIC” in 2001. The first leaders’ summit met at Yekaterinburg, Russia.
    2. Expansion: South Africa joined in 2011. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) joined in 2024, and Indonesia a year later.
    3. NDB: Headquartered in Shanghai, the BRICS bank has approved over $35 billion in infrastructure loans.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026] Which of the following countries are members of the European Union? 1. Belarus 2. Poland 3. Germany 4. Switzerland (a) 1, 2 and 4 (b) 1 and 4 only (c) 2 and 3 (d) 2 and 4 only Answer: C”

  • [30th September 2026] The Hindu OpED: The United Nations’ long road to restoring trust

    [30th September 2026] The Hindu OpED: The United Nations’ long road to restoring trust

    Question (2025, GS2 – 15 Marks): “The reform process in the United Nations remains unresolved, because of the delicate imbalance of East and West and entanglement of the USA vs. Russo-Chinese alliance.” Examine and critically evaluate the East-West policy confrontations in this regard.
    Linkage: Directly addresses why comprehensive UN structural reform remains stalled—attributing the paralysis to major-power rivalry, veto misuse, and the unwillingness of the P5 to concede influence.

    [2026] Which of the following international conventions have NOT been ratified by India?
    1. Employment Policy Convention
    2. Abolition of Forced Labour Convention
    3. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families
    4. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
    5. Convention on Reduction of Statelessness
    (a) 2 and 4 (b) 1 and 2 (c) 3 and 4 only (d) 3, 4 and 5

    Mentor’s Comment

    The UN was built to create trust between states, and it now has to earn trust from the people it serves. Delivery is not the problem, since 98 million people were reached. The problem is that funding power, opaque oversight and skewed leadership make delivery look partisan. Each reform the article implies shifts power away from those who hold it. Donors would lose influence over recruitment and programmes. Permanent members would lose freedom on the veto. Headquarters cities would lose posts. Restoring trust therefore depends on the actors who benefit from the current arrangement agreeing to constrain themselves.

    Why in the News

    The 81st United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) held its high-level week under the theme “Restoring Trust, Managing Transformation: a UN that delivers for all”. The word “restoring” concedes that trust in the UN has collapsed, and global surveys confirm the fall.

    Why does trust matter to the UN, and how far has it fallen?

    1. Why the UN exists: Set up after the Second World War, the UN makes states’ conduct more predictable through dialogue and international law, like agreed rules in a game rivals play.
    2. What went wrong: Over three decades, the UN went from building trust between parties in peacebuilding to needing to restore trust in itself.
    3. Falling confidence: Edelman Trust and Pew surveys found declining trust. In a UN Foundation poll, 52 per cent want deep structural reform, saying the UN struggles to deliver.
    4. Doubts on leadership: Only 58 per cent think the UN can lead on global problems (Rockefeller Foundation and Focaldata poll), possibly a historic low.
    5. The takeaway: The UN’s authority rests on states and publics trusting it, so falling trust weakens its ability to broker peace.

    What are the four reasons for the loss of trust?

    1. Security Council deadlock: UN Security Council (UNSC) paralysis eroded the Assembly’s trust, so it passed resolution A/76/262 requiring permanent members to explain each veto.
    2. Integrity and oversight gaps: Scandals were blamed on individuals, and systemic accountability was seldom addressed:
      • a procurement scandal in Afghanistan (2013);
      • sexual exploitation and abuse cases involving peacekeepers (2017);
      • contracts for non-existent housing projects in Ghana and India (2021).
    3. Donor capture: A few countries give extra-budgetary grants, voluntary money outside the regular budget, and use them to place their nationals and back cherry-picked programmes:
      • the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), the UN’s top financial watchdog, found one government sponsoring eight of nine experts in one agency;
      • spending data reach donor governments, not beneficiary publics;
      • fear of upsetting donors has made staff risk-averse on conflict prevention.
    4. Global South under-representation: Most programmes run in the Global South, where trust is higher, but power sits elsewhere:
      • developing nations hold 84 per cent of the world’s population but 44 per cent of UN civil service leadership posts;
      • only a third of UN leaders in Africa are African, and two-fifths of UN headquarters cities are in the Global South;
      • posts moved out of New York and Geneva in 2025 to cut costs largely bypassed Global South cities.

    Where does the UN still deliver, and where does it fall short?

    1. Humanitarian reach: The UN aided and protected 98 million people in 2025-26. Aid quality and funds reaching local actors remain weak.
    2. Tactical wins: In the wars in Ukraine, Gaza and Iran, the UN kept Black Sea grain exports flowing and prevented a Red Sea oil spill.
    3. Peacemaking gap: It could not turn that goodwill into mechanisms for belligerents to talk, because peacemaking initiative is centralised at the top of the bureaucracy.

    Challenges

    1. Costless vetoes: Explaining a veto carries no penalty, so permanent members keep blocking action. Eg. Ukraine and Gaza.
    2. Liquidity crisis: Unpaid assessed contributions, members’ compulsory dues, deepen dependence on earmarked donor funds.
    3. Weak accountability: No independent system holds senior managers answerable for systemic failures.
    4. Minilateralism: States bypass the UN for smaller groupings. Eg. the Quad, BRICS.

    Way Forward

    1. Public transparency: UN entities should publish programme spending to beneficiary publics, not only to donors.
    2. People-centred ties: The UN should rebuild ties with people, not only governments.
    3. Equitable staffing: The Secretariat should set Global South leadership targets and relocate posts to Global South hubs.
    4. Decentralised peacemaking: The Secretary-General should let field envoys open talks without waiting for headquarters.

    Conclusion

    The UN’s crisis of trust stems less from failed delivery than from how it is governed: who decides, who pays and who answers for failure. Whether the promised “transformation” opens UN leadership and finances to the Global South will decide if trust returns.

    About UN Security Council reform

    1. G4 bid: India, Brazil, Japan and Germany seek expansion of both permanent and non-permanent seats.
    2. Amendment hurdle (Article 108): An amendment needs two-thirds of the Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of members, including all five permanent members.
    3. Rival blocs: The Uniting for Consensus group, including Pakistan, Italy and Mexico, wants only non-permanent seats added. Africa’s Ezulwini Consensus seeks at least two permanent seats with veto.
    4. Stalled talks: The 2026 session of the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) ended without consensus on a framework for expansion.

  • Gender disparities in contraceptive use and sterilisation

    Why in the News

    For the first time, the World Health Organization (WHO) has set benchmarks for reversible male contraceptives, challenging a pattern in which India has met its fertility goals while leaving contraception almost wholly to women. The new guidelines widen the choice of methods beyond those women use.

    What do the new WHO guidelines change?

    1. What they are: The guidelines widen contraceptive options. They set benchmarks that reversible male methods, ones a man can stop to regain fertility, must meet, like a product standard for developers.
    2. Why now: WHO research has challenged the assumption that men would not use new contraceptives.
    3. Choice as equality: WHO’s director for sexual and reproductive health called choice a gender equality issue.
    4. Imbalance in India: Women increasingly carry the burden of both temporary and permanent contraception, so falling fertility has not shifted any of it to men.
    5. The takeaway: Better male methods give India a practical way to share contraceptive responsibility.

    What does NFHS-6 show on contraceptive use?

    1. Unmet need: Fertility is below replacement level. The National Family Health Survey (NFHS-6) for 2023-24 finds unmet need, married women who want to avoid pregnancy but use no method, down one percentage point.
    2. More use overall: Married women using any method rose from 66.7% to 69.1% since NFHS-5.
    3. Modern methods decline: Modern methods, such as pills, intrauterine devices, condoms and sterilisation, fell from 56.4% to 52.7%.
    4. Traditional methods rise: Rhythm and withdrawal rose 6 percentage points, the largest rise of any method. Possible factors are fear of side-effects, privacy, partner preference and access.

    How lopsided is sterilisation?

    1. Female sterilisation: Its use eased from 37.9% to 36.5%, after climbing quickly between NFHS-1 and NFHS-3.
    2. Male sterilisation: Only 0.5% reported it in NFHS-6, down from 3.4% in NFHS-1.
    3. State pattern: Male sterilisation rose in 22 States, but only Telangana gained over one percentage point. States that reached a low Total Fertility Rate (TFR) early were no exception.

    Why has vasectomy become marginal, and why does it matter?

    1. From visible to marginal: As India reached replacement fertility, vasectomy shrank from a visible method to a marginal one, so the goal was met through women.
    2. Simpler procedure for men: Female sterilisation is not unsafe, but ending fertility is less invasive for men and needs only local anaesthesia.

    Challenges

    1. Social norms: Contraception is seen as a woman’s task, and fears about masculinity keep men from vasectomy.
    2. Programmes built around women: Family planning has long relied on female sterilisation camps. Eg. The 2014 Bilaspur camp deaths, Chhattisgarh.
    3. Few male options: Men have only condoms and vasectomy, since reversible male methods are still in development.

    Way Forward

    1. Adopt WHO benchmarks: India should use the WHO guidelines to address the gender imbalance, with the Central Drugs Standard Control Organisation aligning approval rules for male methods.
    2. Counsel men: Train Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHAs) to counsel men on vasectomy.
    3. Address side-effect fears: Counsel women on modern methods so they do not drift to less reliable ones.

    Conclusion

    India has reached its fertility goal without sharing the burden of contraception between women and men. What to watch is whether family planning programmes adopt WHO’s benchmarks for male methods.

    Key numbers

    1. Male sterilisation, NFHS-5: 0.3% (2019-21).
    2. Female sterilisation since NFHS-3: about 36 to 38%.

    Back2Basics: Total Fertility Rate

    1. What it is: TFR is the average number of children a woman would bear in her lifetime at current age-specific birth rates.
    2. Replacement level: About 2.1, above 2 because some children die young and slightly more boys are born.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS1, 15 marks] Critically examine the challenges of demographic transition in contemporary India.”

  • UN Sea Level Declaration

    Why in the News

    A country’s legal existence no longer depends on its coastline: under the Declaration on Sea Level Rise, low lying states threatened by rising seas keep their statehood and maritime zones even if their coasts retreat inland. The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted the Declaration by consensus.

    What does the Declaration protect?

    1. What it is: The Declaration is a political statement by all UN members on responding to rising seas, like a guarantee that a country’s legal existence outlasts its shoreline.
    2. Statehood preserved: Low lying countries such as Fiji, Tuvalu and Vanuatu keep their statehood, sovereign rights and UN membership.
    3. Maritime zones fixed: Sea zones under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) are measured from the coast. The Declaration keeps them defined even as coasts retreat, so a shrinking shoreline does not shrink a country’s sea.
    4. Citizens’ rights: If the sea swallows a country’s territory, its citizens still keep their nationality and economic rights.
    5. The takeaway: A state can now lose its land without losing its legal existence, its seas or its people’s citizenship.

    How does the Declaration organise action?

    1. Origin: A 2024 high-level meeting gave members a mandate to negotiate an action oriented agreement. This Declaration is the result.
    2. Four areas of action: The four page text groups action under four heads:
      • science and data;
      • adaptation and financing;
      • livelihoods, socio-economic development, data sharing and early warnings;
      • the legal consequences of sea-level rise.
    3. People centred response: It asks countries to respond in ways that protect livelihoods and cultural heritage, involving affected communities.
    4. Continued engagement: Members commit to keep engaging on the issue, including a high-level meeting before the 84th session of the General Assembly ends.

    Why do island states need these assurances?

    1. Existential threat: Rising seas threaten to swallow most or all of the habitable territory of low lying island states in the coming decades.
    2. Collective voice: These states negotiate together as the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) in forums including the Conference of the Parties (COP), the annual UN climate summit.
    3. Pace of rise: Global mean sea level is currently rising by about 4 to 5 mm a year.

    Challenges

    1. Not binding: A General Assembly declaration is a political commitment, not a treaty, so it creates no enforceable obligation.
    2. Legal survival is not physical survival: Retained statehood does not stop the flooding and salt intrusion that make atolls uninhabitable.
    3. Adaptation finance gap: Small islands cannot fund sea walls, raised land or relocation from their own budgets.
    4. Narrow migration routes: Pathways for displaced islanders remain small and bilateral. Eg. The Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union treaty (2023).

    Way Forward

    1. Codify in law: The International Law Commission should carry its work on sea-level rise into a binding instrument on statehood and maritime zones.
    2. Deposit baselines now: Island states should deposit their baseline coordinates with the UN Secretary-General, so their zones stay fixed as coasts move.
    3. Grant based adaptation finance: Channel grants to small island states through the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage.
    4. Early warning coverage: Extend the UN Early Warnings for All initiative to every low lying coast.
    5. India’s island partnerships: India should use the Infrastructure for Resilient Island States initiative to back these measures.

    Conclusion

    The Declaration settles what happens in law to a drowning state, but leaves the physical and financial question unanswered. The next test is whether the follow up meeting converts political assurance into binding law and money for adaptation.

    Back2Basics: UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

    1. What it is: The treaty adopted in 1982, in force since 1994, that sets the rules for using the world’s oceans and their resources.
    2. Maritime zones: A coastal state’s territorial sea runs up to 12 nautical miles and its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) up to 200 nautical miles.
    3. Institutions: It created the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the International Seabed Authority.
    4. India: India ratified UNCLOS in 1995.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2020] Which one of the following statements best describes the term ‘Social Cost of Carbon’? It is a measure, in monetary value, of the (a) long-term damage done by a tonne of CO2, emissions in a given year. (b) requirement of fossil fuels for a country to provide goods and services to its citizens, (c) efforts put in by a climate refugee to adapt to live in a new place. (d) contribution of an individual person to the carbon footprint on the planet Earth. Answer: (a)”

  • External Affairs Minister tells UN General Assembly that bids to claim immunity for terrorism will not stand

    Why in the News

    India told the United Nations General Assembly that attempts to normalise terrorism and claim immunity from its consequences will not stand. Pakistan’s Prime Minister had raised Kashmir there a day earlier and called India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty an act of war.

    What is the Indus Waters Treaty and why is it in abeyance?

    1. River division: The treaty divides the Indus basin rivers between India and Pakistan, working like a title deed over river water.
    2. Origin in Partition: Partition left the works feeding the canals in India and the irrigated land in Pakistan, so the two signed in 1960 with the World Bank as a signatory.
    3. What changed: India put the treaty in abeyance after the Pahalgam terror attack of April 2025, stopping performance without ending it. Revival needs Pakistan credibly ending cross border terrorism.
    4. The takeaway: India has tied Pakistan’s water share to ending terrorism, so a water settlement now turns on behaviour rather than geography.

    What did India put to the Assembly on terrorism?

    1. Serial practitioner charge: India named Pakistan a serial practitioner of terrorism.
    2. State sponsorship of terrorism: India called terrorism with state backing and cross border reach a direct affront to the global order, and said sponsoring governments must be held accountable.
    3. Self defence and terror financing: India said it will exercise self defence, that friendship cannot coexist with terrorism and that terror financing must be exposed.

    How did India answer the Kashmir claim?

    1. Right of Reply: India answered through the Right of Reply, a state’s short answer to another’s speech at the Assembly.
    2. Territorial position restated: India described Jammu and Kashmir as an Indian Union Territory, an integral and inalienable part of India.
    3. Plebiscite claim rejected: Pakistan asked the United Nations to deliver a plebiscite, a vote on which country a territory joins. India rejected that and the alleged demographic change.
    4. The counter charge: India recalled that the 9/11 mastermind lived beside Pakistan’s premier army academy, and said Pakistan claims to uphold security by day and carries out terrorism by night.
    5. Rights inside Pakistan: India pointed to killings in Rawalakot in Pakistan occupied Kashmir and to the treatment of minorities there.

    What does the weaponisation of everything mean?

    1. Weaponisation of everything: India used the phrase for economic links turned into instruments of pressure, so countries far from the West Asia, Russia Ukraine and Israel Gaza conflicts are penalised.
    2. Chokepoints in six domains: Extreme competition creates chokepoints, single points others must pass through, in finance, market access, supply chains, technology, resources and connectivity.
    3. Tariffs on Russian energy buyers: A new United States law authorises tariffs up to 100 per cent on Russian energy buyers, including India, so nations are de risking and diversifying.
    4. Global South and sea lanes: Developing countries face a 4F crisis, insecurity of food, fuel, fertiliser and finance. India has lost over 10 seafarers in the Strait of Hormuz and Black Sea.
    5. Stability, security and predictability: Peace is more than the absence of war, and weakens if stability, security or predictability is undermined.

    Challenges

    1. Abeyance has no treaty basis: The treaty carries no clause letting one side suspend it, so the step rests on political decision.
    2. Limited physical leverage: India lacks the storage and diversion capacity on the western rivers to change flows quickly.
    3. Assembly statements bind nobody: A General Assembly speech creates no obligation, so accountability depends on other forums.

    Way Forward

    1. Build what the treaty allows: Complete the storage and power projects the treaty already permits on the western rivers.
    2. Terror financing route: Take Pakistan’s record to the Financial Action Task Force, which grades countries on countering terror financing.
    3. Secure the sea lanes jointly: Expand naval escort cooperation and attack reporting with Indian Ocean partners.

    Conclusion

    The Assembly exchange has turned a water sharing treaty into counter terrorism pressure. Watch whether another member state adopts that condition, because pressure applied alone can be waited out.

    Back2Basics: Indus Waters Treaty

    1. Rivers to each side: The Ravi, Beas and Sutlej go to India, the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab to Pakistan.
    2. What India may still do: India may use the western rivers for non consumptive purposes, limited irrigation and run of the river power, which stores no water.
    3. How a dispute is settled: The Permanent Indus Commission handles questions first, differences go to a Neutral Expert and disputes to a Court of Arbitration.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2016, GS1, 12.5 marks] Present an account of the Indus Water Treaty and examine its ecological, economic and political implications in the context of changing bilateral relations.”